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Abstract 
Amidst the worst disaster to impact a major U.S. city in one hundred years, New Orleans’ main 
trauma and safety net medical center, the Reverend Avery C. Alexander Charity Hospital, was 
permanently closed. Charity’s administrative operator, Louisiana State University (LSU), 
ordered an end to its attempted reopening by its workers and U.S. military personnel in the 
weeks following the August 29, 2005 storm. Drawing upon rigorous review of literature and an 
exhaustive analysis of primary and secondary data, this case study found that Charity Hospital 
was closed as a result of disaster capitalism. LSU, backed by Louisiana state officials, took 
advantage of the mass internal displacement of New Orleans’ populace in the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina in an attempt to abandon Charity Hospital’s iconic but neglected facility and 
to supplant its original safety net mission serving the poor and uninsured for its neoliberal 
transformation to favor LSU’s academic medical enterprise. 
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Introduction  
               Amidst the worst disaster to impact a major city in the United States in one hundred 
years, New Orleans’ Reverend Avery C. Alexander Charity Hospital was permanently closed. 
The twenty story Art Deco public health landmark commonly referred to as “Charity” served as 
southeast Louisiana’s main trauma center, the teaching hospital for several colleges and 
universities, and the healthcare provider of last resort for the poor and uninsured. 
               Within one day of Hurricane Katrina’s August 29, 2005 landfall, conditions at Charity 
rapidly deteriorated from its operation as a modern urban safety net hospital. It quickly became a 
Third World facility hobbled without electricity, air conditioning and running water. As in much 
of New Orleans, Charity’s patients, staff and their families were literally marooned for days 
awaiting rescue. Some died awaiting that rescue. Everyone endured great hardship and 
discomfort as the languid summer heat inundated the hospital as floodwaters swelled outside. 
Evacuation of Charity’s patients, staff and their families, finally completed five days later – left 
behind a shuttered building representing nearly three centuries of healthcare tradition. 
               Charity Hospital’s closure in the wake of Hurricane Katrina forced the layoff of nearly 
all of its 3,600 workers. Graduate training programs were destabilized, leading to the disruption 
of the education of students and medical residents. The finances of the area’s remaining private 
and non-state hospitals hemorrhaged due to overnight inundation with impoverished patients that 
Charity would have normally seen. Many primary care practices and outpatient health centers 
citywide, already decimated by flood damage and the dislocation of their patient base, also lost 
the only hospital which would accept their referrals. Charity’s closure also compromised 
emergency trauma services and psychiatric crisis intervention – leaving a fractured response to 
cope with New Orleans’ staggeringly high levels of depression, mental illness, and suicide. 
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               The doctors, staff and residents of Charity’s emergency department nevertheless 
attempted to reopen the hospital following the storm evacuation of its patients. They almost 
succeeded. Joined by several U.S. military units and international response teams, key 
operational services of Charity were readied for interim use within one month of Hurricane 
Katrina. In spite of this heroic effort, Charity Hospital’s administrative operator, the Louisiana 
State University Health Care Services Division (LSU-HCSD or LSU), deemed the facility unfit 
for medical use to reopen. Instead of expeditiously repairing and reopening New Orleans’ main 
trauma center in the wake of the storm, hospital administrators, backed by state officials 
including Governor Kathleen Blanco halted – then cancelled – a disaster recovery operation. 
               Ordered under the threat of arrest to end their attempted hospital resurrection, Charity 
workers were forced instead to practice medicine in hastily-erected MASH-style tents located 
five blocks away from the campus they had restored just days before. Thus began an odyssey of 
makeshift disaster trauma medicine – resulting in a still-fractured New Orleans healthcare system 
unable to fully restore its acute care capabilities back to even pre-storm levels.  
               This thesis considers the closure of Charity Hospital as well as the future vitality of the 
state hospital system it spawned. Developing over almost three centuries out of the European 
almshouse tradition to yield modern medicine, Charity’s now-shuttered downtown New Orleans 
hospital became the emblematic flagship of iconic populist Huey P. Long’s Share Our Wealth 
commitment to the poor and dispossessed. Charity and its inspired network of Louisiana public 
hospitals – a holdover remnant of Keynesian New Deal-era policies – have also endured through 
decades of institutional neglect and cannibalization of its assets for private medical interests. Yet 
only now has Charity Hospital been seriously challenged – by authorities taking advantage of the 
epic catastrophe sparked by Hurricane Katrina – to permanently supplant its historic mission. 
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Theoretical Foundation   
               Consideration of the closure of Charity Hospital following Hurricane Katrina 
sociologically demands a deeper explanatory investigation rooted within a theoretical 
foundation. Yin (2009, p. 36) suggests that, far from having to develop a “grand theory” of 
immense scope and proportion, “the simple goal is to have a sufficient blueprint” for a study. 
Yin, citing Sutton and Staw (1995, p. 378), states “this requires theoretical propositions [to 
convey] a story about why acts, events, structure, and thoughts occur.”   
               Creswell (2009, p.51) defines theory as “an interrelated set of constructs (or variables) 
formed into propositions, or hypotheses, that specify the relationship among variables (typically 
in terms of magnitude or direction).” In this study, the proposition is “New Orleans’ Charity 
Hospital was closed as a result of disaster capitalism, to supplant its original mission, for its 
neoliberal transformation to favor LSU’s academic medical enterprise.” The stated proposition is 
examined through the review and analysis of literature, data and participant observation. 
               The theoretical parameter for this study starts from its subject of investigation – namely 
the conflict between efforts of New Orleans’ Charity Hospital’s doctors, medical residents and 
the U.S. military to reopen Charity after Hurricane Katrina as the city was virtually emptied of its 
population; and direct actions of Louisiana State University (LSU) and the State of Louisiana to 
forbid the hospital’s reopening. Reallocation of Charity’s capital assets away from its historic 
mission to treat the medically indigent to favor LSU’s graduate medical education for a private 
healthcare marketplace completes the theoretical limit of this case study’s research proposition. 
               Abercrombie, Hill and Turner (1994, p. 80) roots conflict theory in free market 
competition for “resources or advantages desired by others.” This is expressed through the 
mobilization of economic “power resources” out of which social conflict arises. 
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              Conflict theory is also the leading theoretical construct for the discipline of medical 
sociology. Characterized as the sociology of healthcare access and delivery, this thesis draws 
from this scholarship to explore research questions arising out of Charity Hospital’s closure. 
               Matcha (2000) observed the confluence of medical sociology and conflict theory: 
Medicine is more than a biological interpretation of symptoms. For 
instance, medicine involves the values of the health-care provider and 
the patient, as well as the resultant consequences associated with the 
similarities or differences of these values (p. 17).  
 
               Weitz (2001) notes medical sociology frames “problems as public issues rather than 
merely personal troubles.” She cited C. Wright Mills’ critique of the division between “troubles” 
and “issues” through comparison of an individual patient’s experience where issues transcend the 
personal into the larger structural realm, whether in a hospital or in society (p. 5). Referencing 
conflict theory, Weitz also said that the sociology of medicine “often challenges both medical 
views of the world and existing power relationships within healthcare” (p. 9). Weitz writes that 
hospitals once “functioned as total institutions, in which patients traded individual rights for 
health care,” (p. 291) but “the bureaucratic nature and large size of modern hospitals, coupled 
with the highly technological nature of hospital care, often means the patient as individual person 
and not just diseased body gets lost” (p. 296).  
               Brown (1989) addresses the polarity of health, illness, politics, economics and culture:  
Health and illness cannot be understood by simply looking at 
biological phenomena and medical knowledge. Rather, it is necessary 
to situate health and illness in the framework of larger political, 
economic, and cultural forces (p. v). 
 
               Considering deeper these dimensions in the context of the conflict over Charity 
Hospital’s closure following Hurricane Katrina, this thesis extends its social conflict theoretical 
foundation to include the related paradigms of neoliberalism and disaster capitalism. 
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               Harvey (2005) contextualizes neoliberalism within its economic basis: 
Neoliberalism in the first instance (is) a theory of political economic 
practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced 
by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an 
institutional framework characterized by strong private property 
rights, free markets, and free trade (p. 2).   
 
               Horton (2007, p.1) etymologically links “neo” to neo-classical free market economics 
emerging in the late nineteenth century; “Liberal” signifies freedom from governmental 
intervention. Harvey (p. 19) noted that neoliberal conceptions of freedom have served only as the 
theoretical legitimating of a merger of the public sphere into the private sphere, reducing daily 
life into quantified financial transactions to advance capital accumulation above all life pursuits, 
“in short, the financialization of everything” (p. 33).  
               Coining the term medical neoliberalism, Jill Fisher (2007, pp. 64-65) said this variant 
also emphasizes “a cultural sensibility toward the commodification of health and wellness.” No 
longer seen as a necessity, healthcare under medical neoliberalism “transforms individuals from 
patients to consumers.” Rather than holistically considering one’s actual health needs within the 
healthcare system, the emphasis is placed upon individualizing the health experience “in terms of 
opportunities for [consumer] choice” – the choice to purchase health services like commodities – 
leading “to a prioritization of choice over equity and access” – as well as an altered landscape for 
doctors and hospitals to favor privatization. Fisher noted this impact: 
The changing structure of payment for medical services had profound 
effects on the culture of medicine. For example, it can be said to have 
undermined the authority of physicians, who under managed care 
must adhere to the rules of medical diagnostics and treatments set by 
insurance providers … Ultimately, managed care played a key role in 
the commodification of health care. By assigning values and 
standards to clinical practice, medicine became less a social good and 
more a set of commodities to which individual patients have 
differential degrees of access (pp. 65-66). 
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               Focusing on the “internal disagreement” liberals themselves have apart from 
conservatives over healthcare delivery and access, Bodenheimer (2005) argued that the 
neoliberal paradigm simultaneously judges healthcare as a human necessity; yet one that also 
affords it to be most efficiently delivered through private capital, by marshalling public resources 
in order to achieve the fullest and most productive economic and social results. Bodenheimer 
suggests that under this rationality, government health assistance programs like traditional 
Medicare and Louisiana’s Charity hospitals are expected to incorporate private mechanisms to 
manage and distribute otherwise intrinsic public benefits, because market competition is 
expected to produce the strongest program for the best price.                 
               Klein (2007, pp. 14-15) said “the ideology [of neoliberalism] is a shape-shifter, forever 
changing its name and switching identities.” U.S. adherents “who associated liberals with high 
taxes and hippies,” identify themselves as “conservatives,” “classical economists” and 
“neoconservatives.” Fathered by Nobel Prize-winning economist and self-identified classical 
liberal Milton Friedman, Klein (pp. 17-19) suggests neoliberalism is a return to classic pre-
Keynesian liberalism fused with “corporatism” through forced economic and political “shocks.” 
               Extending neoliberalism into the post-modern global capitalism realm, Naomi Klein’s 
2007 book THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, popularized the second 
variant of conflict theory considered within this thesis. Klein defines disaster capitalism as the 
use of a disaster or major event for the deliberate re-engineering of economic, political and 
community spheres to create capital investment opportunities while affected populations are 
internally displaced. Klein suggests that disaster capitalism transforms crisis relief and social 
reconstruction to reflect neoliberal values, defying any attempt to return to simply restoring what 
was before the calamity. Instead, this “reconstruction” paradigm deconstructs what was. 
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                This thesis documents the calamitous healthcare and social impacts of the disaster 
capitalist paradigm on Charity Hospital and New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. 
Occurring with greater frequency beyond the United States over the past forty years, Bello 
(2006) has described this kind of disaster response, “influenced by neoliberal market economics, 
as promoted by the World Bank and influenced by the U.S.” as the Relief and Reconstruction 
Complex. Bello argues that the once dominant role played by the United Nations and the Red 
Cross in post-war and natural disaster relief and reconstruction has been overtaken by a “brand 
of ‘humanitarianism’ (that) has put strategic considerations before people’s needs.” Bello, citing 
Klein (2005), recalls another attempt to “fast track” privatization of public services following the 
1998 disastrous Hurricane Mitch in the Central American nation of Honduras, “while the country 
was still knee deep in rubble, corpses and mud.” This ‘reconstruction’ has now come to define a 
First World disaster response, with the closure of Charity Hospital amongst its first acts. 
                The attempt to reopen Charity Hospital by its doctors, medical residents and U.S. 
military personnel in the weeks following Hurricane Katrina, in defiance of LSU and the State of 
Louisiana signals just the most dominant theoretical conflict explored in this case study. Indeed, 
from discussions of how to finance construction before this ‘Big Charity’ facility was built in 
1939, through previous attempts to close this iconic but worn hospital just a month before the 
2005 storm, this thesis explores its theoretical proposition through a social historical narrative 
and data analysis of the case of Charity’s permanent closure. It is showcased in part by this 
history; in what RMJM Hillier (2008, p. 23) termed as having national architectural, cultural, 
technological and historical significance, with its “unique model of publicly funded care for the 
poor and uninsured,” as being one of the oldest and largest safety net / teaching hospitals of its 
kind, and being emblematic of public healthcare facing restructuring by free market competition. 
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Narrative Structure of this Case Study 
               Yin (2009, pp. 175-179) explores the various ways a case story report can be structured 
as predicated by its purpose. Compositional structures include linear-analytic, comparative, 
chronological, theory-building, “suspense” and unsequenced. Synthesizing data pertaining to its 
theoretical proposition, this case study is set chronologically in a social historical narrative 
format to represent time periods in Charity Hospital’s almost 300 years of history:  
Chapter One – From Charity Hospital’s founding through Medicare and Medicaid 
This chapter reviews the social history of Charity Hospital from its 1736 founding 
through creation of the 1965 federal Medicare and Medicaid programs. Founded as a 
French colonial almshouse, Charity was the home of one of America’s first and most 
enduring medical schools, and became one of the nation’s largest safety net hospitals. 
Chapter One’s first theoretical flashpoint details Huey P. Long’s use of Charity as the 
catalyst for his challenge to the Louisiana bourbon and petrol elites (in expanding public 
health services, his creation of the LSU Medical School, and laying the groundwork for a 
statewide Charity Hospital system). Another conflict that led to the delay in construction 
of the iconic Art Deco ‘Big Charity’ building was Long’s audacious challenge to U.S. 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal with Long’s Share Our Wealth program 
towards the development of a deeper Keynesian liberal social welfare state. Chapter One 
also explores the major post-World War II federal healthcare initiatives that brought 
Charity Hospital’s raison d’être into question because of their substantial competitive 
challenge for patients as well as for federal government financial and healthcare 
resources: the 1946 Hospital Survey and Construction Act (better known as the Hill-
Burton Act), and the 1965 advent of the Medicare and Medicaid programs.  
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Chapter Two – From Medicare and Medicaid until Hurricane Katrina  
Chapter Two reviews the status of Charity and its inspired public hospital system two 
decades out from Medicare and Medicaid’s late 1960s programmatic realization. 
Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) funds, enacted by Congress to support safety net 
hospitals that took care of a disproportionate share of the poor and uninsured, initially 
promised Charity Hospital’s renewal after years of institutional neglect. But the 
siphoning of over $2 billion of these funds by Louisiana’s Medicaid program to favor 
private medicine exacerbated Charity’s crisis – even as a seemingly more focused state, 
and later, a LSU administration sought to modernize Charity’s inspired but beleaguered 
public hospital network. Spotlighted are conflicts between the Edwards’ administration 
and the Louisiana State Legislature, LSU and the Foster administration, and respective 
Louisiana Health Care Authority (LHCA) / LSU Health Care Services Division (LSU-
HCSD) plans to close New Orleans’ Charity Hospital before Hurricane Katrina. 
Chapter Three – Hurricane Katrina and Charity’s Hospital’s forced closure  
Chapter Three recounts how New Orleans’ Charity Hospital’s patients, staff and their 
families endured Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, left to fend for themselves until their 
evacuation a week after the storm. The conflict between LSU and Louisiana Governor 
Blanco and Charity’s doctors, workers, medical residents, U.S. military personnel and 
others seeking to resurrect hospital operations following Hurricane Katrina is detailed. 
Also explored are the medical consequences of keeping Charity Hospital closed in the 
months and years following the storm; as well as the dispute between the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) against the State of Louisiana’s claim that 
Charity was more than 50% damaged and thus eligible for full FEMA replacement funds.  
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Discussion – Was the closure of Charity Hospital a case of disaster capitalism? 
The Discussion Chapter considers in depth whether Charity Hospital’s closure was a case 
of disaster capitalism. Its occurrence during the height of the internal displacement of 
New Orleans’ population following Hurricane Katrina, who was disproportionately 
impacted by Charity’s closure, and its demographic and human rights implications are 
detailed. With regards to disaster capitalism’s definition as an opportunity for the 
creation of investment opportunities, this chapter highlights the Bring New Orleans Back 
Commission (BNOB) and the Louisiana Health Care Redesign Collaborative efforts to 
take advantage of Charity Hospital’s closure. Also explored in depth are LSU’s often 
contradictory motivations, in defense of Charity’s inspired statewide public hospital 
system (against critics seeking to end LSU administration) and LSU’s own calls for its 
dissolution, to supplant its historic Charity heritage for a medical neoliberal enterprise. 
Findings – Confirmation of the theoretical proposition for this case study 
The Findings Chapter summarizes the key theoretical foundational results in considering 
this case study’s conflict supposition that New Orleans’ Charity Hospital was closed as 
the result of disaster capitalism in order to supplant Charity’s original safety net mission 
in favor of LSU’s neoliberal University Medical Center academic medical enterprise. 
Epilogue – Conflict between LSU and the Jindal administration over the LSU-HCSD state 
budget appropriations recalls how broken our healthcare system is without Charity Hospital  
 
Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal and his Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH’s) 
mid-year raid of the LSU Health Care Services Division (LSU-HCSD) Fiscal Year 2011-
2012 budget to cover DHH’s own budget shortfall portends grim consequences for LSU’s 
current and future public hospital system administration; and recalls how broken our 
healthcare system is without Charity Hospital – completing the theoretical parameter. 
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Methods  
               The research strategy for this thesis is a case study. Creswell (2009, p. 13), citing Stake 
(1995), defines a case study as a rich and exhaustive description of an issue, detailed through one 
or more cases within a setting or context. Yin (2009, p. 130) suggests “the first and most 
preferred strategy is to follow the theoretical propositions that led to your case study.”  
               In Yin’s case study strategies (pp. 130-131), theoretical propositions drive the 
development of research questions; shaping the literature review and guiding the collection of 
data, “(focusing) attention on certain data and (ignoring) other data.” The theoretical proposition, 
said Yin, “also helps to organize the entire case study and to define alternative explanations to be 
examined.” Yin suggested research questions rooted in theoretical propositions emphasizing 
‘how’ and ‘why’ “can be extremely useful in guiding case study analysis.”  
               This case study is qualitative. Abercrombie, Hill and Turner (1994, p. 341) said:  
This refers to analysis which is not based on precise measurement and 
quantitative claims. Sociological analysis is frequently qualitative, 
because research aims may involve the understanding of phenomena 
in ways (requiring neither quantification nor precise measurement).  
 
               Creswell (2007, pp. 129-130) grouped qualitative data into “four basic types:” 
observations, interviews, documents and audio-visual materials. Research for this case study 
involved the collection of primary and secondary data, consisting of documents and audio-visual 
materials. 1 Free of interpretation or evaluation, primary source material document original ‘real-
time’ occurrences on which evaluative literature is later based. Secondary source material 
usually consists of “accounts written after the fact with the benefit of hindsight.” Depending on 
the context, literature and data can serve as both primary and secondary sources (University of 
Maryland Libraries 2011).  
                                                 
1
 The list of 73 literature and 519 data items utilized for this case study is available in the reference section. 
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               Collection and processing of archival data occurred in tandem and as the result of the 
literature review to explore theoretical and historical propositions of the study and to develop 
new lines of inquiry. Coding and content analysis classified data into manageable categories that 
formed the basis for development of the thesis outline, discernment of findings and drafting of 
the narrative in relation to the research questions.  
                The collection of primary and secondary data for this thesis began conscientiously in 
January 2006. During New Orleans’ first Martin Luther King, Jr. parade following Hurricane 
Katrina, a group of Tulane Medical School residents, who said they had helped clean out Charity 
Hospital, proclaimed the facility had been repaired from flood damage it received during the late 
August 2005 storm. To substantiate the claims, they passed out copies of a December 17, 2005 
article by Adam Nossiter in The New York Times entitled: “Dispute Over Historic Hospital for 
the Poor Pits Doctors against the State.” Their claims elicited my interest, as I was an outpatient 
of Charity Hospital at the time of the storm. I engaged in extensive library research and review of 
electronic databases at the University of New Orleans (UNO) Earl K. Long Library. I attended 
numerous public meetings of post-Katrina recovery and healthcare reform efforts, collecting 
publicly distributed materials. I also filed Louisiana Public Records Act requests of LSU and 
Louisiana state officials.  
               Under direction of my thesis advisor Dr. Vern Baxter, a theoretical foundation built on 
open-ended questions began to take shape. It was under Dr. Baxter’s direction that I explored 
broader areas of healthcare policy; and was introduced to the paradigm of neoliberalism – 
especially in conjunction with Klein’s exploration of disaster capitalism. This latter line of study 
was also greatly enhanced thanks to my tenure as a Student Research Assistant at the UNO 
Center for Hazards Assessment, Response and Technology (UNO-CHART) from 2006 to 2010. 
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Study Validity and Reliability  
               Concerning study validity and reliability, Yin (2009) notes “because a research design 
is supposed to represent a logical set of statements, you also can judge the quality of any given 
design according to certain logical tests.” Yin identifies case study “tactics” for validity and 
reliability testing as they apply to descriptive case studies (pp. 40-45):  
• Construct validity: Identification of correct operational measures for the concepts studied 
• Use multiple sources of evidence / in data collection 
• Establish chain of evidence / in data collection 
• Have key informants review draft case study report / in composition 
 
• External validity: defining domain of generalization of study findings  
• Use theory in single-case studies / in research design 
 
• Reliability: demonstrate study operations can be repeated for same results 
• Use case study protocol / in data collection 
• Develop case study data base / in data collection (p. 41) 
 
               This thesis uses multiple sources of evidence and establishes a chain of evidence drawn 
from historical literature and data – reflected primarily through a conflict theoretical lens to 
maintain construct validity. Ongoing discussion over specific subject areas regarding Charity 
Hospital’s closure and parallel ‘how’ and ‘why’ reasons serve as key informant review 
indicators. Generalization of study findings tests external validity. Reliability of study findings is 
assured with the advance statement of data collection protocol and attaching a detailed 
bibliography of all cited literature and data. 
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Standpoint of the Researcher  
K. Brad Ott’s 2003-2004 Winter Holiday Greeting. December 2003 self-portrait produced by Blaine Dunlap. 
               My personal standpoint of this thesis began as a patient. Just shy of two years before 
Hurricane Katrina, I suffered a deep vein thrombosis – a leg clot following an extended period of 
sitting during vacation travel. Within a week of my return from the trip, I experienced partial 
paralysis on the right side of my body. Upon admittance to the Emergency Department of 
Charity Hospital, I was injected with blood thinners to break the clot. I had already suffered a 
stroke – but the paralysis was substantially reversed thanks to Charity’s emergency intervention.   
               Out of concern for a potential stroke reoccurrence, Charity’s medical staff kept me in 
the hospital six days – in time to determine that I also had an undiagnosed congenital heart defect 
– which would require heart surgery. I received this corrective surgery at LSU Interim Hospital 
in 2008. Awaiting this, I became a regular Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans 
(MCLNO) outpatient – receiving regular blood clotting monitoring and medicine calibration 
under coordination of the Robert Hamilton Coumadin Clinic and other LSU medical units. 2 
                                                 
2
 The Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans (MCLNO) comprises Charity and University hospital campuses. 
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               Due to suffering a stroke, heart and brain injury, I was evaluated by Louisiana 
Rehabilitation Services (LRS). My job retraining program was to return to the University of New 
Orleans to complete my undergraduate degree in sociology and seek an advanced degree for 
enhanced employment potential. I completed my undergraduate studies in 2007. 
               Within a few months of my stroke, I joined Advocates for Louisiana Public Healthcare 
(ALPH), a community advocacy group supporting Charity Hospital operations. Serving as its 
legislative director in 2004 and 2005, I was also the appointed representative for health care 
consumer interests on the Region 1 Health Care Consortium (R1HCC – comprised of Jefferson, 
Orleans, St. Bernard and Plaquemines parishes) and served as co-chair of its “Care for the 
Uninsured Committee.” This latter advisory council was one of nine inaugurated during the 
Louisiana Governor’s Health Reform program under Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco.     
               Operating under the Participatory Action Research paradigm (PAR), 3  I am combining 
both my standing as a former Charity Hospital patient and an advocate for its reopening with my 
role as a researcher. Participant observations expressed herein are solely my own. Through 
rigorous review of the literature backed by recognized theoretical standpoints and the expansive 
consideration of multiple sources of data, these research procedures intend to afford replication 
and validation of my findings, as well as address any perceptions of researcher bias. In addition 
to disclosing my standing as a researcher, the ethical dimensions of this case study which I 
adhere to are to honestly represent all findings, interpret clearly applicable literature and theory 
and properly attribute all material sources utilized. Concerns that would otherwise arise with the 
subject of healthcare and its provision which might involve research directly upon human 
subjects are greatly minimized with reliance upon public documents and audio visual materials.  
                                                 
3
 See West, Alcina, Peterson and Laska (2008). Also known as Advocacy/Participatory: Creswell (2007, pp. 21-22) 
and Action Research: Brydon-Miller, Greenwood and Maguire (2003) and Hilsen (2006). 
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In this harbor weary sea-worn ships drop anchor and new launched 
vessels start their outward trips. Within these walls, life begins and 
ends.           
 
Seal of Charity Hospital, embossed on its entrance floor 4 
 
 
 
But perhaps Huey’s most tangible legacy comes with the essential 
things he made: the government programs that eventually 
transformed Louisiana from one of the most ruthlessly irresponsible 
caretakers of its people in the nation to one of the most beneficent … 
[like] the Charity Hospital system, with its anchor and architecturally 
handsome New Orleans base, providing the necessity of health care…  
 
Garry Boulard, Huey Long Invades New Orleans (1998, p. 211) 
 
  
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the public hospital has suffered much loss 
of support since passage of the Medicare and Medicaid programs in 
the mid 1960s… 
 
Andrew J. Brown, Community Health (1981, p. 100) 
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Charity Hospital’s founding  
through Medicare and Medicaid  
 
Charity Hospital’s First 200 Years: Yielding Modern Medicine.......................................17 
 
Huey Long launches LSU Medical School,  
‘Big Charity’ and a statewide hospital armada ..................................................................20 
 
Table 1: New Orleans’ Charity Hospital and its inspired public hospital system.............27 
Charity Hospital and its inspired safety net system face competitive pressure  
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4
 Viewed via participant observation; See also Tulane University School of Medicine (1990, p.3)  
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Charity Hospital’s First 200 Years: Yielding Modern Medicine 
               The etymology of charity, with twelfth century origins, denotes “benevolence for the 
poor” (Online Etymology Dictionary 2011). Hospitals, as social institutions, are also said to be 
rooted with “the concept of charity care” (Missouri Foundation for Health 2005). Founded as a 
colonial infirmary, Charity Hospital is also amongst the oldest teaching hospitals in America.  
               Mechanic (1978) noted the practice of medicine is a relatively recent development: 
Medicine has really developed primarily in the past 100 years. Before 
that time medical practice consisted for the most part of trial-and-
error attempts by self-appointed practitioners to deal with the ills of 
people. Although hospitals can be traced back as far as the pre-
Christian era, it was not until late in the nineteenth century (that) 
hospitals cared for any large number of patients (p. 316).  
 
               Stoeckle (1995), citing Vogel (1980) said hospitals “were founded in the 1600s to 
attend to the ‘sick poor’ with ‘medical relief,’ not simply to house ‘the poor’ as ‘poor relief’ … 
removed from the community and hospitalized because of infectious disease…” (p. 4).  
               Starr (1982) observed hospitals were places most people avoided:   
Almost no one who had a choice sought hospital care. Hospitals were 
regarded with dread, and rightly so. They were dangerous places; 
when sick, people were safer at home. The few who became patients 
went into hospitals because of special circumstances … (as) seamen 
in a strange port, travelers, homeless paupers, or the solitary aged – 
those who, traveling or destitute, were unlucky enough to fall sick 
without family, friends, or servants to care for them (p. 72). 
 
               Salvaggio (1992, p.11) recalled New Orleans’ Charity Hospital’s 1736 founding. The 
first infirmary of the French colonial port, the Royal Hospital, was restricted to military 
personnel and colonial administrators. Capuchin religious fathers were left to care for the rest of 
the populace: “Horrified by the plight of indigent patients being turned away from the Royal 
Hospital,” French sailor and master ship builder Jean Louis forged a provision in his 1735 will to 
establish the Hospital of St. John, or L'Hopital des Pauvres de la Charité (Hospital for the Poor).  
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               Salvaggio (1992) said a second hospital was built in 1743 (p. 12). Later, under Spanish 
colonial rule, hurricane destruction in 1778 and 1779 led to construction of a third Saint Charles 
/ San Carlos Hospital in 1785 through the generosity of prominent Spanish businessman Don 
Andrés Almonester y Roxas (pp. 20-22). Destroyed by a fire in 1809, a fourth Charity Hospital 
would be built by the Louisiana state government in 1815 (pp. 26-37).  
               Underscoring Charity Hospital’s almshouse status, Salvaggio said African slaves and 
Ursulines nuns were Charity’s permanent medical staff in its earliest years (pp. 13-14). 
Conditions were overcrowded, necessitating the placement of two patients per bed (p. 16). Most 
of Charity’s doctors performed without payment as volunteer physicians (pp. 27-28).  
               Within a year of the inauguration of the fifth Charity Hospital in 1833, Salvaggio 
(1992, pp. 67-68) observed that new milestones would be set. Charity’s governing board “took 
an important step in an effort to eliminate political problems and placed hospital management 
entirely in the hands of the Daughters of Charity” – the famed French order of Catholic religious 
women who gave distinguished nursing care during the 1832 yellow fever-cholera epidemic. 
Salvaggio also said The Medical College of Louisiana, forerunner of the present-day Tulane 
University School of Medicine – was established at Charity as the first one in the city and state. 
               Salvaggio (p. 68) noted that initially, the French-trained physicians of Charity Hospital 
scoffed at the medical college’s establishment – “who undoubtedly considered American 
medical schools inferior to those of Europe.” Starr (1982, pp. 40, 146) underscored this 
skepticism, saying many of the first American medical schools actually operated just as 
apprenticeships, without the benefit of hospital experience or training. Salvaggio (pp. 86-87) said 
that the Medical College of Louisiana’s proprietary nature did not inspire confidence in its 
medical education – until 1884, when Paul Tulane gave $1.25 million to form Tulane University.  
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               Matcha (2000) said “a 1906 survey (of 162 medical schools) by the American Medical 
Association (AMA) brought about not only fundamental change in medical education, but also 
provided the basis for the professionalization of medicine.” In an act of peer review, Matcha 
noted the AMA “turned to the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching” which 
enlisted Abraham Flexner to perform a similar study in 1910. He found “only 31 of the medical 
schools should remain open” (p. 230). Salvaggio (1992) said Flexner declared Tulane made the 
cut: “It is unthinkable that Tulane could have received such a good rating had it not been for the 
wide variety of patients and the hands-on teaching provided by Charity Hospital” (p. 98).  
               New Orleans’ Charity Hospital’s evolution into a major teaching center portended the 
late nineteenth century transformation of American medicine. Starr (1982, p. 169) noted the 
record rise in the number of American hospitals to over 4,000 by 1910 from under 200 in just 
forty years. Roberts and Durant (2010, p. 13) recorded that this dramatic rise “was influenced by 
a number of social and demographic changes, including immigration and rapid urbanization, 
which resulted in densely populated cities with increased demand for healthcare.”  
               Starr (1982, p. 145) now described hospitals “developing from places of dreaded 
impurity and exiled human wreckage into awesome citadels of science and bureaucratic order.”  
               Charity Hospital pioneered much of this development in its first 200 years. Salvaggio 
spotlights an editorial lauding Charity by the Cameron Parish Courier, May 26, 1923: 
New Orleans wears proudly the honor of being the home of Charity 
Hospital. It is an institution that confers distinction upon the city. New 
Orleans, because of the magnificent work done by Charity Hospital, is 
rated among the first in medical science.  
 
But Charity Hospital serves the whole state of Louisiana. Its mantle of 
mercy shields the sick and the injured of the city street, country road, 
pine hills, and cypress swamp. From wheresoever he comes, so it be 
within the borders of this state, his wound will be bound up, his 
ailment ministered to (pp. 102-103). 
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Huey Long launches LSU Medical School, ‘Big Charity’ and a statewide hospital armada 
 
               Murray (2006, p. 468) said “sickness” insurance based on half of a worker’s pay was 
available in the U.S. by the late nineteenth century. Starr (1982, pp. 206, 240-241) noted that 
while fraternal societies provided insurance to just over a quarter of American families, most 
remained uninsured. Starr elaborated that while the federal government enacted “a system of 
compulsory hospital insurance for merchant seamen as far back as 1798 (following European 
precedents),” this was the exception. Starr said “although general hospitals in Europe became 
primarily governmental and tax supported, in America they remained mainly private.”  
               Louisiana, descendent from French and Spanish colonial rule, became a noteworthy 
U.S. exception. McDonald (1984) noted that “Louisiana was the first state in this country to 
maintain and operate a general hospital from state funds…” (p. 3).  
               Campaigning for governor in 1927 for a second time after suffering a narrow loss in 
1924, Huey P. Long, an attorney who had successfully challenged Standard Oil’s unmitigated 
profits while a Public Service Commission regulator, proclaimed a new course for Louisiana – 
one in which Charity Hospital would ultimately play a pivotal role. Long’s vision of social and 
economic change was encapsulated in a campaign speech he gave under the tree which inspired 
the poet Henry Wadsworth Longfellow in St. Martinville, Louisiana – the Evangeline Oak: 
And it is here under this oak where Evangeline waited for her lover, 
Gabriel, who never came. This oak is an immortal spot, made so by 
Longfellow’s poem, but Evangeline is not the only one who has 
waited here in disappointment. Where are the schools that you have 
waited for your children to have, that have never came? Where are the 
roads and the highways that you send your money to build, that are no 
nearer now than ever before? Where are the institutions to care for the 
sick and disabled? Evangeline wept bitter tears in her disappointment, 
but it lasted through only one lifetime. Your tears in this country, 
around this oak, have lasted for generations. Give me the chance to 
dry the eyes of those who still weep here! (Long 1933, p. 99). 
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               Long was resoundingly elected governor in 1928. Enacting sweeping social and 
economic reforms, he consolidated power to push through his ambitious agenda. Surviving 
unrelenting impeachment attempts by his political and corporate enemies, Long practiced the 
craft of previous governors by freely dispensing state jobs and contracts to his supporters. Yet 
loyalists were drawn however – not from the ossified Bourbon plantation elite that ruled the state 
virtually uninterrupted since its colonial French founding – but from the common hard-scrabble 
men and women of north Louisiana Long had come of age with; first as a traveling salesman, 
then as a tenacious trial lawyer representing the dispossessed (Williams 1969, pp. 9-106). 
               Seeing that Charity Hospital was a rich center of patronage, Long: 
…moved to take over the board of administrators of one of the largest 
institutions operated by the state – Charity Hospital in New Orleans, 
which was maintained for indigent patients and which was the most 
extensive hospital of its kind in the South. It was governed by a nine-
man board, of which the governor was an ex-officio member 
(Williams, p. 292). 
 
               Long chose Tulane University-trained doctor and Rhodes Scholar Arthur Vidrine to 
replace Charity's previous superintendent Dr. William Leake – who was the son of a Standard 
Oil attorney Long had fought in a number of cases when he served on the state Public Service 
Commission. With Vidrine at the helm, Long proceeded to study whether Charity could 
clinically support another medical school (Williams, p. 293). Salvaggio (1992, p. 110) noted that 
few Louisianans could afford to attend the private Tulane -- then the only one in the state. 
               Williams (pp. 512-513) cited Tulane overcrowding that “it had to refuse many qualified 
applicants.” Long said “creation of a second institution would enable these and other young men 
to secure a medical education and would provide Louisiana with more doctors.”  Both Salvaggio 
and Williams observed however that the creation of LSU’s Medical School next to Charity 
Hospital would likely be seen – not as a healthy addition – but as a direct assault upon Tulane.  
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               Long’s relationship with Tulane had been complicated. In one of his most catalytic life 
events, Long compressed a three-year Tulane University Law program into one, passing the bar 
to become “a full-fledged lawyer at the age of twenty-one” (Williams 1969, p. 79). Salvaggio 
(1992, p. 106) said Governor Long in 1929 also reserved “500 beds in Charity Hospital 
specifically for Tulane” – cementing the school’s medical training program within Charity and 
resolving a major bureaucratic impasse that had bedeviled Tulane for decades.   
               Yet Long (1933) certainly also knew that Tulane’s chair was a ringleader against him: 
Impeachment would have been over anywhere except in Louisiana, 
and over in Louisiana with anybody except the kind of opposition 
which I had aroused. … The controlling political factor of The Times-
Picayune newspaper was a railroad, telegraph and power company 
lawyer by the name of Esmond Phelps. He was also the head of the 
Board of Supervisors of Tulane University, on which sat others 
affiliated with such interests. The institution was largely supported by 
the Rockefeller Foundation (Long, pp. 180-181). 
 
               Salvaggio (pp. 108-110) detailed the “colossal mess” of Vidrine being denied a coveted 
Tulane professorial appointment, reportedly at the hands of Dr. Alton Ochsner, then head of 
Tulane surgery. Ochsner later would lose his Charity medical privileges because of a confidential 
communication with another colleague Vidrine may have intercepted – which warned that 
Tulane’s dependency on a politicized Charity and its house staff would doom Tulane’s program.   
               Long’s desire to create a LSU Medical School wasn’t out of any antipathy against 
Tulane or its leadership. Long responded to The Times-Picayune: 
Huey snapped back: “Raise all the hell you want to, print what you 
want to. But we’re going to have that medical school and every 
qualified poor boy can go” (Williams, p. 514). 
 
               Long’s confrontation with Tulane’s defenders paid off handsomely. LSU’s medical 
building was constructed next to Charity in record time for its October 1931 opening. Medical 
school enrollments, despite the economic depression of the 1930s, swelled at both schools.  
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               Louisiana in the early 1930s became a national leader in healthcare. Care of the 
mentally ill improved dramatically through the most modern therapeutic interventions of the day. 
Arbitrary restraints of psychiatric patients and prison inmates had ceased. Psychiatric patients 
and prison inmates alike received for the first time “a system of regular medical care” (Williams 
1969, pp. 546-547). Rural healthcare in particular saw unprecedented improvement: 
Through the Board of Health Long tripled funding for public 
healthcare. The state’s free health clinics grew from 10 in 1926 to 31 
in 1933, providing free immunizations to 67 percent of the rural 
population. By expanding the state’s network of roads and bridges, 
Long made it possible for citizens – especially the rural poor – to seek 
professional healthcare and hospitalization (Long Legacy Project, 
2010). 
 
               Williams noted that Long’s “critics could not deny his claim that the hospitals had been 
enlarged and bettered” even as they lambasted his authority over them. New Orleans’ daily 
newspaper, The Times-Picayune, charged that Long’s health reforms were a guise for patronage: 
[The Times-Picayune charged] Long associates who were not poor 
received free Charity Hospital treatment … The charge was 
substantially accurate.  But it did not cite the fact that the practice was 
not new: persons with political influence had always been able to get 
into the hospital. What was new, and hence very apparent, was now 
that more of them got in – because there were more beds (Williams 
1969, p. 547).  
 
               Starr (1982, p. 173) noted medical patronage was also prevalent in private hospitals 
throughout the United States – favoring upper-class rather than working class groups with free 
medical care and that “staff appointments went to physicians from established families…” 
               Referencing the aging 100-year old fifth Charity building, Salvaggio (1992, pp. 125-
126) said Huey Long made substantial improvements in the downtown New Orleans facility. Yet 
by 1936 daily hospital admissions at Charity were higher than counterparts in Chicago, New 
York and Los Angeles – because of Long’s promise of free care for all poor Louisianans. 
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               Salvaggio (1992, p. 126) said a federal grant was sought in 1933 to pay 30 percent of 
costs of a new Charity building. The balance was proposed be paid over 30 years “from revenues 
generated by a few private, paying wards...” Admitting private physicians of Southern Baptist 
Hospital and Touro Infirmary however charged that the plan “would put them out of business…”  
               Leighninger (2007, pp. 139-141) said in June 1934, Huey Long “announced that he had 
a new plan to finance a new sixth Charity Hospital: The pay beds would be withdrawn, and in 
their place the state’s corporation tax would be raised.” Long’s plan seemed to initially gain 
federal confidence. A volatile political situation in New Orleans at the time however, between 
pro-Long and anti-Long forces, coupled with Long administrative moves to “keep federal 
projects out of the hands of his enemies” – ultimately halted the process of constructing the sixth 
Charity Hospital until after Huey Long’s death.  
               Wall, Cummins, Schafer, Haas and Kurtz (2002) said while Long “worked hard to elect 
Franklin D. Roosevelt to the White House, the harmonious relationship between the two men 
soon collapsed, largely for the same reason that Long had fallen out with Governor Parker in the 
early 1920s: Huey wanted FDR’s job.” (p. 283) Wall, et al on Long’s “Share Our Wealth”:  
In 1934 while a U.S. Senator, (Long) proposed a national plan of 
income redistribution called “Share Our Wealth” as a superior 
alternative to the existing “New Deal” of President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt. To many of the unemployed or marginally employed 
during those Depression years, “Share Our Wealth” sounded 
attractive indeed, with its assurances of guaranteed family incomes, 
free college educations, homestead exemptions, veterans’ bonuses, 
shorter work weeks and similar benefits – supposedly all to be funded 
by taxes levied on the incomes of the very wealthy… (p. 268). 
 
               Klein (2007, p. 251) said President Roosevelt strengthened his own New Deal program 
to stem calls for even more radical economic proposals – such as Huey Long’s call for stricter 
regulation of finance capital and sweeping social welfare – “to steal Long’s thunder.” 
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               Klein (2007, p. 251)  proposed that Long represented the popularization of much more 
direct calls for a centralized economic restructuring of the American economy in the face of a 
deepening Great Depression – and that in response to this popular threat, America’s industrial 
and financial titans saw that Roosevelt’s “New Deal” was the preferable route.  
                Dethloff (1976, pp. 31-32) explored Long’s challenge to Roosevelt, quoting from his 
1935 Share Our Wealth circular that free market failures demanded government intervention: 
We looked upon the year 1929 as the year when too much was 
produced for the people to consume. We were told, and we believed, 
that the farmers raised too much cotton and wool for the people to 
wear, and too much food for the people to eat. Therefore, much of it 
went to waste. ... But, when we picked up the bulletin of the 
Department of Agriculture for that year 1929, we found that, 
according to the diet which they said everyone should eat in order to 
be healthy, multiplying it by 120 million, the number of people had 
the things which the government said they should eat in order to live 
well, we did not have enough even in 1929 to feed the people. … But 
why … did it appear we had too much? Because the people could not 
buy the things they wanted to eat, and needed to eat. That showed the 
need for and the duty of the Government then and there, to have 
forced a sharing of our wealth, and a redistribution, and Roosevelt 
was elected on the pledge to do that very thing. 
 
               Leighninger (2007, pp. 52-53), focusing on Louisiana’s Public Works Administration 
projects, first noted that the fiscal architecture of the New Deal had to be hashed out – as 
President Roosevelt’s initial economic stimulus began to falter amidst worries about deficit 
spending. Leighninger mused whether Roosevelt really did consider deeply the merits of Huey 
Long’s cogent argument to equalize wealth with consumption as its basis through direct 
government intervention. Long’s economic theory ran parallel to the ideas of John Maynard 
Keynes, the influential British economist. Keynes called for investment to stimulate “community 
consumption.” This, said Klein (2007, p. 20), represented the “mixed, regulated economy” 
mitigating capitalism’s excesses through wage hikes, social welfare and public works programs. 
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               The controversy between Long and Roosevelt which blocked construction of the new 
Charity Hospital was eclipsed in dramatic fashion. On the evening of September 8, 1935, Huey 
Long was assassinated in the Louisiana State Capitol. His New Deal legacy was momentous:  
In the space of seven years he gave (Louisiana) a highway system 
second to none in the nation, an outstanding state university, vastly 
improved public schools, and the beginnings of a comprehensive 
system of state aid to the sick and the elderly, far in advance of the 
national Medicare program (Wall, et al, 2002, p. 284).              
                       
               Leighninger (2007) said Louisiana’s reconciliation with the Roosevelt administration 
after Long’s death, along with his corporation franchise tax – restarted the Big Charity project: 
Laws Long had passed to keep federal agencies at bay were repealed. 
The way was cleared for a third Charity Hospital proposal. This time 
only a grant was requested, which freed the (Public Works 
Administration) from concerns about hospital bond issues. Matters 
were further helped by the new regulations increasing the size of the 
grant from 30 to 45 percent. For the state’s share of the project, the 
Charity administrators could rely on funds from (Long’s) corporation 
franchise tax that had been dedicated to it and which, a newspaper 
noted as early as March 1935, had been “piling up in the banks and … 
not doing anybody any good” (p. 141). 
 
               Five months of patient relocation and demolition of Charity’s nineteenth century fifth 
hospital building cleared the way for construction on the sixth ‘Big Charity’ in July 1937. It was 
completed in July 1939. Charity became the second largest hospital complex in the U.S. with 
2,680 beds in its main building and 850 additional beds in “four memorial buildings.” Also built 
were a power house, ambulance, laundry and warehouse buildings, and a new school of nursing. 
               Detailing building subsidence of about 18 inches following Charity’s construction, 
Leighninger recalled “investigators found various corners cut by contractors,” necessitating 
reimbursement (p. 147). But Salvaggio (1992) observed:  
Charity again became one of the world’s great hospitals – a model of 
health care for indigents years before modern federal health-care 
programs were put into effect (p. 137).  
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Table 1: New Orleans’ Charity Hospital and its inspired public hospital system 
 
Hospital, Original name 
 
Year opened 
 
Location 
 
 
Charity Hospital 
 
 1736 
 
 New Orleans 
Shreveport Charity Hospital 5  1876 Shreveport 
Huey P. Long Memorial            1938 Pineville 
Lafayette Charity Hospital 6 
Florida Parishes Charity Hospital 7 
Northeast Louisiana Charity Hospital 8 
Washington-St. Tammany Charity 9 
Lake Charles Charity Hospital 10 
Earl K. Long Memorial 11 
South Louisiana Medical Center 12 
University Hospital 13 
           1938 
           1938 
 1941 
 1943 
 1958 
 1968 
 1978 
 1992 
Lafayette 
Independence 
Monroe 
Bogalusa 
Lake Charles 
Baton Rouge 
Houma 
New Orleans 
 
 
Source: Roberts and Durant. 2010. A History of the Charity Hospitals of Louisiana. Table by K. Brad Ott 
 
               Popularly attributed by many to Huey Long, it was his younger brother Earl K. Long 
who “built more charity hospitals than any other governor.” Kurtz and Peoples (1990, p. 267) 
noted then Lieutenant Governor Earl Long in 1936 enacted the old-age pension “(expanding) it 
into the nation’s largest program for senior citizens” to pay out considerably more monthly 
benefits than Social Security at the time. A free “welfare prescriptions” program, “free 
ambulance service and dental care (via) mobile medical clinics, were particularly helpful for 
those in … rural areas.” Louisiana became a national model for social welfare innovation.  
                                                 
5
 Second location built in 1889. (p. 67) Replaced in 1953 as Confederate Memorial Hospital. Became LSU 
Shreveport in 1976 with medical school. Now known as LSU Health Sciences Center-Shreveport (p. 74). 
6
 Replaced and renamed University Medical Center in 1980 (p. 113). 
7
 Renamed Lallie Kemp Charity Hospital in 1954 (pp. 122-124). 
8Replaced and renamed E. A. Conway Medical Center in 1987 (p. 134). 
9
 Expanded in 1951, (p. 148) it merged to become Bogalusa Medical Center in 2002 (p. 153). 
10
 Renamed W. O. Moss Medical Center (p. 159). 
11
 Renamed Earl K. Long Medical Center (p. 169). 
12
 Renamed Leonard J. Chabert Medical Center (p. 191). 
13
 Formerly Hotel Dieu Hospital; with Charity: The Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans (MCLNO) (p. 48). 
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Charity Hospital and its inspired safety net system faced competitive pressure  
because of the 1946 Hospital Survey and Construction (Hill-Burton) Act  
               Anderson, Boumbulian and Pickens (2004, p. 1163) cite Dowling’s (1982) City 
Hospitals to outline four stages of urban public hospitals. Charity led most in all the stages:  
•  Stage one was the ‘poor house’ or almshouse. “During this period hospitals were 
components of almshouses and medical care was considered subordinate to the 
almshouses’ social and welfare functions.”  
•  Stage two was “the practitioner period” … “when medical and nursing care became the 
focus of the urban public hospital. Physicians took time away from their private practices 
to see patients in an inpatient hospital setting.”  
•  Stage three was known as “the academic period,” when “urban public hospitals installed 
full-time medical staffs controlled by medical schools largely in response to the Flexner 
Report. …”  
•  Stage four was the “large investment of federal funds to build academic infrastructure for 
research, education and patient care.”  
 
               Salvaggio (1992, p. 97) said while New Orleans hospitals such as Hotel Dieu, Touro 
Infirmary and Southern Baptist Hospital grew, “as late as 1950, Charity probably contained two-
thirds of all occupied hospital beds in New Orleans.” Indeed, ‘Big Charity’ and its armada of 
Louisiana safety-net public hospitals expanded to lay the groundwork toward an integrated 
healthcare system decades before most American hospitals or states. Especially for low-income 
people, Charity’s multiple facilities revolutionized access to the latest advances of modern 
medicine unbounded by geography or one’s ability to pay. 14  
               Advancing a comprehensive European social health insurance model, Louisiana’s 
nascent Charity Hospital system served its public well. 15 Yet its ability to keep doing so now 
faced new challenges from federal programs that favored patient access to proprietary medicine 
with private insurance. In time, this would have a profoundly detrimental impact on Charity. 
                                                 
14
 e.g., Charity had the first blood bank in the South (Salvaggio 1992, pp. 150, 190); pioneered in anesthesiology (p. 
139); infectious disease research (pp. 158-159); and sickle cell anemia research (pp. 178-179). 
15
 e.g., “The state’s charity hospitals are as close as America gets to a European-style public health system” (Swann 
2005); “In the United States, the political conditions and preexisting institutions were altogether different … where 
classical liberalism had most thoroughly shaped the relations between state and society” (Starr 1982, pp. 240-241). 
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               President Harry S. Truman in 1946 proposed a national program to expand veterans’ 
and community hospital capacity, support for medical research and graduate medical education, 
and comprehensive health insurance coverage for all Americans (Starr 1982, pp. 281-286). After 
encountering fierce resistance to the national health insurance part of the proposal, Truman 
succeeded only in passing into law a national program of veterans’ and community hospital 
construction known as The Hospital Survey and Construction Act. Better known as the Hill-
Burton Act, after its U.S. Senate sponsors Lister Hill and Harold H. Burton, this massive post-
war construction program was conceived out of a 1942 American Hospital Association (AHA)-
sponsored national commission. Between 1947 and 1971, Hill-Burton put up one-third of the 
cost of hospitals, nursing homes and outpatient facilities; with two-thirds of costs locally-raised 
to receive federal match funding (pp. 348-351). Starr said Hill-Burton’s programmatic 
requirements for obtaining the loans necessarily favored projects that could prove financial 
viability – meaning that the new hospitals funded often served wealthier communities.  
               This mass expansion of community hospitals nationwide following World War II 
would pose a new competitive challenge to Louisiana’s Charity system and other similarly-
situated public hospitals. Two facets of the Hill-Burton Act that outwardly sought to address 
inequities within the legislation would in time have profound impacts upon Charity and its 
inspired safety net system. Starr observed the first involved the provision of charity care:                
Hospitals receiving assistance had to make available “a reasonable 
volume of hospital services to persons unable to pay.” But for the next 
twenty years, no regulations were issued specifying what a reasonable 
volume might be, and the provision went unenforced (p. 350). 
 
               The lack of enforcement of charity care provisions under Hill-Burton saddled the 
Charity Hospital system to bear a disproportionate burden of providing indigent healthcare in 
Louisiana – freeing newly-constructed private hospitals to attract patients with insurance.  
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               Starr (1982) noted that the second facet involved addressing racial discrimination in 
public accommodations. Community hospitals would be barred from receiving Hill-Burton funds 
if they discriminated on the basis of race – yet the law contained a crucial loophole: 
The law itself prohibited discrimination by any assisted hospital, but 
said its conditions were met if separate but equal facilities were 
available in an area. The Supreme Court did not rule these provisions 
of Hill-Burton unconstitutional until 1963 (p. 350).  
 
               Roberts and Durant (2010, pp. 172, 196, 221-225) recorded that while three Charity 
units or hospitals received Hill-Burton planning and design funds – racial segregation was 
unabated until passage by the U.S. Congress of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Effectively, this meant 
that in most cases Charity Hospital system facilities were the only hospitals available for African 
Americans in Louisiana until the close of 1965, when the threatened loss of federal funds within 
one year of the Civil Rights Act’s enactment forced integration of all medical facilities.                  
               Matcha (2000, p. 317) observed that Hill-Burton’s hospital expansion “(exacerbated) 
structural problems associated with the health-care system by creating an over-supply of 
facilities that are underutilized.” In Louisiana, seven Charity facilities were already in operation 
with Hill-Burton’s 1946 enactment. Charity now found itself in a new competitive environment 
competing against newly-constructed private facilities serving a healthier population of 
individuals having health insurance. Lax enforcement of Hill-Burton’s charity care and racial 
discrimination provisions only magnified Charity’s under-financed operations – which would 
face additional competitive pressure with the 1965 enactment of the federal Medicare program: 
For elderly people, Medicare alleviated the very great evil of 
uncertainty about medical treatment; it gave them security they had 
never known before. For many, the greatest worry had been whether 
they could afford physicians and hospitalization. Before Medicare, 
when workers retired – typically, in those days, at 65 – many of them 
were on their own with regard to medical coverage… (Pence 2004, p. 
453). 
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Medicare and Medicaid undermined “special categories” like Charity Hospital  
 
               Brown (1981) illustrated the impact Medicare (and its counterpart for the poor, 
Medicaid) had on patients whose previous source of healthcare was in hospitals like Charity: 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the public hospital has suffered much loss of 
support since passage of the Medicare and Medicaid programs in the 
mid-1960s. Many of the poor and elderly who were previously 
dependent on this facility for curative care are now able to use private 
practitioners and hospitals. The image of the public hospital as the 
“poor people’s” hospital spurred movement of Medicare- and 
Medicaid-eligible patients to the private sector… (p. 100).  
 
               Salvaggio (1992, p. 193-196) suggested that Charity’s raison d’être was now in 
question unless it enacted major structural changes. Salvaggio cited a 1965 Times-Picayune 
editorial warning that state legislative appropriations for Charity could even be in jeopardy.  
               Rebutting the widespread view that Medicare reflected expansion of the socialized 
welfare state, Oberlander (1997, p. 597) said “Medicare was modeled after the indemnity 
insurance plans that predominated in 1965.” Matcha (2000) also addressed that federal spending 
under Medicare and Medicaid would actually enhance private medicine practice:  
The passage of Medicare and Medicaid represented an economic boon 
for the medical community. Although reimbursement levels were not 
consistent with the private sector, these programs offered a new and 
growing pool of medically needy persons… (p. 349). 
 
               Freund and McGuire (1995, pp.305-306) said that the politics of Medicare’s passage 
compromised the possibility of an actuarially-sound public health insurance program – resulting  
instead in an unprecedentedly expensive public-private hybrid with few cost-controls, lacking 
restraints on hospital utilization and reimbursement of medical procedures reflecting retail costs: 
The financing of Medicare had been problematic from the outset. To 
overcome the objections to the program by doctors, insurance 
companies, hospitals … Medicare legislation created less of a public 
healthcare program and more of an infusion of public money into 
private channels (Freund and McGuire, p. 305). 
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               Initially, the American Medical Association (AMA) vigorously opposed Medicare’s 
creation. Freund and McGuire (1995) said however that the AMA came to support the program: 
To secure the cooperation of physicians, the initial Medicare 
legislation allowed reimbursement of doctor’s “usual and customary 
fees,” so long as those fees were “reasonable.” Such vague language, 
especially in the context of a seldom competitive fee-setting process, 
led to rapid inflation. Fees increased disproportionate to other rates of 
inflation; the number of elderly treated increased, and the number of 
medical services ordered by doctors for their Medicare patients rose 
markedly… (p. 306) 
 
               Starr (1982, pp. 379-388) said fissures between medical advances of the period, 
expanded access to care and unsustainable costs – were brought on not only by Medicare and 
Medicaid, but also, by unresolved contradictions of a largely private health system.  Under these 
conditions, the public welfare state can only expand if it first provides a guaranteed windfall for 
private capital interests – leading to the vast growth of a corporate healthcare complex. 
               Medicare and Medicaid outlays now fueled widespread fear of unrestrained inflation in 
the U.S. economy growing throughout the 1970s:  
The adoption of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965 made the federal 
government the dominant force in U.S. health care finance. Almost 
immediately thereafter, Medicare outlays skyrocketed. After the 
expected initial ramping up during program implementation in 1967-
68, the program unexpectedly continued to grow in inflation-adjusted 
terms, accelerating to real rates of increase in the 10-20 percent range 
for the balance of the 1970s. This growth came at an awkward time, 
during a period in which the U.S. was experiencing simultaneous 
increases in both inflation and unemployment (Moran 2005, p. 1417). 
 
               This growth in Medicare costs was not sustainable. The inflation they were fueling was 
negatively impacting the U.S. economy. Starr (pp. 379-388) posed that there could either be a 
more regulated, nationalized governmental solution – or the nation could opt for free market 
forces to discipline Medicare inflation. President Richard Nixon launched in February 1971 a 
free market “national health strategy” of managed care organizational expansion.  
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               The term managed care implies healthcare system controls through close monitoring of 
healthcare providers to tightly scrutinize “where and when patients receive their healthcare” 
(Weitz 2001, pp. 425-427). Widely recognized by their administrative units as “HMOs” or 
“Health Maintenance Organizations,” these are pre-paid insurance provider groups, paid through 
“a fixed yearly fee in exchange for a full range of healthcare services.” 
               Starr (1982, pp. 396-397) said that Nixon conferred with industrialist Henry J. Kaiser 
(who had refined earlier models of health purchasing cooperatives during World War II) and 
reviewed plans adopted by Governors Reagan (California) and Rockefeller (New York) before 
urging Congress to incentivize the mass expansion of HMOs to become by 1980 the dominate 
form of health insurance. According to Moran (2005, p. 1419), managed care plans came to 
define health insurance, despite a “backlash against the most restrictive (HMO) forms.” 
               While both Medicare and Medicaid were enacted in 1965, Starr (p. 370) noted they 
“reflected sharply different traditions.” Medicare’s connection with Social Security and its 
“uniform national standards for eligibility and benefits” contrasted it with Medicaid’s “stigma of 
public assistance.” Medicaid rules vary widely in all 50 states, as well as in what kind of 
coverage is provided and how much reimbursement physicians would receive – leaving 
Medicaid often underfunded and poorly resourced by the medical community.  
               Despite documenting chronic underfunding, a precipitous decline in medical 
residencies, labor strife amongst Charity’s house staff and nurses, and the near-total breakdown 
of the hospital’s physical plant as the result of deferred maintenance, Salvaggio (1992, pp. 193-
248) said that Charity Hospital improbably ascended from its possible closure after the passage 
of Medicare through a series of events, mishaps and interventions that likely would have 
otherwise felled a less venerable institution. 
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               Freund and McGuire (1995, p. 283) documented the practice of patient dumping – 
when "for-profit hospitals frequently refuse to serve patients who cannot pay or transfer them – 
often in medically unstable conditions” to public or non-profit hospitals. The practice was 
outlawed by Congress in 1987. Salvaggio (1992, p. 251) also found that Charity also endured the 
custom of patient skimming. This routine involved the acceptance – indeed, the active 
recruitment by neighboring private hospitals of patients away from Charity – by admitting them 
for costly, but financially reimbursable trauma care to nearby Tulane and Hotel Dieu hospitals.  
               Salvaggio (p. 203) said that even with Medicaid reimbursement, most area private 
hospitals actively discouraged admittance of the indigent patients Charity regularly treated – 
prompting a successful class action lawsuit demanding free care at private hospitals (under their 
Hill-Burton charity care responsibilities). As part of the settlement, Charity also received 
additional Medicare and Medicaid funding to reopen closed beds and recruit nursing staff, as 
well as to ensure maintenance of its overburdened emergency department. Charity’s substandard 
obstetrics, gynecology and pediatrics care; latent segregation and uneven treatment of poor 
patients, especially women of the period, demanded more corrective action (Ward 1986, p 10). 
               Louisiana Governor John McKeithen increased substantially Charity’s budget during 
the 1968 to 1972 period – reversing the fiscal bleeding enough to keep the hospital from 
completely closing its inpatient units. Salvaggio (pp. 200-202) noted a significant capital outlay 
of the period was the 1969 installation of new electrical transformers to stem persistent power 
problems. A major water main break in 1970 that flooded Charity’s basement for one day 
prompted the replacement of inundated switchgear components. McKeithen also unsuccessfully 
attempted state legislative passage of a statewide “vice tax” from coin-operated amusements, as 
well as an excise tax on the sale of whiskey with the proceeds dedicated to Charity hospitals.  
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               Its woes notwithstanding, Charity Hospital still garnered notable acclaim amidst its 
substantial complexity and inherent shortcomings. Observed Ward (1986): 
Charity Hospital was widely believed to provide the best services for 
gunshot wounds or emergency care. It also offered excellent treatment 
for such challenges as premature infants, contagious diseases, and 
trauma care (the medical inheritance of the indigent) (p. 10). 
 
               Lovell (2011b) noted that “under Louisiana’s populist legacy, Charity hospitals 
continued to expand … at a time when other states were dismantling their public hospitals.” 
Charity could not however ignore Medicare and Medicaid’s soaring costs. 
               Starr wrote (p. 377) even as the federal commitment to funding Medicare and Medicaid 
substantially deepened; its direct delivery became increasingly privatized.  Aside from Veterans 
healthcare “and various other special categories” – the advent of Medicare and Medicaid 
“undermined the rationale for municipal, veterans’ and other government hospital services.”   
               Stolzenberg (2000) reviews the “special category” of “safety net” hospitals: 
Public hospitals have demonstrated their value to the nation’s 
healthcare system by filling service gaps and caring for vulnerable 
populations, thereby earning the title “America’s Safety Net System.” 
This title clearly implies that the public hospital will always be there 
when other institutions cannot, are not, or do not want to be there. The 
title also suggests that the public hospital system is rarely a system of 
choice but is merely the default provider when the primary system 
fails to meet a need. Despite these negative connotations, the public 
hospital system, with all its problems, has a definable mission and in 
many respects has carved out for itself a specific niche in the nation’s 
healthcare system. While there has been much debate surrounding the 
problems of the system, there has, until recently, been little argument 
about the need for its continued existence… (p. 347) 
 
               Charity and its inspired public hospital system are among “the special categories.” A 
hold-over remnant of Keynesian economics in a country of private enterprise, Charity continued 
shouldering its indigent healthcare burden long enough to view what was perhaps the dawn of a 
renewed state commitment, fortuitously aligned with new federal support for safety net hospitals.  
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In the last five years, the state has used its Charity Hospital system 
like a money machine. 
 
Peter Shinkle, The Advocate (Shinkle 1994)  
 
  
LSU … is steeped in knowledge about the Charity system, where it 
has trained doctors for decades. But the law properly stresses that 
patient care, not medical training, must be LSU’s top priority. 
 
Editorial, The Advocate (1997)  
 
 
The Louisiana way in medical treatment for the less well-off has no 
parallel in the United States, but that unique status hasn’t served as 
protection. 
 
Adam Nossiter, The Advocate (Nossiter 2003b)  
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The Louisiana Health Care Authority (LHCA) oversees Charity Hospitals;  
proposes the end of the name ‘Charity’ and to close New Orleans’ Charity Hospital 
  
               Conveying the grave condition of Charity Hospital in the late 1980s, Roberts and 
Durant (2010), citing Salvaggio (1992) called for Charity’s reform:  
Charity was closer to death in 1990 than it was following the 
hurricane of 1799 or the great fire of 1809, or during the terrible post-
Civil War years. The question is whether or not it will rise like the 
phoenix from its ashes as it has in the past. Perhaps a better question 
is, ‘should it rise? Or can Louisiana develop more efficient and 
humanitarian means to care for its truly indigent ill and train its future 
physicians? … (pp. 307-308)  
 
               As hospital conditions worsened, questions arose over the need to change Charity’s 
administrative governance to afford it a more focused management. In 1936, the State Hospital 
Board was created to oversee Huey Long’s vision of a statewide network of Charity hospitals 
(LSU Health Care Services Division / LSU-HCSD 2011a). Aside from the 1940s when Charity 
was under outside management, the State Hospital Board was responsible for Charity system 
hospitals until 1970, when the Department of Health and Human Resources was created. Seeking 
to streamline oversight, Charity in 1988 was placed under the control of the Department of 
Health and Hospitals (DHH). Yet Charity’s woes worsened (Salvaggio, pp. 138-139, 284). 
               “A new concept of governance” to transform state-owned general hospitals, the 
Louisiana Health Care Authority (LHCA) passed into law in 1989 under Governor Buddy 
Roemer (Roberts and Durant, p. 44). The LHCA was charged with “developing long-range plans 
to revitalize the entire statewide charity hospital system” (Salvaggio, p. 291). Taking over nine 
Charity hospitals in 1991 from the Department of Health and Hospitals (apart from Shreveport, 
which was run by LSU), LHCA’s nine member board, appointed by the governor and confirmed 
by the state senate, had “the ability to independently set policy, funding and sell bonds for the 
charity hospital system” (Yacoe 1991). 
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               Presenting its “strategic plan” before the 1991 Regular Louisiana Legislative Session, 
The LHCA highlighted key problems facing Louisiana’s public hospitals – including the 
prospect of some system facilities ceasing operations. It detailed both broad and specific 
categories: fiscal woes, loss of residency slots due to budget shortfalls, long waits for medical 
procedures, and the flight of experienced healthcare professionals. It also found that even as 
Charity hospitals generated the bulk of Louisiana’s Medicaid budget, Medicaid patients 
themselves were fleeing the system – with their Medicaid funds – furthering imperiling the 
safety net system (Louisiana Health Care Authority / LHCA 1991, pp. xviii-13). 
               The LHCA report set out several overarching goals to address what it viewed as the 
crisis facing Louisiana’s Charity Hospital system. Emphasizing “replacement and modernization 
of physical plant,” the report called for the imminent replacement of New Orleans’ Charity 
Hospital, Baton Rouge’s Earl K. Long Memorial Hospital and Pineville’s Huey P. Long 
Memorial Hospital. Charity and Huey P. Long in particular, the LHCA report said “should both 
have been replaced thirty years ago.” It remarked that the renewal of Big Charity Hospital could 
be the keystone in the development of a “New Orleans Medical Center Complex.” LHCA’s 
report also extolled in its first priority the goal of planning and design work to replace aging and 
neglected charity hospitals in Independence, Bogalusa and Lake Charles; system-wide 
installation of modern medical equipment and upgrades; streamlined funding, governance and 
management; more comprehensive resource allocation and integration of medicine and academic 
training residencies across the entire state hospital system; and enhanced relationships with 
counterparts in both the state welfare system, the state psychiatric care system and private 
healthcare providers. The LHCA said that much of this change would either be ongoing or 
completed within five years from the date of its strategic plan (LHCA 1991, pp. 20-31). 
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               Much as the LHCA’s strategic plan detailed the Charity Hospital system’s deficiencies 
and challenges, it also extolled Charity Hospital and its distinctive public safety net healthcare 
system as “a model for the nation” – Indeed, it branded it “The Louisiana Model”: 
Every state faces the question of how to provide a safety net of health 
care for those without insurance and how to provide clinical training 
experience for physicians and other health professionals. Few states 
have answered this question more simply or more comprehensively 
than Louisiana. The concept underlying Louisiana’s hospital system is 
a considerable improvement on those of many states. Elsewhere, a 
patchwork of local public hospitals, usually in urban areas, provides 
uneven access to care and incomplete integration with medical 
education. Louisiana’s approach has several beneficial features that 
are the envy of many… (LHCA 1991, pp. 31-32). 
 
               Despite heralding the Louisiana Model as one worth emulating, the LHCA said that for 
the health system to realize its full potential, it had to rebrand itself away from the institutional 
identity on which its own extolled model developed – by removing the name “Charity”:  
The hospitals, which currently are known as the “Charity system,” 
represent Louisiana’s principal mechanism to deliver health care for 
the uninsured and others with inadequate access, and to provide 
clinical training opportunities for new physicians and other health 
care professionals. Both roles will remain critical elements of public 
policy in the state.  Despite the System’s clear and important purpose, 
its popular name leads to misunderstanding. That name should be 
changed (to) the Louisiana Medical Centers (LHCA 1991, pp. 17-18). 
 
               While Salvaggio (1992, p. 196) recorded a 1966 failed attempt to “remove the word 
charity from the titles of all state charity hospitals,” twenty-five years later, the LHCA put forth 
its rebranding as its first task toward the hospital system’s revitalization. It argued: 
The “Charity system” (fails to describe its) critical role played in 
medical education (and) suggests that the hospitals are part of the 
state welfare system … (They) are not “free” and are not available to 
our citizens through “charity.” They represent a form of health 
insurance that is paid for by all Louisiana taxpayers. … If “Charity 
system” is a misnomer now, the “charity” image will be even less 
appropriate in the future (LHCA 1991, p. 18). 
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               Though Roberts and Durant (2010, pp. 48-49) echoed the LHCA’s characterization that 
the name “charity” failed to adequately describe the hospital system’s modern role, they also 
offered two key counterpoints on the rebranding of New Orleans’ Charity Hospital. First, 
Charity’s physicians and medical residents actively resisted the proposed name change. 
Charity’s “physician training at the hospital is world-renowned and the medical community 
recognizes Charity Hospital … not “MCLNO” (Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans) as 
a prestigious training ground for doctors…” Secondly, Roberts and Durant record throughout 
their work that although all but the downtown New Orleans flagship hospital would ultimately 
shed the Charity name, 16 they aptly observed Louisianans resisted doing away with Charity’s 
identity – and suggested they would not do so – unless a major change in the system occurred:  
It appears that the longstanding label and image of these facilities as 
“charity hospitals,” has become ingrained in the culture of Louisiana 
and thus, will be difficult to change without major alterations in the 
structure and character of the public healthcare system (p. 281).  
 
               Charity came under the threat of closure in 1991 with the loss of its hospital 
accreditation (Kazel 1991). The LHCA nevertheless immediately set out to implement its 
proposal toward rebranding the state hospital system away from the Charity name by seeking to 
close its iconic but disheveled flagship. In 1992, the LHCA purchased the former Hotel Dieu 
hospital and renamed it “University Hospital” (Laborde 1993). The “University Hospital” name 
seemed to imply that it would now become LSU Medical School’s private practice hospital. 
Salvaggio (1992, pp. 193-196) noted that LSU as early as the late 1960s sought to shed its 
reliance upon what it viewed as an outdated hospital facility. LSU also built a considerable 
expansion of its medical school between its original location next to Charity and Hotel Dieu.  
                                                 
16
 Roberts and Durant recorded that ‘Big Charity’s’ main hospital building was renamed “the Reverend Avery C. 
Alexander Charity Hospital” under a 1991 Louisiana State Legislative resolution – to recognize the late civil rights 
activist and state representative who stalwartly defended social welfare programs and Charity hospitals (p. 48). 
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               Tulane University, for many of the same reasons LSU sought a new practice hospital, 
built its own hospital downtown, apart from Charity in 1975 (Salvaggio 1992, pp. 193-196). In 
contrast to catering to the specific desires of LSU doctors wanting to keep separate their Hotel 
Dieu private practice patients, while relegating their medically indigent patients to Charity, 
Roberts and Durant (2010, pp. 47-48) said renaming Hotel Dieu as University Hospital had more 
to do with making a clear break from “Charity” by underscoring its teaching hospital status 
under the MCLNO brand name. This decision however left many LSU physicians wanting. 
Roberts and Durant said the LHCA, backed by the gubernatorial administration of Edwin 
Edwards, announced publicly that the main reason for ordaining Hotel Dieu as the new 
University Hospital would address medical accreditation issues by “(facilitating) the movement 
of patients, regardless of financial status, from the dilapidated Charity Hospital campus” that was 
neglected by the lack of appropriations on social welfare programs and facility maintenance. 17                                          
               Stating it would close Charity within 5 years, the LHCA asked the Joint Commission 
on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) to “let Charity Hospital operate with 
safety defects that would take $20 million to fix” (Pope 1993b). Criticism flared however, that 
the state would “gamble” on patient’s lives by refusing to spend money to meet the fire code (de 
la Houssaye 1993). Charity lost its accreditation in 1993 (New Orleans City Business / CB 1994). 
               With promises to address code deficiencies, JCAHO accreditation of Charity was 
restored by early 1994 (CB 1994). Roberts and Durant (pp. 49-50) said the LHCA’s attempt to 
construct a separate LSU Medical School “critical care tower” adjacent to University Hospital – 
apparently intended to placate still disaffected LSU private practice faculty – ran up against the 
threatened loss of federal funds, as well as uncertainty posed by a national health reform attempt, 
putting on hiatus more than $1 million already spent in its construction planning and design.  
                                                 
17
 LSU-HCSD (2007c): “Forty-five Years of Studies: Construction of a New Public Hospital in New Orleans, p. 1. 
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               While the LHCA had independent statutory authority to execute purchase contracts and 
even its own agency fiscal increases, its wanton excesses as other state agencies faced budget 
cuts brought widespread criticism. LHCA’s original purchase of the private Hotel Dieu hospital 
– at a cost of $58.5 million – was criticized “because the purchase process was not subjected to 
regular capital outlay procedures and the price of the debt was high” (Alexander 1993). Ignoring 
calls from the State Treasurer and one of Louisiana’s two U.S. Senators to curb agency spending, 
LHCA’s creation of “a new $120,000-per-year job to oversee the merger” of Hotel Dieu and 
Charity Hospital campuses and its departmental addition of 450 employees led to widespread 
calls for the LHCA to be abolished (The Advocate 1994a; Shuler 1994a; Shuler 1994c; The 
Advocate 1994b). The agency ultimately was abolished in 1997. 
               Anticipation in governmental and healthcare circles originally was that the LHCA 
would become the departmental vehicle to revitalize Louisiana’s venerable yet neglected and 
severely underfunded Charity Hospital system. Roberts and Durant (2010, pp. 44-54) said that 
the LHCA’s failure to be the agency of Charity’s institutional renewal occurred because the 
LHCA micromanaged decisions “for personal and political reasons” while utterly failing in its 
policy oversight of Charity Hospitals through “poor leadership and irresponsible behavior.…” 
               Roberts and Durant’s account does not mention the LHCA’s lack of leadership in 
contending with the main funding source for Charity hospitals of the period: the federal 
Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) program. Commonly identified by its acronym (and 
pronounced as “dish”), DSH funds were first created by Congress in 1981 to support hospitals 
that treated a disproportionate share of the uninsured. Enacted to shore up mostly public safety 
net hospitals that saw the exodus to private hospitals of patients having qualified for Medicare 
and Medicaid, Charity likely could benefit, if it could return to its priority programmatic status. 
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Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) funds enrich private providers at Charity expense 
               Fishman and Bentley (1997, pp. 31-36) said targeted support for certain hospitals 
treating people usually ineligible for Medicaid – yet still poor and uninsured prompted Congress 
to “(mandate) an explicit payment adjustment…” Originally intended as a temporary measure, 
DSH funding became a permanent federal budget item in 1990.  
               While the DSH program was originally enacted as part of legislation to correct 
inflationary deficiencies in Medicaid payment reimbursements, because program requirements 
were “broad and vague, many states ignored (them)” (Mechanic 2004, p. 5). Spivey and 
Kellermann (2009) said the DSH program was originally conceived as a federal-state shared 
Medicaid responsibility. 18 While the federal government would contribute the bulk of 
designated DSH funding reimbursement, significant state resistance toward making even modest 
matching payments from which designated hospitals could then receive full reimbursement 
prompted Congress to mandate that states make matching DSH fund payments:  
When most states ignored their obligation to make (DSH) payments, 
Congress … deemed certain hospitals to be DSH providers and 
established methods to force states to make DSH payments to those 
hospitals (p. 2599). 
 
               Mechanic detailed how several states, including Louisiana, managed to overcome 
putting up their own money to provide a match for federal DSH reimbursement:  
In the late 1980s several states, starting with West Virginia, 
determined that it would be permissible to collect donations from 
hospitals, use the donations to draw down federal matching funds, and 
make DSH payments to those same hospitals without actually putting 
up state dollars (p. 6). 
 
               Fishman and Bentley noted also that “states became very creative in increasing their 
Medicaid funding via provider-specific taxes (and) intergovernmental transfers…” (p. 36).       
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 E.g., a 28% state/federal match means the state puts up $28 (the amount which is advanced to it from a 
participating DSH hospital such as Charity) and the feds $72 to equal $100 for a DSH provider. 
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               Mechanic (2004, p. 7) said by 1992, DSH payments made up 36 percent of Louisiana’s 
program. Spivey and Kellermann (2009, pp. 2599-2600) said nationally “between 1990 and 
1996, federal DSH payments ballooned from $1.4 billion to more than $15 billion annually…” 
with Louisiana in particular taking advantage, ranking fourth per capita in DSH payments.  
               Wall, et al (2002) said from 1989 during the Roemer administration through 1994 in the 
Edwards administration, the state Medicaid budget went from $1.1 billion to $4.2 billion: 
Louisiana discovered the golden egg laid by the Medicaid goose … 
With its large numbers of poor people Louisiana had no difficulty in 
meeting the “disproportionate share” criterion... (p. 409)  
  
               Notice however that it was Louisiana’s Medicaid budget – not Louisiana’s Charity 
hospitals – that overwhelmingly benefitted from the program intended for safety net hospitals. 
Indeed, Coughlin, Ku and Kim (2000, p. 148) noted this aspect of public hospitals being shorted:  
When public hospitals have net gains, it is possible that they do not 
get to keep their gains. That is, the net DSH gains experienced by 
state hospitals may be returned to the state treasury … states often 
reduce other subsidies to those hospitals that offset the gains.”  
 
               The advantage of matching DSH funds with Medicaid reimbursement is significantly 
greater than just earning reimbursement from Medicaid funds alone. The excess revenue comes 
both from the disproportionate share of hospital care provided by an eligible hospital, and a “per 
patient per day” charge available because Medicaid recipients received care (Pope 1993a).  
               Substantial Louisiana DSH fund payments resulted from the state “taking care of a 
disproportionate number of poor people in its charity hospital system.” This added “up to about 
three times the actual cost of care for the patients” (Shuler 1994b). “Hundreds of millions of 
dollars” of DSH payments were made annually – but “instead of allowing public hospitals to 
keep that huge amount of federal tax money, [state government] forced state hospitals to ‘donate’ 
those millions” to the Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH) (Shinkle 1994).  
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               Wall, et al (2002, pp. 409-410) found meanwhile that “the quality of medical care for 
Medicaid recipients did not improve – what did were opportunities for politically connected 
individuals to make handsome profits …” Wall, et al specifically cited Times-Picayune reporter 
Chris Adams’ 1995 “Medicaid Madness” investigation into the phenomenal growth of private 
psychiatric facilities that received substantial Medicaid reimbursement for questionable expenses 
– enriching several former state officials and Edwards’ gubernatorial campaign contributors. 
               Adams detailed how DSH funds, generated wholly from Charity Hospital system care, 
were re-appropriated to benefit private psychiatric facilities:  
In the arcane rules that govern Medicaid finances, a few carefully 
placed words can mean millions of dollars. That’s what happened in 
1993, when a three-sentence provision inserted into the state’s 
Medicaid guidelines pumped $7.6 million into a group of politically 
connected, high-profit private psychiatric hospitals … Because most 
of the new private psychiatric hospitals were almost exclusively 
treating Medicaid patients, and most of the large public hospitals in 
the Charity Hospital system had thousands of non-Medicaid patients, 
the new provision represented a windfall for the private hospitals 
(Adams 1995b).  
 
               Columnist James Gill of The Times-Picayune quipped that “anyone who has had the 
feeling from time to time that we might be living in a Charles Dickens novel can forget it”:  
Not even the formidable Dickens imagination could have conjured up 
the sinister, money-grubbing caricatures of humanity that populate the 
latest story of Louisiana’s political class (Gill 1995).  
 
               Engendering charges that “the state has used its charity hospital system like a money 
machine … $1.7 billion (was taken) out of the public hospital system” for a whole host of 
Medicaid programs “including some that enrich(ed) private companies” (Shinkle 1994). Roberts 
and Durant (2010, p. 54) meanwhile, citing information from a former LHCA official, said 
approximately $2 billion in funds was shifted from the Charity Hospital system “to fund other 
items in the overall (state) budget.” Charity, unfortunately, would not recoup this loss. 
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Facing an end to the golden egg era of DSH funds, Gov. Edwards proposes a Charity HMO 
               New federal rules were enacted to end profiting off of DSH funds. Facing a $750 
million Louisiana Medicaid loss, Governor Edwards proposed that the Charity Hospital system 
“would be dismantled” and “the state would begin paying a set amount to insurance companies – 
such as health maintenance organizations – to provide health care coverage for the poor” (Shuler 
1994d). With a year left in his last term, Edwards’ bid to convert state Charity Hospitals into a 
health maintenance organization (HMO) would become the latest twist in which Charity assets 
would be maximized – while promising little for Charity’s institutional longevity. Critics cried 
foul against Edwards’ apparent administrative probity in developing “a plan for the delivery of 
health care to Louisiana’s poor people … being hatched in secret without an opportunity for 
input or discussion among the people who will pay the bill” (The Advocate 1994c). 
               The state’s argument to support a new Charity Hospital HMO plan seemed to employ a 
variation of the old DSH funding scheme to put up as little state funding match as possible – 
except this time professing reform, by promising an alternative to the very Medicaid program its 
own administration ran up extraordinary costs upon:  
The state is hoping for federal help out of a $750 million state health-
care financing shortfall in return for experimenting with an alternative 
to the costly Medicaid program. The $750 million fuels $3 billion of 
Louisiana’s $4.5 billion health-care program” (Shuler 1994e). 
  
               With uncanny parallels to the discarded “public option” proposal that was originally 
part of President Obama’s 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), the 
LHCA fifteen years earlier sought enactment of “The Louisiana Safety Net Plan for Managed 
Care.” LHCA Chairman Dr. Arnold Lupin said it proposed to establish “a ‘medical home’ for 
Medicaid and indigent populations in the state and for populations with special health needs” by 
incorporating use of the state’s Charity Hospital system (Shuler 1995a). 
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               More than six months of debate ensued over the Charity HMO proposal, with 
objections arising from virtually every quarter. “Some legislators … complained that moving to 
the HMO system will only take dollars away from health care and put them in the pockets of 
insurance companies who are seeking big profits.” Private hospitals decried that the private 
insurance market would be put at an unfair advantage (Shuler 1994e). One legislator also warned 
that employers might drop their insurance coverage (Shuler 1995f). State Insurance 
Commissioner Jim Brown echoed the private provider sentiments: “Some private HMOs are 
wondering whether there would be enough of a client pool left” for them (Shuler 1995d).                   
               In another twist, the relationship between Charity and the HMO would also be wholly 
defined by a medical neoliberal administration in the form of a public private partnership:  
The LHCA will have to contract with a private firm to handle HMO 
administrative functions for the first two years because the health care 
authority does not have the in-house capacity to do the job – [at a cost 
of] about $30 million annually (Shuler 1995c).  
 
               The outsourcing cost of the Charity HMO administration later was raised to cost $40 
million. LHCA officials also provoked some ire with their demand to approve the contract in “21 
days instead of the regular 45 days allowed for the procedure. The idea is to have the public 
HMO ready to go by July 1” – the beginning of the new fiscal year. Meanwhile, the required 
federal approval for the proposal remained uncertain (Shuler 1995e). 
               Charity’s HMO contract cost was revised upward again to $45 million. The escalating 
cost coupled with the expedited timeframe to solicit and review proposals heightened suspicions 
of renewed administrative corruption favoring politically well-connected firms. State 
Representative Melissa Flournoy exclaimed: “It looks like it’s been cooked from the very 
beginning. That’s why people want to blow up the health care authority.” In response, state 
legislators proposed the LHCA’s abolition (Shuler 1995g). 
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               Governor Edwards faced almost total revolt for his Charity HMO proposal. His own 
legislative floor leaders, “some members of the Legislative Black Caucus … and the Acadiana 
Caucus (were) vocal in their dislike for parts of the plan.” Election-year politics and the 
uncertainty of what the federal government would do with the DSH program seemingly led 
everyone to dissent against the proposal. The Advocate also said that the state requested “13 
deviations from regular Medicaid rules” in order to advance the HMO plan (Shuler 1995h). 
               Federal officials meanwhile remained steadfast against forgiving Louisiana’s Medicaid 
shortfall, even after “Gov. Edwin Edwards, lawmakers and state health officials went to 
Washington on bended knee … imploring … to let Louisiana skip out on following new 
Medicaid rules,” saying they weren’t to blame for past excesses. The Congressional closure of 
loopholes in the DSH funding program now required “Louisiana … to use its own money to pay 
the state’s 28 percent match – not federal dollars” (Zganjar 1995).  
               While respective state and federal officials shared the same Democratic political party 
affiliation, larger events also impacted Louisiana’s plans – as a troubled attempt toward 
implementation of national healthcare reform was simultaneously underway. Some national 
Democrats even suggested that Louisiana “get out of hospitals” (Coates 1994).  
               Federal officials rejected both the Charity HMO, and a bailout of Louisiana’s $750 
million Medicaid shortfall – leading Governor Edwards’ to end his quest (Shuler 1995j and k). 
Republican Congressman Robert Livingston of Metairie, chair of U.S. House Appropriations 
Committee, urged top federal health officials to kill Louisiana’s Medicaid salvage proposal: 
Our beneficiaries and our taxpayers cannot be served if they are 
subjected to a new system which would become fiscally insolvent and 
could be administered by those same people who created the current 
situation, which is replete with allegations of fraud and 
mismanagement (Shuler 1995i). 
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               Unable to bail out Louisiana’s Medicaid program through creation of a Charity 
Hospital system HMO, out-going Governor Edwards’ administration actions to tackle a looming 
$750 million budget deficit confirmed widespread public skepticism that past Medicaid spending 
largely enriched private medical providers at the expense of Medicaid recipients:  
Officials with the state Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH) 
made an initial $130 million in cuts to the state Medicaid health care 
program … (yet) people on Medicaid will continue to receive the 
same level of in-patient hospital services they now receive, although 
the hospitals will be paid less (McMahon and Shuler 1995).  
 
               To address the remainder of the $750 million shortfall, state health administrators 
returned to utilize the same DSH mechanisms – and money – which generated the hundreds of 
millions of dollars in excess Medicaid program expenditures. Indeed, officials suggested a large 
chunk of the match funds still remained in the state budget, cycling through Louisiana state 
government coffers, without any expected loss in revenues! While millions of dollars of federal 
DSH funds would no longer be matched in the way they were because of new Congressionally-
mandated spending restrictions, Edwards’ administration officials argued the level of budget cuts 
required to balance the state’s remaining $3 billion Medicaid budget was now much lower – 
meaning that meaningful programs would not see once feared cuts (Shuler 1995m). 
               The first bill seeking transfer of Charity hospitals to LSU failed – but only because of 
LSU’s opposition, not for any lost love of the widely viewed-as-corrupt LHCA (Shuler 1995g). 
The Advocate’s Shuler also confirmed that the LHCA engaged in the “double counting” of 
Medicaid dollars. “Because of that double counting … the state never really had a $4 billion 
Medicaid program from which cuts were to be made.” Shuler incredulously observed: 
It seems there was some recycling of Medicaid money involved … 
Maybe that’s why $1 billion cannot be found on paper anywhere. It’s 
the cut that never was (Shuler 1995m). 
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Bobby Jindal saves Louisiana Medicaid by shrinking it; Jindal leaves unaddressed the 
continued diversion of millions of dollars in DSH funds from Charity hospitals  
 
               The November 1995 election of Republican Governor Murphy J. “Mike” Foster 
signaled the end of the LHCA’s administration of the Charity Hospital system. Though it would 
take another year to dissolve the agency, the LHCA’s demise would be just one of several 
significant healthcare policy shifts impacting Charity during Foster’s two terms in office.  
               Within days of his gubernatorial inauguration, Foster selected 24-year-old Rhodes 
Scholar Piyush “Bobby” Jindal for Secretary of the Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH). 
Calling him “a genius,” Foster addressed Jindal’s youthfulness as an asset for DHH: 
I am not a gambler. I am a very conservative person. And, I am very, 
very comfortable that this is not a gamble. This man is going to go 
into (DHH) and engender a lot of respect (Shuler 1996a).  
 
               Jindal was employed after his university studies for the consulting firm McKinsey and 
Company (Konieczko 2008). He was a healthcare advisor to U.S. Representative Bob Livingston 
(Shuler 1996a). Espousing both neoconservative and neoliberal viewpoints, Jindal pledged “to 
transform the public health system” away from the state-run Charity hospitals. Jindal said:  
Neither the Medicaid nor other working poor populations will be 
denied necessary health care services. (However) neither group 
should receive services unavailable to state workers or individuals 
with private insurance … There are no sacred cows … (DHH’s) 
mission will require a shift of focus from being a health care provider 
to a wise purchaser of services (Shuler 1996b). 19 
 
               Jindal also vowed to “aggressively seek recovery of an estimated $26.6 million in 
Medicaid overpayments made to 15 hospitals providing care for the state’s poor.” Specifically 
targeted were two private psychiatric facilities run by former Lieutenant Governor Bobby 
Freeman, and a drug treatment program with ties to former Louisiana House Speaker Pro-tem 
Sherman Copelin housed at New Orleans General Hospital (Shuler 1996c).  
                                                 
19
 See Klein (2007, pp. 14-15). Neoconservatism and neoliberalism extols privatization of public services. 
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               DHH Secretary Jindal’s administration’s first few months provoked widespread outcry. 
Nursing homes still in business after stepped up enforcement of state and federal regulations 
faced reduced payments. And citing the need to trim costs, DHH moved “toward making 
Medicaid recipients pay a small fee each time they receive health care services” (Shuler 1996d). 
Patients chafed at a proposed charge of “$25 to be admitted to the hospital” (Shinkle 1996). In 
response, the state legislature nixed the hospital admission fee (The Advocate 1996). 
               Jindal attempted worker layoffs at several state-run psychiatric facilities (Shuler 
1996e). He instituted a system of rationing in substance abuse programs to allow “more people to 
be served per year, helping to relieve waiting lists” (Shuler 1996g).  
               Amongst policymakers however, Jindal gained wide renown. Vowing that Medicaid 
would not grow beyond a designated threshold, Jindal pledged “the state (would) not fund any 
new initiatives or add to optional programs until we can control spending” (Shuler 1996f). 
Jindal’s pledge, coupled with “accepting a cap on federal Medicaid payments for two years,” 
prompting federal officials to work out a deal which “averted a catastrophe” of massive budget 
cuts in Louisiana’s Medicaid program. Attending a news conference announcing the deal, LSU 
Medical Center Chancellor Dr. Mervin Trail said “we dodged a nuclear explosion” (Gyan 1996). 
               Congressional critics were quick to point out Louisiana Medicaid was able to finesse a 
substantial bailout because U.S. House Appropriations Chairman Bob Livingston was from the 
suburban New Orleans suburb of Metairie. “What Louisiana is getting is a very sweet deal,” said 
Congressman Henry Waxman of California. “It is very special treatment. It is pork barrel 
money.” Recounting Louisiana Medicaid’s maximization of DSH funding, Congressman John 
Dingell of Michigan said “[this] is an indefensible Medicaid giveaway … apparently based on 
the philosophy that no bad deed should go unrewarded” (McKinney and Shuler 1996). 
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               The Advocate acknowledged the Congressional criticisms as justified. It editorialized 
that indeed, Louisiana “pled guilty as charged, threw itself on the mercy of the court and got off 
easy.” “Easy” however, was a $400 million cut in Medicaid – instead of “an immediate cut of 
$1.5 billion” from the Fiscal Year 1996-1997 budget.  The Advocate said:  
The sins were committed by past administrations. But the massive 
cuts in services would fall on the 900,000 Louisianans who rely on 
the state for health care. The poor and the sick are not the bad guys … 
Louisiana can’t expect another reprieve … We got off easy. Let’s not 
blow our second chance (The Advocate 1996). 
 
               DHH Secretary Jindal’s administration of Louisiana Medicaid substantially ended 
outright fraud and advance payments to private providers, “recouping $35.4 million” refunded 
under threat of state litigation (Shuler 1998). He left the program two years after his appointment 
with a fiscal surplus – earning him national acclaim and an appointment to “(lead) the staff of 
(the National Bipartisan Commission of the Future of Medicare charged with heading off an) 
impending financial crisis in federal health programs for the elderly” (The Advocate 1998).  
               Jindal did not alter the basic formula to utilize the Charity hospital system’s dominant 
capacity – to provide healthcare for the uninsured – by generating federal DSH match 
contributions. Indeed, DHH continued siphoning millions of dollars for private hospitals and 
other Medicaid providers. And with less overall funding, Charity system hospitals now faced the 
prospect of significant budget cuts even as its DSH “money-machine” functions continued. 20 
               Before leaving Louisiana’s capital for the nation’s capital, Bobby Jindal assisted 
Governor Foster in abolishing the LHCA – and transferring the Charity Hospital system to 
Louisiana State University’s (LSU) medical school. Previously in 1976, LSU had converted 
Shreveport’s Charity Hospital, the former Confederate Memorial Medical Center, into what is 
now known as the LSU Health Sciences Center (LSUHSC) at Shreveport (LSUHSC-S 2011). 
                                                 
20
 See McMahon (1996a and 1996b); Shuler (1996h); Walsh (1996b) and Weiss (1996). 
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LSU assumes administration of Charity hospitals; and faced a continued loss of DSH funds 
 
               Louisiana House Appropriations Chairman Elias “Bo” Ackal of New Iberia first 
proposed “turning over the state’s charity hospitals to the LSU Medical Center” to provide an 
alternative to DSH funding. LSU Medical Center Chancellor Merv Trail said “there’s a potential 
for an academic health center such as ours to be a source of matching funds, but the hospitals 
would have to come under our governance” while pledging to “fight any attempt to implement 
the plan if any medical school money is at risk” (Shuler 1995b). Though abolition of the LHCA 
and transference of Charity hospitals to DHH was overwhelmingly passed in the Louisiana 
House of Representatives as the centerpiece of its 1995-96 state budget, its proposed use of LSU 
Medical Center “in-kind matching” funds “to produce … federal funds for Medicaid” was 
rejected by the State Senate after the LSU Board of Supervisors opposed the measure (McMahon 
1995; Shuler 1995L). LSU System President Allen Copping demanded funding guarantees 
before it would administer all ten of Louisiana’s Charity hospitals (Myers 1995).  
               Roberts and Durant (2010, p. 54) noted that LSU’s early reticence of taking on 
budgetary administration of a Charity Hospital system it medically dominated since the 1930s 
came in part from its desire to just exercise control of New Orleans’ Charity and University 
hospitals – but the legislature insisted LSU “accept all nine of the LHCA hospitals or none of 
them.” Governor Foster, who originally favored “setting the free market loose on the 260-year-
old Charity Hospital system,” welcomed LSU administration (Walsh 1996a).                                                  
               Tulane University Medical School officials originally challenged LSU’s administration 
of Charity system hospitals, after “expressing dissatisfaction at the prospect of having their 
teaching programs controlled by LSU, their direct competitor” (Redfearn 1996). Following 
negotiations, Tulane endorsed the LSU Charity system oversight proposal (Zwolak 1997). 
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               LSU’s reputation that it had what it took to run a successful academic medical center is 
showcased with its LSU Health Sciences Center in Shreveport. Added onto Shreveport’s charity 
hospital in 1975, it is now LSU’s largest with over 500 staffed beds. 21  LSU-Shreveport has also 
been praised for having the best ratio of insured/uninsured patients, the most diverse patient base 
and the greatest integration of public and private medicine practice (LSU Health 2010; 
McDonald 2002). Yet it also has the ability to self-generate its budget without having to return 
funds to the state, and retains self-generated funds in accounts that went across budget years.  
                LSU Shreveport has a solid, up-to-date capital infrastructure and does not need 
legislative approval for its operations. With a combined medical school and charity hospital 
administration and budget, its faculty practice only in its hospital, thus referring their significant 
book of private patients to LSU Shreveport, reinforcing fiscal sustainability (McDonald 2002).  
                Former chancellor and surgeon Dr. John McDonald noted that LSU Shreveport has had 
the ability to treat rich and poor alike without segregating their healthcare, which he argued made 
the institution one of a kind in Louisiana (McCauley 2002). He noted however that this had not 
always been the case; and that the state’s elites are responsible for the ‘two-tier’ system: 
The most tragic aspect of the history of medicine in Louisiana has 
been the segregation of public and private care. For almost 200 years 
now it has been philosophically accepted in Louisiana that the poor 
get their care in one place and the affluent get their care in another. 
Further, that care has been qualitatively different, and that has been 
acceptable to the state’s power structure. I submit that this philosophy 
is unacceptable. It is akin to advocating separate but equal schools. 
Not only is it morally wrong, it does not work. It separates the teacher 
from the practitioner and the student from best practice. The clinical 
investigator cannot supplement income … I do not know of a single 
world-class medical center that does not have some access to private 
patients (McDonald 2002). 
                                                 
21
 Shreveport’s Charity hospital, founded in 1876, was renamed Confederate Memorial Medical Center following its 
1953 building dedication. It was renamed LSU Shreveport Medical Center in 1976 (http://lsuhscshistory.org 2011). 
LSU Board of Supervisors member Dr. Jack A. Andonie said LSU Shreveport has 550 beds (Andonie 2011); while 
the 2010 LSU Health Annual Report says there are 459 licensed beds – both sources indicate 90% + occupancy. 
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               Amidst expressed fears of privatization and the closure of all the public hospitals except 
those in Shreveport and New Orleans, LSU School of Medicine dean Dr. Robert Marier voiced 
support for the Charity system. Testifying before Louisiana’s House Appropriations Committee:   
The state’s charity hospitals, under public stewardship for more than 
260 years, won’t be handed over to a big for-profit corporation if 
Louisiana State University is put in charge. We want to make it 
emphatically clear that there are no deals to privatize the hospitals. 
We intend to manage the hospitals as a safety-net system (Walsh 
1997a). 
 
               Louisiana House Bill 1162 authorized the LSU takeover of Charity hospitals and the 
abolition of the LHCA. The state senate voted 31-7 for passage, despite fear that the proposal 
would not work – or that Charity’s historic mission would be subverted (Shuler 1997). A 
Constitutional Amendment also passed “(giving legislators) ultimate control of the hospital 
system” (Walsh 1997b). Louisiana voters affirmed it in 1998 (Louisiana Constitution 1998). 
               Change of administration of Charity system hospitals from the LHCA to LSU 
immediately brought forth absorption of all LHCA employees and property into LSU. “The LSU 
Medical Center (also transacted) a cooperative endeavor agreement with Tulane University 
Medical Center for the administration of the Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans 
(Charity Hospital) and Huey P. Long Medical Center” in Pineville (Legislative Fiscal Office / 
LFO 1997). LSU also sought to resurrect some delayed LHCA projects, including construction 
of “a critical care tower on South Johnson Street alongside University Hospital” (Walsh 1997c). 
               While LSU pledged to uphold Charity’s safety net system, it also sought to discard Big 
Charity as the physical center of its medical enterprise. It additionally promised to overcome 
historical restrictions as applied to Charity system hospitals limiting them to patients without 
insurance, prohibitions against discharge of employees protected by Civil Service and automatic 
qualification without means-testing of the uninsured for free hospital care (Pope 1997). 
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               In an editorial, The Advocate acknowledged that the resulting bill transferring the 
Charity Hospital system from the LHCA to LSU overcame many of their initial concerns. While 
praising LSU’s ability and the certainty of public oversight, “some nagging concerns” remained: 
We also wonder if LSU can run the hospitals with no increase in state 
funding, as the Foster administration promises, without sometimes 
scrimping on needed medical services to poorer citizens. Finally, 
there is no guarantee that LSU officials, after their long allegiance to 
their (graduate medical education) mission, can change their attitudes 
to keep patients foremost in their minds (The Advocate 1997). 
 
               The new LSU Health Care Services Division (LSU-HCSD) administration of the 
Charity Hospital system engendered praise for having “brought stability to a system that had 
been bedeviled by short-staffing and political interference” (Pope 1998). Yet LSU also faced 
immediately the dilemma of the continued flight of Charity-generated DSH funding.  
               Concluding that all assets left by the LHCA included unspent DSH funds, LSU took 
ownership of “$86 million in cash the charity hospitals had on hand at the end of the 1996-97 
fiscal year” – even as Governor Foster “assumed the same money reverted to the state general 
fund and counted it as part of a $135 million surplus for 1996-97” (Redman 1998).       
               Having spent the entirety of the surplus to pay down long-term state indebtedness, the 
Governor’s Office sought a legal opinion: The Louisiana Attorney General ruled in favor of the 
Governor and against LSU “because of an accounting error...” (Redman 1999a).  
               Shortly after suffering the loss of the $86 million, “top officials with the LSU Medical 
Center warned … they might have to shut down as many as 15 percent of the beds in the state’s 
charity hospital system to cope with budget pressure (in the 1999-2000) fiscal year.” While 
stating that emergency care “(wouldn’t) be jeopardized … patients with conditions that are not 
life-threatening may not get treatment.” LSU officials said such a drop in patients would also 
negatively impact Charity’s graduate medical residencies (Redman 1999b).  
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               Miraculously, the feared cuts did not occur, due in part to “the state’s expected $4.4 
billion share of a national $206 billion settlement of tobacco litigation” which Governor Foster 
said “health care and improvements to the (LSU) operations of the state’s charity hospitals 
probably would be the best way to spend the money…” (The Times-Picayune / T-P 1998). 
               LSU faced other challenges. Big Charity was nearly closed in 1999 when a deadline for 
mandatory installation of fire sprinklers passed (Scallan 1999). The state legislature ultimately 
intervened with legislation which gave “high–rise structures used as state hospitals or prisons 
until Jan. 1, 2005 to install the sprinkler systems” (Anderson 1999). The legislature provided 
funding in 2002 to complete the project (Louisiana House Bill 2 (HB 2) 2002, p. 50). 
               In the midst of the 1999-2000 Fiscal Year, DHH Secretary David Hood proposed 
cutting $30.5 million from Charity hospitals (Ritea 2000). However, “the Joint Legislative 
Committee on the Budget approved tapping money in some special agency funds to prevent 
some $90 million in pharmacy program and charity hospital cuts …” (Shuler 2000a). Even so, 
New Orleans’ Charity Hospital’s HIV-HOP outpatient clinic curtailed free distribution of several 
vital medications and limited their formulary, leaving patients compromised: “Those with private 
insurance (were) no longer able to get prescriptions filled through the clinic” – severely 
impacting one patient whose “insurance policy will pay 80 percent of his drug bill cost, but only 
after he pays the entire cost” – effectively barring the patient from his medicines (Pope 2000a). 
               During the remainder of Governor Foster’s term, LSU endured several additional 
rounds of budget cuts. Charity hospitals in Bogalusa, Independence and Lake Charles barely 
escaped permanent closure. LSU Health Sciences Center-New Orleans Chancellor Merv Trail 
said, “LSU did not take over these hospitals to close them. It will be a decision made by this 
legislature and administration” (Shuler 2000b).  
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               Only through state legislative intervention was Charity Hospital’s system budget often 
safeguarded (Pope 2000b). DHH often retaliated by shutting down parish health units and laying 
off personnel – which usually sent patients into Charity system clinics and emergency rooms 
(Shuler 2000c). In response, the Legislature approved authorization “giving the charity hospital 
system more flexibility in managing its funds” (Shuler 2002a).  
               LSU was also told that Charity system hospitals now had to pay for healthcare for 
prisoners. The Advocate reported “the prisoner-care shortfall cropped up when U.S. Medicaid 
officials said the state could not tap federal (DSH) health-care dollars to treat inmates” (Shuler 
2002b). This situation worsened when $48.4 million in state health spending cuts ballooned into 
a proposed $168 million financial hit in the largest areas of Medicaid spending – leading one 
LSU official to predict a “health care Chernobyl” – equating the fiscal outcome to the infamous 
1986 Ukrainian nuclear reactor meltdown (Shuler 2002c). 
               In an effort to calm budgetary chaos and produce a common DSH payment rate for 
state and private hospitals alike, the state legislature enacted Senate Concurrent Resolution 27 of 
2002 to prompt development of a common “payment methodology” for LSU-HCSD and 
LSUHSC-Shreveport Charity hospitals as well as for private provider Medicaid reimbursement 
under DHH administration (LSU-HCSD 2003, p. 17). The report reviewed past legislative efforts 
and proposed creation of a payment system “based upon current costs and inclusive of annual 
adjustments for inflation.” The legislative committee report recommended “that the manner in 
which additional DSH funding is structured and implemented be consistent with … meeting the 
health care needs of the state’s medically indigent and uninsured and to improve overall health 
outcomes for Louisianans” while recognizing possible cuts in federal DSH funding (Louisiana 
Senate Concurrent Resolution 27 (SCR 27) Report 2003, pp. 2-6). 
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               The report called for a profound break from what many in the healthcare community 
saw as years of inequitable DSH reimbursements. It recognized the preeminent and historic role 
played by Louisiana’s Charity Hospital system – and proposed for the first time a dedicated set 
of financial and medical benchmarks that would afford greater predictability in DSH funding – 
while also affording non-state hospitals (especially rural providers) DSH funding reimbursement 
for the first time (SCR 27 Report 2003, pp. 2-6).  
               Ignoring the legislative findings, the Foster administration took advantage of another 
increase in federally-designated safety net hospital DSH funds, meant expressly for Charity:  
The federal government passed a bill allowing for enhanced DSH 
payments to state owned safety net hospitals. This enhanced payment 
is limited to Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004 and would allow for up to 
175% of costs to be reimbursed. This enhanced funding is also 
designed to allow state safety net hospital(s) additional capital for 
investment and infrastructure (LSU-HCSD 2003, p. 17). 
 
               Louisiana DHH already received additional Medicaid incentive payments to “ease 
budgetary pressures to cut the program (by) temporarily raising the federal matching rate for 
Medicaid – the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage or FMAP” without needing to divert 
safety net hospital DSH payments. Louisiana’s enhanced FMAP rate increased to 74.58 for 
October 2003 to June 2004 (Ku 2003). This increased Louisiana’s Medicaid program spending to 
take advantage of the enhanced 2.95% federal match under FMAP (LHR 2003, p. 46).  
               Yet DHH forced Charity system hospitals to lose its enhanced DSH funding – and 
forced Charity to bear an additional system-wide budget cut, together totaling $274.7 million: 
State match generated from the use of the “175% overpayment option. 
For FY 03-04 and FY 04-05, the state may pay public hospitals 175% 
of their indigent care costs under federal Medicaid-DSH rules. To 
generate this overpayment, Medicaid will pay to state hospitals and 
DHH will recoup from them $274.7 million. After paying the state’s 
matching share, DHH will net $196.8 million for use in the Medicaid 
program… (Louisiana House Fiscal Division / LHFD 2003, p. 48).   
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               Federal and LSU officials cried foul, “arguing that the (DSH funding) was not intended 
to be used for anything besides the state’s charity hospitals” (AP 2003; Shuler 2003g). Under the 
special federal match rate of 175%, “the charity system (was) eligible to collect $671 million … 
but the Legislature capped the hospitals’ revenue at $345 million … the rest (was) diverted to 
(DHH) ...” -- leaving an additional $52 million unaccounted for (Moller 2003). 
               State legislators decried the cuts endured by Charity system hospitals – but did not 
succeed in restoring the lost funds in the same budget year. The spending cuts totaled $66.5 
million, with 291 people losing their jobs (Shuler 2003c). New Orleans’ Charity Hospital 
endured the largest cut: $27 million and 59 jobs lost (Moller 2003). Nine operating rooms, the 
diabetic clinic, Charity’s home health department and the urgent care W-16 walk-in clinic were 
shuttered. (Butler 2003) “W-16 alone saw 40,000 patients each year, and its closure was 
disastrous for the emergency room” (Reckdahl 2004). 
               This round of austerity also came at the time LSU began to gain wider authority to 
manage its own budget, without what they viewed as onerous legislative restrictions. Act 906 of 
the 2003 Regular Legislative session proclaimed the end of “Open Access” – Louisiana’s 
historic commitment to the poor to receive free hospital care without means testing, circa 1926: 
Any bona fide resident of the state of Louisiana who is medically 
indigent or medically needy shall be eligible to be admitted for any 
form of treatment by any general hospital owned and operated by the 
state of Louisiana (Revised Statute 46:6, LSU-HCSD 2004, p. 3).   
               Act 906 “(provided a means-tested) definition of “medically indigent” as any person 
below 200 percent of the federal poverty level and uninsured … requiring that persons above this 
income threshold be responsible for contributing toward the cost of their care” (LSU-HCSD 
2004, p. 15). It also allowed LSU to “reduce hospital spending by up to 35 percent of the 
previous year’s actual expenses without legislative approval” (Barrouquere 2003). 
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               Though commanding a legislative majority, critics vowed to make the passage of Act 
906, as well as the DHH diversion of DSH funds meant for Charity hospitals an issue in 
forthcoming 2003 state legislative and gubernatorial election contests. Senator Don Cravins of 
Arnaudville worried that LSU would not “keep their commitment to the people of Louisiana they 
made when they took over the charity system…” (Barrouquere 2003). Senator Diana Bajoie of 
New Orleans said “the change would prompt people who truly need care to stay away from the 
hospitals” – worsening the situation for emergency departments (Shuler 2003c). Senator Joe 
McPherson of Woodworth “said lawmakers were “misled” when they were told flexibility would 
allow the hospitals to better serve the needy.” LSU System President William Jenkins retorted: 
“Flexibility is important for us, but at the same time without funding that flexibility has made it a 
very difficult challenge for us” (Shuler 2003d). Indeed, the massive Charity system budget cuts 
threatened seven Tulane and LSU medical residencies with dissolution: “Three (of these) 
programs received warning letters from the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical 
Education, a board that certifies all U.S. medical resident programs” (Butler 2003).  
               The future of the Charity Hospital system dominated Louisiana’s gubernatorial contest. 
Republican candidate Dan Kyle advocated Charity’s dissolution by privatization (Dyer 2003). 
Democrats Claude “Buddy” Leach and Richard Ieyoub vowed to keep all the hospitals open. 
Most of the rest of the candidates however, be they Republican or Democrat, supported the 
original Charity flagship facilities’ operation; but differed on details of their mission to serve the 
poor and the level of administrative control the remaining ones should be placed under. The 
Advocate observed: “All the major candidates for governor agree that LSU’s teaching hospitals 
in New Orleans and Shreveport should be preserved. But the fate and role of the other seven 
hospitals in urban and rural communities is another question” (Shuler 2003e). 
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The fate of Charity hospitals were a deciding factor in the 2003 LA. Governor’s race 
               The two leading candidates in the 2003 Louisiana Governor’s race shared remarkably 
similar views on the fate of the Charity Hospital system. Democratic Lieutenant Governor 
Kathleen Babineaux Blanco suggested that urban non-state hospitals “are saying just pay us for 
indigent care. If you give us the same amount as charity hospitals, we will take care of it and the 
state doesn’t have to worry about bricks and mortar.” Meanwhile the former DHH Secretary and 
Republican Party’s choice Bobby Jindal, under whose watch LSU became the administrative 
operator of the Charity Hospital system, “(advocated) local governance of the state hospitals…” 
(Shuler 2003e). Jindal lead the voting in Louisiana’s multi-party primary. Blanco came in 
second. Blanco “was the target of negative advertising” by Richard Ieyoub, a fellow Democratic 
Party challenger who charged that Blanco would close Charity hospitals (The Advocate 2003). 
Ieyoub then endorsed Blanco, after she pledged to keep the Charity system open (Frink 2003).  
               In a case of political turn-about, Blanco ran television commercials charging that Jindal 
sought to dissolve the Charity system. They “featured Evan Howell, a former staff neurologist 
who served at Lallie Kemp (Charity) Medical Center … while Jindal was cutting the DHH 
budget” (Frink and Dyer 2003). Blanco narrowly won the election (Nossiter 2003b). Adam 
Nossiter opined in The Advocate that Blanco: 
Throughout the primary, for instance, (Blanco) was distinctly 
lukewarm on a hot-button issue for Democrats, the state’s charity 
hospitals … A campaign statement released by her back in May said: 
“The Charity Hospital System is clearly broken. We can no longer 
afford to financial support a two-tiered health-care system in this 
state.” But standing on the Capitol steps this week, at a boisterous 
rally with health-care professionals, she said firmly: “I stand here in 
full commitment to our state’s charity hospital system. Over 1 million 
Louisiana citizens depend on our charity hospital system as their 
primary means of getting health care. These citizens cannot be 
abandoned” (Nossiter 2003a). 
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Governor Blanco’s reform panel grapples with Charity’s centrality in state healthcare  
 
               The enormous role played in securing the election of Louisiana’s first female governor 
by voter concerns about future of the Charity Hospital system cannot be overstated. Had 
Kathleen Blanco not shifted her original lukewarm position to favor Charity hospitals, there 
would have been very little to distinguish herself from her primary opponent Bobby Jindal. 
Supposed conservative voter hostility to her gender otherwise cancelled out any conservative 
voter hostility to Jindal’s Indian national heritage and complexion. 22 In a curious bid, an effort 
was made to keep in place Governor Foster’s DHH Secretary David Hood (Shuler 2004b). Yet 
Hood’s view, that “the Charity Hospital system died in 1965 when Medicaid and Medicare were 
invented by Congress – We have just not had the funeral yet” (Shuler 2003a) was soundly 
repudiated by Louisiana voters. Whatever misgivings Charity Hospital supporters had about 
Blanco, advocates now thought LSU had a solid chance to modernize the iconic network.  
               Governor Blanco’s choice for DHH Secretary, internal medicine specialist Dr. Fred 
Cerise, received wide acclaim. He previously served as administrator of Baton Rouge’s charity 
hospital, the Earl K. Long Medical Center (Shuler 2004c). Cerise set out to organize a statewide 
health reform summit held March 2004 in a downtown New Orleans hotel (The Advocate 2004). 
               Continued federal scrutiny over the diversion of Congressionally-earmarked Charity 
Hospital DSH funds as well as the drastic cuts to Charity’s system budget threatened to up-end 
the entire state budget by nearly $800 million. Secretary Cerise admitted the diversion was 
wrong – but “as head of the state health agency” he appealed to the Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) to uphold the spending (Shuler 2004d). CMS ruled in favor of DHH, 
on the pledge that there would be no additional Charity Hospital cuts (Madigan 2004).  
                                                 
22
 Author comment: Some commentators have suggested that Jindal was a victim of racism in his first gubernatorial 
bid. Whatever the validity of that assessment, Jindal went on to win four years later an unprecedented first primary 
victory by one of the largest margins in Louisiana history, overcoming several well-financed white candidates. 
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               Thanks in part to increased oil prices, LSU-run Charity hospitals were fully funded for 
2004-2005 (Moller 2005b; LHFD 2004, pp. 2-3). 23 It was also fully funded in the 2005-2006 
fiscal year, even with the loss of 175 percent federal DSH match. Indeed, the State General 
Fund’s contribution was $68 million higher than 2004-05 fiscal year (LHFD 2005, p. 11).   
               Governor Blanco’s “Health Care Reform Panel” prompted the creation of “permanent 
regional health care consortiums” born out of the summits organized by DHH Secretary Cerise. 
Launched by Senate Health and Welfare Committee Chair Joe McPherson and House Health and 
Welfare Committee Chair Sydnie Mae Durand, the regional health consortiums sought to 
capitalize on “grass roots input into the problems of, and possible solutions for, the health care 
system in Louisiana.” Established in the nine defined regions surrounding Charity hospitals, 
invitations to participate were advertised by DHH in conjunction with the Louisiana Senate 
district offices of each region represented. Notably, participation was expanded beyond just 
healthcare industry representatives to also include patient groups and healthcare workers. 
Members’ terms were slated for three years with “consortium members … selected by plurality 
vote of each region’s legislative delegation” (Louisiana SCR 95 2004, pp. 1-2).  24 
               Rather than diminish the role played by Charity system hospitals, Governor Blanco and 
DHH Secretary Cerise emphasized its centrality, yet also its overburdened capacity in providing 
healthcare for the uninsured. With surveys finding “the Charity Hospital System is the First Line 
of Defense for many” (EP&P Consulting 2004), Cerise emphasized: 
Current demand for care is greater than the system can accommodate. 
In addition to its service obligation, this system provides the 
environment for much of the medical education enterprise in the state. 
Chronic underfunding of maintenance has produced serious facility 
problems in several regions of the state… (Cerise 2004a). 
                                                 
23
 Louisiana is the third largest oil producer in the U.S., allowing it to earn severance taxes based on the price of oil. 
24
 The author was appointed to a three-year term for the Region 1 Health Care Consortium (representing healthcare 
consumers in Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines and St. Bernard parishes) in October 2004. 
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               The public conversation which unfolded from Governor Blanco and DHH Secretary 
Cerise’s health care reform initiative attempted to couple Louisiana’s poor health indicators with 
the state’s high rate of poverty, rather than just blame either the impoverished or the inadequacy 
of the public health system which predominately served them. The state’s poverty and health 
indicators nevertheless were grim. Louisiana indeed was ranked 4th highest in the U.S. in the rate 
of poor residents as well those with family incomes below 200 percent of the federal poverty 
level for family size; and was 49th or 50th in state-by-state rankings during the period in overall 
health status. Yet state officials also pointed out, in an unprecedented level of self-criticism, that 
though over one million Louisianans were covered by Medicaid in 2003, restrictive policies 
effectively limited participation to “children, pregnant women, age 65 and older, and people with 
disabilities.” Louisiana, said DHH, had “the second lowest (Medicaid) income threshold of any 
state” – 13 percent of federal poverty level (Cerise 2004b, pp. 2-6).  
               A report from metropolitan New Orleans’ – “Region 1 Consortium Update” offered a 
starker comparison. “The big picture problem in Region 1 is a large underserved population that 
suffers with poor health status – among the worst in the nation.” Almost 28% of New Orleans 
residents in 2004 lived in poverty, with “approximately 50% of non-elderly adults … uninsured 
and over half of the children are on Medicaid … (with) minorities … the most uninsured 
segment ...” (Stephens 2005, p. 3). The report also noted:  
Further exacerbating this problem was the closure of services at the 
Medical Center of Louisiana (Charity Hospital). This has reduced the 
primary care capacity to less than 20% of what is needed to 
adequately cover the needs of the uninsured alone. These cutbacks 
have resulted in six month waiting periods for medical clinic 
appointments, and have further extended the already overburdened 
emergency rooms of our region. For example, the average service 
time in the Emergency Room (at Charity) is now eight to twelve 
hours (Stephens 2005, p. 4). 
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               Region 1’s “Care for the Uninsured Committee,” 25 in issuing its report to the regional 
consortium, placed the leading emphasis on “(protecting) resources allocated for the Medical 
Center of Louisiana (Charity Hospital) as the major provider of care for the uninsured in the 
region.” It also extolled many of the professed aims of the Governor’s Health Care Reform 
Panel, including expanded health insurance access and integration of primary care and mental 
health services – while leaving MCLNO/Charity as the epicenter of care to be accessed and 
improved upon (Williams and Ott 2005). 
               As friendly to Charity Hospitals as the Blanco/Cerise administration seemed to be, 
justifications to abandon or move from them by redirecting its main DSH funding away from the 
Charity system sometimes echoed the previous Foster/Jindal administration. A DHH discussion 
paper that would form the basis of the Governor’s Health Care Reform Panel recommendations 
proposed a “Louisiana DSH Demonstration … to place all of the state’s DSH allotment in a 
pool.” The paper cited as justification “(the) high rate of uninsured residents” … “an oversupply 
of hospital beds compared to the rest of the nation” and “a growing number of uninsured are 
receiving episodic care in private hospital emergency departments, most of which do not have a 
coordinated, associated outpatient clinic network.” This concept paper proposed underwriting 
private insurance coverage at the expense of the public hospital system (DHH 2005a, pp. 3-6). 
               DHH Secretary Cerise however stopped the wholesale diversion of Charity Hospital 
system DSH-operating funds to private providers. Freed for the first time from the threat of 
Charity Hospital’s dissolution since assuming administration of the Charity system, LSU began 
asserting more directly what it could do  to “leverage educational resources to provide access” 
and “organize indigent care to provide training opportunities” to further its “dual mission” of 
graduate medical education and safety net healthcare (LSU-HCSD 2004, p. 6).  
                                                 
25
 The author was Co-Chair with Clayton Williams of the 19-member committee. 
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LSU proposes building a new hospital – and closing Charity 
 
               Clark (2010a) said LSU’s administration of the Charity Hospital system since 1997 
defied the usual operational and financial obstacles to provide a successful safety net network:  
Louisiana’s state hospital system is an unusually comprehensive 
access-to-care model in a particularly poor state … (LSU has made) 
Louisiana’s access-to-care model a workable avenue for providing 
healthcare services for its low-income population. (LSU’s) disease 
management programs help patients control chronic conditions and 
reduce preventable admissions and emergency department visits. An 
enhanced medication assistance program compliments disease 
management efforts by helping patients secure the drugs they need to 
adhere to treatment protocols and avoid health crises… (p. 122). 
 
               Louisianans, whether or not they were patients, concurred by a wide margin that the 
Charity Hospital system was vital. A late 2003 Baton Rouge Advocate poll found: 
Louisiana voters … made it clear they want to preserve the state’s 
charity hospital system. Eighty-seven percent of those interviewed 
said Louisiana should continue its charity hospital system instead of 
closing the hospitals and paying to have needy patients cared for at 
private hospitals (Shuler 2004a).  
 
               A similar poll conducted by The Advocate in late 2004 found similar results:  
Support for the charity system crossed all demographic regions, with 
[no support ranking] less than 81 percent [Baton Rouge and Acadiana 
areas]. The greatest support came from respondents in the New 
Orleans metropolitan region at 91 percent and next north Louisiana at 
86 percent … [and also commanded] 84 percent among white 
respondents and 89 percent among black respondents (Shuler 2005a). 
 
               Despite a high regard for LSU’s improvements and the Charity system overall, 
“lawmakers simmering frustration with long waits and closed beds” reached a boiling point, 
prompting legislators to threaten LSU with higher education cuts if Charity hospitals didn’t 
receive higher consideration. Some charged LSU “(favored) its educational missions above 
providing hospital services to the indigent.” State Senate Finance Committee Vice-Chair Joe 
McPherson said, “You all need to get your priorities straight” (Moller 2005a). 
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               Six years after it took over the Charity Hospital system from the Louisiana Health Care 
Authority, LSU commissioned its first comprehensive infrastructure assessment. Citing long-
standing deferred maintenance, LSU found its “public hospitals … physical condition so bad that 
they need more than $300 million in repairs just to keep them open … (with) the total cost of all 
recommended improvements … is $1.1 billion” (Shuler 2003f).  
               The two-year study proposed building entirely new hospitals in Baton Rouge, Pineville 
and New Orleans. The 2003 LSU hospital facility assessment, conducted by Washer-Hill & 
Lipscomb and Adams Project Management (ADAMS), found other Charity hospitals in fair 
condition; though it questioned whether the smallest facility in the safety net network, Lallie 
Kemp Medical Center in Independence, should remain open. The 2003 study also urged LSU not 
to add a “critical care tower” as was originally planned for University Hospital, the old Hotel 
Dieu Hospital the state purchased in 1992 as Charity’s replacement (Shuler 2003f). 
               In preparation for a push in the state legislature to secure capital outlay funding for new 
replacement hospitals, LSU commissioned its own poll to determine the depth of public support: 
The poll found that, when given a choice, 83 percent of those 
surveyed said they favor having the state continue the LSU-run public 
Charity Hospital system over closing the hospitals and having “needy 
patients” cared for in private hospitals. Only 7 percent favor private 
hospital care. The rest gave no answer (Shuler 2005b). 
 
               More than 66 percent of respondents said that private hospitals would not provide the 
same level of care for the uninsured (Shuler 2005b). Critics, including the Louisiana Hospital 
Association, called for the closure of all Charity hospitals “except those attached to medical 
schools in Shreveport and New Orleans.” Even Governor Blanco, who otherwise publicly backed 
LSU’s new hospitals initiative, endorsed “community-by-community assessments of the future 
of the Charity hospitals within them,” prompting LSU to step up lobbying efforts (Shuler 2005c).               
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               A newly enacted “hospital provider tax” purportedly designed to more equitably 
distribute DSH funds to private hospitals that treat the uninsured, also placed additional pressure 
onto LSU. They charged that “private hospitals get a higher reimbursement rate,” whereas LSU 
Charity system hospitals Medicaid reimbursement was arbitrarily capped, producing what they 
lodged was an unjust disparity that will annually cost LSU over $100 million (Shuler 2005c). 26 
               Closure and replacement of Charity and University Hospitals, known together as the 
Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans (MCLNO), was proposed in a May 2005 report: 
Due to years of deferred maintenance, lack of reinvestment in 
facilities, and changes in privacy regulation, MCLNO is housed in 
hopelessly outmoded facilities. Without action, MCLNO will likely 
lose its facility accreditation. The loss of this accreditation will cause 
MCLNO to fail to meet its mission of providing healthcare access to 
the uninsured, resulting in the redistribution of the area’s medically 
indigent to New Orleans’ other hospitals at a potentially higher cost to 
the state, and could possibly cause the evaporation of key health 
profession education programs in New Orleans (ADAMS 2005, p. 7). 
 
               The report said that a new hospital that would emulate “the Shreveport model” of 
academic medical centers. One option was new construction located next to University Hospital 
(known as the “South Option”) and converting the 1970s campus into outpatient clinics. Adams 
Management however recommended “that LSU-HCSD seriously consider locating the 
replacement facility north of Tulane (Avenue) with an address facing Canal Street” allowing for 
“the necessary future expansion” and “(providing) a better image and better transportation 
access” (ADAMS 2005a, pp.3-4, 7) – the same location planned for the post-storm LSU UMC. 
               Structural deficiencies cited overwhelmingly focused on Charity’s campus. Consultants 
urged that any “potential reuse of Charity” be for “non-hospital uses” and recommended 
“avoiding any research related or major educational functions” (ADAMS 2005a, p. 216). Issued 
just three months before Hurricane Katrina, the report urged Charity Hospital’s demise. 
                                                 
26
 The hospital provider tax was delayed then repealed entirely. See HB 131 (2005 FES) and SB 246 (2006). 
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It was an amazing spirit of people in the community doing the right 
thing, trying to open up this landmark institution to be a beacon light 
for the recovery of New Orleans. 
 
Dr. James Moises, quoted by Lolis Eric Elie, The Times-Picayune 
(Elie 2006)   
 
 
If I have anything to say about it, we’re not going to rebuild Charity. 
 
Jerry Jones, Louisiana Office of Facility Planning and Control (FPC) 
quoted by Jan Moller, The Times-Picayune (Moller 2006a)  
 
 
Katrina was not the only catastrophe for the poor of New Orleans. 
The event has been used as an opportunity to close the doors of 
Charity Hospital… 
 
Lt. Gen. Russel L. Honoré (2008, p. S6)   
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Charity Hospital’s patients, staff and families weather Hurricane Katrina; LSU left all 
hospitals to fend for themselves; Federal health response compounds LSU’s failure 
 
               A day after Hurricane Katrina’s August 29, 2005 landfall, electrical switchgears located 
in the respective basements of Charity and its sister campus University Hospital were inundated 
by floodwater. Conditions at both hospitals rapidly deteriorated. In a matter of hours, the largest 
medical complex in Louisiana and one of the largest public safety net hospitals in the nation was 
transformed from a modern medical center into a Third World facility hobbled without 
electricity, air conditioning and running water. As in much of New Orleans, Charity and 
University hospital’s patients, staff and their families were literally marooned for days awaiting 
rescue. Some patients died awaiting rescue. Everyone endured great hardship and discomfort as 
the languid summer heat swamped the hospital inside as floodwaters swelled outside. 27 
               Surviving Hurricane Katrina’s winds, only to succumb to its encroaching floodwaters, 
several framed accounts are filled with heroism and humanism amidst fatalism. Barkemeyer 
(2006) recalled caring for infants at University Hospital without access to electricity or 
sanitation. Baldwin, Robinson, Barlow and Fargason (2006) outlined the interstate transfer of 
these same neonates. Gray and Hebert (2007) recounted sanitary improvisation at Charity and 
other area hospitals when New Orleans’ municipal water services were shut off just a few days 
after Hurricane Katrina’s landfall. Kline (2007), deBoisblanc (2006) and Van Meter (2006) 
balanced out the challenges and frustrations with camaraderie and humor abounding in 
improbability. Van Meter in particular recounted an evacuation scene:  
Later, semi tractor-trailers backed up the ambulance ramp to evacuate 
the remaining Charity Hospital patients. To everyone’s amazement, 
Charity’s 120 psychiatric patients cooperated very well by standing in 
lines in the hospital’s front lobby as they waited to be loaded into 
military trucks that had backed up to the front steps” (p. 253). 
                                                 
27
 Amongst numerous in-depth news reports documenting Charity and University hospital’s crisis, representative 
were ones by The Associated Press (2005a), Sternberg (2005) and Freemantle (2005). 
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               About 200 patients evacuated from Charity and 167 from University Hospital. Three 
had died because of post-storm conditions (United States House 2006, p. 286). 28 Loewenberg 
(2005) contrasted the evacuation response between Charity Hospital and Tulane Medical Center:   
One of the most dramatic, and horrible, examples of the inequality of 
the disaster was that of Charity Hospital, where 600 patients and 
medical staff were trapped for more than 4 days behind torrents of 
sewerage and contaminated water, cut off from electrical power, clean 
water, and medical supplies. While Charity, the largest public hospital 
in Louisiana, went without relief … the private facility across the 
street, Tulane University Medical Center, hired 20 private helicopters 
to evacuate its 1400 patients and family members (p. 881).  
 
               Loewenberg noted however that this inequity was no direct fault of Tulane, as chair of 
Tulane School of Medicine Dr. Lee Hamm, went by boat immediately to confirm the deplorable 
conditions at Charity and University Hospitals with Associated Press journalists – only to find 
that no immediate state rescue response was forthcoming (p. 881). Van Meter (2006) also noted 
that Tulane received “some of our sicker Charity Hospital patients…” (p. 253). 
               Several observers suggested that much of what actually happened could have been 
avoided – had disaster plans simply been read and followed. Said Loewenberg:  
Government officials had warned about the disastrous results of a 
major storm for years. A particularly detailed briefing was given 
(2003) by a group of scientists at the Center for the Study of Public 
Health Impacts of Hurricanes at Louisiana State University (p. 882).  
 
               Franco, Toner, Waldhorn, Maldin, O’Toole and Inglesby (2006) and Brevard, 
Weintraub, Aiken, Halton, Duchesne, McSwain, Hunt and Marr (2008) noted that the 2001 
flooding of Houston’s Hermann Memorial Hospital in Texas during Tropical Storm Allison was 
referenced in the LSU Health Care Service Division’s disaster preparedness plans. Federal 
officials concurred, finding that LSU failed to uphold its responsibilities for hospitals under the 
state emergency operations plan in advance of Katrina (United States Senate 2006, p. 600). 
                                                 
28
 Eight patients total died; three at Charity / University were wholly attributable to post-storm conditions. 
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               LSU’s inadequacy in disaster preparedness left both its own Charity and University / 
MCLNO complex as well as other non-LSU hospitals to fend for themselves. Guin, Robinson, 
Boyd and Levitan (2009, pp. 51-53) noted that 25 New Orleans metropolitan area hospitals with 
2,500 patients and 11,000 staff and their own family members – even the three not requiring 
evacuation assistance – “were overwhelmed with the needs of their own patients and largely 
unable to provide assistance to others.” The Louisiana Superdome special-needs clinic, run by 
the New Orleans Health Department, relocated to the adjacent New Orleans Arena for more 
space – but quickly was inundated with acute admissions. Aid and evacuation stations were 
erected on Interstate 10 near the 17th Street Canal and the Causeway interchange. Another 
improvised (and chaotic) triage center was staged at the Louis Armstrong New Orleans 
International Airport for transfer to Air Force evacuation flights. Guin, et al (p. 47) also noted 
that search teams 29 made 65,000 rescues to areas outside of the floodwaters – but often just to 
places like roadway overpasses, where people were marooned for up to 5 days without shade or 
provisions – until the full-scale U.S. military evacuations were completed. 
               The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) only ‘man on the ground’ in 
advance of Katrina, Marty J. Bahamonde, observed the Superdome “shelter of last resort”: 
The Superdome had opened as a special needs shelter, but on (the day 
before Hurricane Katrina’s scheduled landfall), as thousands of 
residents were unable to evacuate, the Superdome became a shelter of 
last resort for anyone left in the city. By noon, thousands began 
arriving and by midday, lines wrapped around the building … I met 
with the National Guard inside the Superdome to discuss a range of 
things including the expected arrival of a FEMA Disaster Medical 
Assistance Team (DMAT) from Houston. The National Guard also 
told me that they expected 360,000 “meals ready to eat” “MREs” and 
15 trucks of water to arrive that night … Instead of 360,000 MRE’s 
only 40,000 arrived. Instead of 15 trucks of water, only 5 arrived, and 
the medical team did not arrive either (Bahamonde 2005, p. 2). 
                                                 
29
 Guin, et al said the U.S. Coast Guard and other military, the LA. Dept. of Wildlife and Fisheries and many 
independent persons made rescues with limited air and water craft, to any available spot of dry land or roadway. 
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                The first team to reach the Superdome shelter, New Mexico DMAT, arrived one day 
after Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, and was immediately swamped with meeting the medical 
needs of 20,000 people (Bahamonde 2005, pp. 3-4). Guin, et al (2009, p. 75) said only one 
federal DMAT, Oklahoma 1, arrived in advance of the storm to provide immediate healthcare. A 
special report of the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
entitled Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, recognized that “Charity Hospital in 
New Orleans, rendered inoperable by flood water, was one of only two major trauma centers in 
the entire state” (U.S. Senate 2006, p. 399). Guin, et al (p. 75) summarized its findings: 
• Activation of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) was 
severely hampered by “a limited number of federal medical teams 
(that) were actually in a position prior to landfall to deploy into 
the effected area” – and only one was in place before the storm. 
• “The federal government’s medical response suffered from a lack of 
planning, coordination, and cooperation, particularly between the 
U.S. Health and Human Services (DHHS) and the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS)” (inclusive of FEMA). 
• Federal medical agency providers lacked “adequate resources or the 
right type or mix of medical capabilities to full meet the medical 
needs … of large evacuee populations…” 
• “Although FEMA eventually deployed virtually all of its (NDMS) 
resources … there was a greater need for such teams than could be 
filled, and those teams that did deploy experienced difficulties…” 
• No “federal medical supplies were prepositioned in the Gulf 
region;” it was impossible to fill “a last-minute request from the 
City of New Orleans” before Hurricane Katrina made landfall. 30 
               Though not officially called upon by the federal Department of Homeland Security 
until after that agency realized the enormity of Hurricane Katrina, the U.S. Department of 
Defense (DOD) under the command of “Lieutenant General Russel Honoré was already leaning 
forward pro-actively and moving assets and personnel into (the storm impacted) region” 
(Keating 2005, Broderick 2006). Charity Hospital would also be seen as a key military asset. 
                                                 
30
 Instead of the required 12 hours delivery, supplies from the Strategic National Stockpile took 3 days (AP 2005e). 
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The attempt to reopen Charity Hospital by its workers and the U.S. military is thwarted 
               Charity’s patient evacuation was completed on September 3, 2005 – five days after 
Hurricane Katrina’s landfall (Freemantle 2005). Charity’s Emergency Department (ED) chief 
doctors subsequently were summoned by U.S. Army Special Forces units under the command of 
Captains Jason Howard and Robert Byerley, staged at the Morial New Orleans Convention 
Center, to assume its medical operations. Lead personnel from both groups returned September 6 
to find that all of the first floor doors of Charity were left open and unsecured! 31 Charity’s ED 
doctors and military forces promptly agreed to embark on a plan to assess whether the hospital 
could be reopened, and once given clearance, proceed to do so (Moises 2009b, p. 115). 
               More than 150 soldiers under the command of General William Caldwell IV, 
Commander of the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division, accelerated the restoration of Charity by its ED 
doctors, nursing staff and medical residents (Evans 2009). Noting that “a building and not a tent” 
was needed for doctors to treat patients, Captain Howard said the 82nd Airborne’s decision to 
support Charity Hospital’s reopening was based on solid strategic evidence: 
1)  The first floor of the hospital was not compromised by flood 
water, only the basement was. This made it easiest to salvage. 
2)  The location and elevation of Charity Hospital was high 
enough and well located that if the levees broke again, patients 
and employees could be easily rescued by a large truck and 
evacuated via the nearby interstate. This was not so for the 
other hospitals. 
3)  Charity Hospital was also centrally located so that 
(Emergency Medical Services) could stage from there on dry 
ground so they could better provide medical support to the 
surrounding areas. 
4)  Charity Hospital suffered the least amount of damage 
compared to all of the hospitals in the area. 
5)  When the building was surveyed by a team of physicians who 
had set up several (field) hospitals, they were all in agreement 
that Charity was easily salvageable, (and) that it could be up 
and running within a few weeks (Howard 2006). 
                                                 
31
 See Gratz (2011): “…participants in the post-storm cleanup described seeing signs of outright sabotage.” 
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                U.S. military efforts to reopen Charity were authorized under Emergency Support 
Function (ESF) Annex #8 – Public Health and Medical Services, pursuant to the Department of 
Homeland Security’s National Response Plan on disasters and mass casualty incidents. Its first 
use of ESF-8 since its creation in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. military formally 
received clearance from the Department of Health and Human Services and FEMA to restore 
hospital facilities in this “presidentially-declared” disaster (Lister 2005; ESF-8 2003 and 2008).   
                As called for under ESF-8, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers evaluated Charity’s 
structural integrity and found it structurally sound. Howard said he then consulted with an 
“industrial hygienist” about the floodwaters then standing in Charity’s basement “(deciding) it 
was no where as bad as what was in the city streets.” Four million gallons of floodwater were 
pumped from Charity’s basement, Howard said, with the help of the crew of the Navy Battleship 
Iwo Jima, and by German engineers (Howard 2006). The USS Iwo Jima’s Damage Control team 
finished “dewatering” Charity’s basement September 14; and went on to drain floodwaters from 
the basement of the former Baptist Hospital Uptown and other facilities (Jones 2005). The Naval 
Mobile Construction Battalion 40 (NMCB) also made continual structural and environmental 
assessments of Charity – and boarded more than 300 windows in advance of Hurricane Rita’s 
landfall September 20, 2005 (Louisiana House Concurrent Resolution 8 (HCR 8) 2005). 
                Airline Ambassadors International (AAI), a non-governmental organization of airline 
employees affiliated with the United Nations assessed Charity’s new role in military operations: 
Airline Ambassadors (AAI) assisted the [U.S. Army Special Forces] 
as they conducted interagency coordination during Katrina relief. AAI 
provided Special Forces with (a) 2 megawatt generator to keep 
Charity Hospital functional … After Charity Hospital was cleaned up 
and pumped out (of floodwaters) … Charity Hospital turned out to be 
a military asset that provided training for Special Forces medics. 
Reopening Charity Hospital was critical to the health care strategy of 
the entire southern [part of the U.S. impacted by Katrina] (AAI 2008). 
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                One of the first people who had originally arrived at Charity to affect the rescue of its 
patients and hospital personnel, Staff Sergeant John A. Johnson, Prime Power Electrician, 205th 
Engineering Battalion U.S. Army, testified to his role in Charity Hospital’s restoration:   
Beginning on about September 7, 2005, I played a leadership role in 
restoring power to Charity Hospital, and in assisting in the cleanup of 
Charity in an effort to make it ready for possible quartering of 
soldiers. Between September 7 and September 19, 2005, I personally 
witnessed and participated in the complete restoration of the first and 
second and parts of the third floor of Charity Hospital … Among the 
work done by me and others, we rerouted power from the basement, 
which was flooded when I arrived, and restored power to the first 
floor of Charity. We powered up the entire emergency room. We also 
used a backup generator to power up floors 3 through 19, and saw the 
generators successfully do that… (Johnson 2009, p.2). 
 
                Johnson estimated that there had been over 200 people involved, including the Coast 
Guard, Navy Seabees and various state National Guard units, as well as many civilian 
volunteers. Johnson said under Howard’s command, the 21st Chemical Company attached to the 
82nd Airborne oversaw the removal of all perishable refuse from Charity Hospital – and 
meticulously cleaned and certified Charity’s emergency room and intensive care units as well as 
other floors for medical use. Johnson remarked: “I can attest from personal knowledge that the 
emergency room was cleaner than it was before (Hurricane) Katrina” (Johnson, pp. 2-4).                     
               LSU Health Sciences clinical assistant professor of emergency medicine and ED 
physician Dr. James Moises said the “spotless” clean up of Charity’s first three floors was 
“essentially complete by September 21.” He said that electric power, sanitation services and air 
conditioning was also restored to the hospital (Moises 2009a, p.4). 32  
               While initially granted authorization by LSU officials to proceed with Charity’s clean 
up, ED doctors were warned not to admit patients. General Caldwell nevertheless expressed 
confidence about the necessity of standing up Charity for patient care (Moises 2009b, p. 118).                       
                                                 
32
 Photos of Charity’s restoration taken by its workers and U.S. military personnel are in Appendix A. 
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               Within days of the restoration of Charity’s first three floors being fully completed, 
Sergeant Johnson had requested and “arranged for the delivery of powerful state of the art 
generators from General Electric, which would have the capacity to provide power to floors 3 
through 19 on a longer-term basis” – only to have “LSU officials, in my presence, refused to 
accept the generators, and as a result, General Electric took them away.” LSU, backed by state 
officials, ordered an end to all efforts to reopen Charity Hospital (Johnson 2009, pp. 2-5). 33   
               LSU officials also warned its workers not to return. Indeed, Charity Hospital security 
intimated that if they did, the workers would be charged with criminal trespassing. Charity 
Hospital was then permanently closed by September 30, 2005 (Moises 2009b, p. 121).  
               Military commanders who questioned the closure order were told by Louisiana 
Governor Kathleen Blanco their help was no longer needed. Lieutenant General Russel Honoré, 
Commander of Task Force Katrina, remarked:  
“Ma’am, we got the hospital clean, my people report … if you want to 
use it,” I recalled telling Governor Blanco. Her reply to me: “Well 
general, we’re not going to open it; we’re working on a different 
plan” (Burdeau 2009).   
 
               General Caldwell said Charity was ready to reopen after three weeks of intense 
restoration. Said Caldwell: “We were actually thinking of having a ribbon-cutting ceremony, 
give ‘a thumbs up’ and turn it over to the health care professionals” (Burdeau 2009). 
               Reflecting on reasons state officials wanted to keep Charity closed, Honoré said:  
This is about business, man. This is about rich people making more 
money. This is not about providing health care (Burdeau 2009). 
 
               Former Charity doctor James Moises said it was about getting a new medical complex:  
It was their orchestrated plan. It was ‘How can we manipulate the 
disaster for institutional gains?’ (Burdeau 2009).  
                                                 
33
 YouTube A/V interview: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E2QCUslXFDU&feature=player_embedded.  
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               For her part, Governor Blanco told The Associated Press she didn’t recall speaking 
with General Honoré about Charity’s closure – nor did she even know about their efforts to stand 
up the hospital for medical use (Burdeau 2009). Nevertheless, it was well known that Blanco had 
refused to permit Joint Task Force Katrina to exert full control over the Louisiana National 
Guard and other post-Katrina efforts during the same time period as the Joint Task Force 
Katrina-backed attempt to reopen Charity Hospital (Bowman, Kapp and Belasco 2005).  
               Tensions between the Bush Administration and Governor Blanco flared in the storm’s 
aftermath, heightening the failure of emergency response that stranded tens of thousands until the 
cavalry under Honoré’s command came. U.S. Representative Tom Davis, Chairman of the Select 
Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, said: 
We all acknowledge the heroic efforts that (the Department of 
Defense), National Guard, and Coast Guard personnel made, efforts 
that saved many, many lives. The mobilization was massive and, at 
least once the call went out, swift. But we also need to acknowledge 
that there were problems with the military response … There were 
problems … with an early and persistent disconnect between DOD 
and state and local authorities… (Davis 2005). 
 
               Congressman Davis went on to frame the boundaries of conflict on disaster response 
“with regard to the National Response Plan’s Catastrophic Incident Index – the annex that 
authorizes federal agencies to act when state and local capacity even to know what they need is 
compromised by the sheer size of the calamity.” Yet Davis also cites a statement by the National 
Governors Association – stating that governors should lead any disaster response (Davis 2005).  
               Major General Bennett C. Landreneau, Adjutant General of the Louisiana National 
Guard, testified that it was under Governor Blanco’s command and that DOD’s Joint Task Force 
Katrina under the command of Lt. Gen. Honoré was “one of working partners” – directly 
coordinating with Governor Blanco their hurricane response (Landreneau 2005, p. 3). 
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Louisiana returns $340 million in emergency FEMA aid meant to repair Charity Hospital 
               The lengths to which the U.S. military sought to restore Charity Hospital’s most vital 
functions cannot be overstated. In addition to being granted advance authorization under the 
ESF-8 provisions, “FEMA authorized expenditures up to $1 billion” for the military to transport 
and distribute relief supplies and set up medical facilities. In turn, “Department of Defense 
(DOD) granted commanders a ‘blank check’ to do whatever was necessary to help the people of 
Mississippi and Louisiana” (U.S. Senate 2006, p. 425; Wombwell 2009). According to a 
Congressional Research Service assessment of early Department of Defense Katrina-related 
appropriations, FEMA reimbursed the DOD $4.6 billion (Bowman, Kapp and Belasco 2005).                    
               A possible attempt by the Department of Defense to allocate substantial monetary 
resources to cover necessary repair costs of Charity Hospital was initiated – but declined by 
Louisiana state officials in September 2005. Under normal FEMA Public Assistance program 
guidelines, the federal agency would pay 75 percent of project costs and a state would be 
responsible for 25 percent. Under special expedited rules, FEMA pledged “to reimburse state 
agencies and local governments for costs involved in lifesaving emergency work related to 
Hurricane Katrina” reimbursing 100 percent of all eligible costs (FEMA 2005). 
               Louisiana’s Department of the Treasury received $352 million during the third week of 
September 2005, adding to $105 million already on hand for a total of $457 million in FEMA-
approved disaster assistance. Louisiana’s Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH) officials 
however expressed confusion over what the funds were intended to reimburse. DHH officials 
said if they accepted the funds without accounting for actual expenditures, the state would be 
charged interest, and potentially blocked from future FEMA Public Assistance funding – so 
DHH promptly returned to FEMA almost $340 million (Maggi 2005).  
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               In a departmental press release, DHH acknowledged numerous questions from the 
public, but said that its handling of the FEMA “overpayment” – which DHH said never actually 
reached their coffers – was disclosed to Governor Blanco, as well as to the Legislative Auditor 
and the state inspector general’s office. DHH Secretary Dr. Fred Cerise cited the federal Cash 
Management Improvement Act of 1990 that “only allows state agencies such as DHH to get 
federal reimbursement for actual expenditures, not for anticipated needs” (DHH 2005b). 
               DHH interdepartmental electronic communications revealed that “Charity hospitals 
might also be included in this $350 million dollar request” (Reynolds 2005). The 
communications also indicated that the funding was being arranged as part of a mid-year state 
budget adjustment, known as a BA-7, to account for the expenditure of funds within state 
government. The communications do not indicate whether the funding request was being made 
on behalf of the U.S. Department of Defense – though its Louisiana counterpart known as the 
Military Department was seeking to line up “$350 (million) on the Military’s BA-7 for (the 
Office of Public Health)” (Dusse 2005). DHH said in its press release that the agency “received 
$352 million from FEMA, but spent only $9.6 million on (Office of Public Health) special needs 
shelters that were opened throughout the state, overtime pay and medical supplies”(DHH 2005b). 
               Under ESF-8 provisions both DHH and LSU have federally-mandated state-directed 
responsibilities during emergencies and disasters. Both state administrative bodies came under 
fire for their lack of professional competency (Rainey, Scardina and Updike 2005, pp. 131-132). 
Yet nagging questions also loomed that questioned the state’s assertion that Charity Hospital 
could not be made suitable for medical use. LSU-HCSD chief Don Smithburg said “Charity 
Hospital would cost $340 million to repair” (Moller 2005d). This was the same amount which 
the U.S. military apparently attempted to give Louisiana officials for Charity’s reopening. 
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The healthcare consequences of Charity Hospital’s forced closure 
 
               After rebuffing Task Force Katrina’s efforts to reopen Charity Hospital, LSU had 
attempted to retain the U.S. Navy hospital ship USNS Comfort to become Charity’s substitute. 
The ship had arrived at the Port of New Orleans September 29 after spending nearly three weeks 
on the Mississippi Gulf Coast treating more than 1,800 people in Hurricane Katrina’s aftermath. 
The 800-bed floating trauma center however saw no more than 100 patients during its two week 
New Orleans stay. Charity Emergency Department (ED) Dr. James Aiken said he was “very 
concerned” that the Comfort’s departure would leave “New Orleans without a fully functioning 
public hospital as residents began to return” (The Associated Press / AP 2005c; Moller 2005d). 34 
               Following the closure of Charity Hospital and the Comfort’s departure, Charity’s 
remaining medical staff practiced medicine in several makeshift locations. First, six tents were 
set up outdoors as an urgent care MASH unit five blocks away in a parking lot from the Charity 
campus they had restored just days before. More serious trauma cases were treated in a joint 
Army Special Forces-Charity ED unit inside the Morial New Orleans Convention Center (Young 
2005). Dr. Peter DeBlieux, director of resident training at Charity, responding to the provision of 
“E-MED” emergency medicine tents, rather than just reopening the hospital: 
Now my fear is the entire country will think it’s appropriate to care 
for our patients in a tent. I don’t think the rest of the country 
appreciates we are seeing people in a tent (Connolly 2005). 
 
               DeBlieux said the unit, dubbed “The Spirit of Charity,” saw about 150 patients daily.                 
Because of the makeshift nature of E-MED tents, it failed to meet federal health standards – and 
hence was unable to receive Medicare, Medicaid or private insurance reimbursement. The unit’s 
funding was drawn instead from Charity hospital system state budget allocations for its physical 
building – monies that LSU officials acknowledged were running out (Connolly 2005). 
                                                 
34
 For healthcare consequences related to Charity’s closure that prompted internal displacement, see pp. 111-115. 
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               After Charity’s closure, just 250 out of nearly 4,000 Charity and University hospital 
employees remained working, with the rest placed on unpaid furlough (Connolly 2005). 
Displaced health professionals warned that these job losses could become permanent – and 
would compromise the very recovery of the city: 
We read in the paper that the governor wants to keep as many people 
as possible in the state; that the mayor wants to repopulate the city 
soon and start building business again. I could not agree more. But 
not addressing Charity Hospital / MCLNO and leaving employees’ 
employment status in limbo is not the way to do this (Danos 2005).  
 
                  Two months after Charity’s closing, over 2,600 hospital employees would be fired 
(Moller 2006c). LSU and Tulane graduate medical education programs were destabilized, 
leading to the reassignment of 550 medical residents and fellows. The Delgado Charity School of 
Nursing and other schools, in addition to LSU allied education and dentistry programs were also 
impacted by the displacement of 2300 nursing and allied health students (LSU-HCSD 2005).  
               And “The Spirit of Charity” was forced to wander again, as the Morial New Orleans 
Convention Center sought to prepare the site where the tent hospital stood for pre-storm booked 
conventions (Callimachi 2006). They moved to a once-flooded department store next to the 
Louisiana Superdome (still used as outpatient clinics); while a mothballed hospital in Jefferson 
Parish was reopened as a temporary 40-bed Level 1 trauma center. LSU-HCSD spent nearly $5 
million for the makeshift facilities, which were later reimbursed by FEMA (Louisiana Public 
Records Act request 2006; United States General Accountability Office / U.S. GAO 2006a, p. 6).  
               Charity Hospital’s closure in the months and years following Hurricane Katrina 
underscored its utter centrality to southeast Louisiana healthcare, both public and private. 
Charity’s Level 1 trauma center was the only one on the Gulf Coast – forcing remaining 
hospitals to receive patients with medical conditions rarely experienced (Barringer 2006). 
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               Coupled with the near-total closure and / or destruction of area nursing homes and 
rehabilitation facilities, the few remaining open hospitals quickly filled with patients that would 
not be so easily discharged (Barringer 2006). A severe shortage of nurses, aides, home hospice 
and service workers compounded the crisis (DHH 2006). A veritable Katrina Doctors’ Diaspora 
– “the largest single displacement of doctors in U.S. history” – added pressure to those remaining 
(American College of Emergency Physicians / ACEP 2006). This loss of health workers, federal 
officials said, resulted in “staffed hospital beds (inside New Orleans’ city limits) that were about 
80 percent less in February 2006” than before the storm (U.S. GAO 2006a, p. 35). 
               Charity’s closure also compromised trauma services beyond New Orleans -- especially 
in Baton Rouge – the latter where many evacuees endured lengthy wait times that threatened to 
adversely affect patients’ health (ACEP 2006). Many primary care practices and outpatient 
clinics citywide, already decimated by flood damage and the dislocation of their patient bases, 
lost the only hospital which would accept their referrals (Ferdinand 2006).  
               The finances of remaining private and non-state hospitals also hemorrhaged due to the 
virtual overnight inundation with patients that Charity would have normally seen. Charity’s 
sudden closure sent shock waves of pain – even on those which had proclaimed this iconic but 
neglected hospital to be outmoded (Zigmond 2006; Larkin 2007, p. 58; Sternberg 2007). 
               Testifying before a U.S. House subcommittee on post-Katrina healthcare, Colorado 
U.S. Representative Diana Degette remarked about the private providers’ apparent underlying 
stance when it comes to Charity Hospital – and especially its care for the uninsured: 
I asked the panel of the private hospitals if their long-term business 
plans included providing care to the population previously served by 
Charity; and everybody got a look of shock on their face and said no, 
that was not in their business plan for assuming the care of Charity’s 
patients in the long term (Degette 2007, p. 7). 
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               Diane Rowland, Executive Director of the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the 
Uninsured, characterized Louisiana healthcare as “a two-tier system” with private hospitals and 
providers serving those with insurance and Charity system hospitals serving the uninsured – and 
that the closure of Charity after Hurricane Katrina had a profoundly negative impact on both: 
Our household interview survey (revealed) the fact that 90 percent of 
our respondents did not feel there were enough services, hospitals, 
clinics, medical facilities in the New Orleans area to meet their needs 
and that it was one of the most troubling factors in their decision of 
whether (to return or stay) in New Orleans (Rowland 2007, p. 21). 
 
               Though licensed at 714 beds in two campuses at the time of Hurricane Katrina, there 
were 300-500 regularly staffed beds between Charity and University hospitals (LSU-HCSD 
2005; Hartley 2012). Before Katrina, Charity had 70 ED beds and University 14 (Moises 2009a, 
p. 1). Charity also had a 128-bed psychiatric “Crisis Intervention Unit” (BKA 2007). Pre-
Katrina, Charity had more than 160 outpatient clinics on its MCLNO campus (Smithburg 2007, 
p. 176). Another 21 free clinics apart from LSU were situated throughout metro New Orleans 
(Partnership for Access to Healthcare / PATH 2003). Six years later, 76 safety net clinics 35 are 
open, including ones run by LSU-HCSD inside LSU Interim Hospital and other locations 
(Greater New Orleans Community Health Connection / GNO CHC 2011).          
               Charity’s sister facility, University Hospital, once declared “unsalvageable,” reopened 
in late 2006 as LSU Interim Hospital (Smithburg 2005, Moran 2006). Staff shortages initially led 
to only 60 of 150 beds available for its opening (Moller 2006c). Its Level 1 trauma center did not 
return until February 2007 (LSU-HCSD 2007f, p. 19). Six and a half years later, LSU Interim 
has 255 staffed beds with 38 intensive care unit beds (Hartley 2012). FEMA has reimbursed LSU 
$101 million of the hospital’s total repair costs (FEMA 2011).   
                                                 
35
 “Safety net” indicates access to free inpatient and outpatient healthcare, exclusive of prescription drugs and 
certain tests, for those with incomes of 200% of the federal poverty level for family size, qualifying under either 
under the 1115 Medicaid waiver (DHH 2010) or LSU-HCSD Free Care (LSU-HCSD 2011b). 
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               Nowhere has the impact of Charity’s closing been more acute than with inpatient 
psychiatric care. The closure of the hospital’s psychiatric Crisis Intervention Unit (CIU) – once 
the city’s largest facility – left Orleans Parish Prison’s 60-bed psych-ward to become the default 
provider and the largest place for inpatient psychiatric care (Stephens 2007). A clinician noted:  
Without Charity Hospital and the VA Medical Center, the psychiatric 
public sector bed capacity was reduced 96% four months after the 
disaster; one year later the reduction remained at 70% (Calderon-
Abbo 2008, p. 305). 
 
               Years after Charity’s closure, the inundation of area general hospital emergency rooms 
with mental health patients continues to be a seemingly insurmountable obstacle. Such patients 
often remain for weeks and crowd out other acute care patients. Within the first year of the 
storm, hospitals effectively were closed to new admissions – even as ambulances and police 
continued to drop off emergency patients (Potash and Winstead 2008, p. 122).  
               The American College of Emergency Physicians said psychiatric care was “deficient 
before the storm (and) now close to non-existent” – and that Charity’s closed psychiatric CIU 
was “the number one cause for the mental health crisis” in New Orleans (ACEP 2006, p. 3). 
Three years after the storm, 20 beds were staged in trailers outside LSU Interim as a “Mental 
Health Emergency Room Extension (MHERE) (Eggler 2008). This makeshift unit received more 
than 350 people in September 2010 alone “with a mental health crisis” (Tebo 2010). 
               Baton Rouge Mayor Melvin “Kip” Holden noted that his city was also adversely 
impacted with the loss of “900 of the state’s 2,100 licensed beds when New Orleans was 
evacuated” (Holden 2005). Baton Rouge mental health professionals “reported a 72 percent 
increase in patient volume at their three mental health clinics, 100 additional cases per month of 
patients in mental health crisis presenting to area emergency rooms” … and a near doubling of 
“commitment orders for mental health treatment” (Potash and Winstead 2008).  
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               A study conducted in early 2006 of all Tulane University faculty and staff (including 
administrators) found “a significant burden of (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder) PTSD symptoms 
was present 6 months following Hurricane Katrina among a large group of adults who had 
returned to work in New Orleans” – and this was from a workforce, researchers said, that had 
“universal health coverage and the benefits of an employee assistance program” (DeSalvo, Hyre, 
Ompad, Menke, Tynes and Munter 2007). Meanwhile a study of LSU Interim ED patients 
surveyed right after the hospital was reopened found a PTSD prevalence of 38.2 percent – ten 
times higher than the national PTSD prevalence of 3.6 percent (De Wulf, Mills, Levitan, Macht, 
Afonso, Avegno and Mills 2007). In a 2007 survey by the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 
access to mental health services declined – and “that three out of four people support the 
restoration of Charity Hospital as a primary health care resource for the poor” (Shields 2007). 
               New Orleans had “15.8 suicides per 100,000 persons in 2009 – well above both the pre-
Katrina rate of 9.8 and the national rate of 10.96” (UNITY for the Homeless of Greater New 
Orleans / UNITY 2010). A rash of suicides at Orleans Parish Prison, compounded by inadequate 
staffing and procedures, underscore the need for more outside treatment options (T-P 2009b).  
               Heightened levels of violence also have come define the post-storm landscape. 
Incidents such as the killing of two children by their uncle, who suffered from schizophrenia, led 
New Orleans Police Department Crisis Commander Cecile Tebo to observe:  
This is what happens when a city does not provide in- and out-patient 
services for people with mental illnesses (Urbaszewski 2011).  
 
               Tebo has long warned of “the ticking time bombs” of people suffering from debilitating 
mental illness and lacking mental health resources, who are “poised to harm themselves or 
someone else.” She also said that many in prison wouldn’t be there if proper treatment options 
were made available (Tebo 2007).                   
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               Some public education, healthcare and homeless advocates have sounded the alarm that 
the failure to replace the mental healthcare services once provided by Charity Hospital has 
heightened disaster-induced PTSD – leading to enhanced rates of chronic homelessness and an 
intractable wave of crime since Hurricane Katrina (UNITY 2010; Andrews 2011).  
               Following demands from New Orleans Mayor C. Ray Nagin and the City Council to 
restore or replace Charity’s psychiatric CIU, the state and LSU announced in 2007 a slight 
expansion of inpatient mental health services, with 20 additional adult psychiatric beds each at 
DePaul Hospital and the New Orleans Adolescent Hospital (NOAH) (Nagin 2007; Hong 2007; 
Calderon-Abbo 2008, p. 307). The state also evaluated whether Charity could be reopened for 
just its psychiatric CIU – finding that Charity’s “deficiencies are correctable” (Blitch Knevel 
Architects / BKA 2007a and BKA 2007b). 
               Despite the expansion of adult psychiatric beds, mental health capacity remains 
strained. Planners for the proposed replacement of Charity Hospital acknowledged that the 
current 38 beds “are nearly 100 percent occupied and the unit is frequently on ‘diversion’ status” 
– and that 22 additional beds for 2015 “rapidly will be filled” (Verité 2011, p. 17). 36 
               Health professionals from around the nation decried Charity Hospital’s closure. Robert 
E. Suter, President of the American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP) wrote to LSU:  
The emergency medical services provided at Charity Hospital are an 
essential public service that needs to be restored and maintained to 
avoid further tragedy (Suter 2005). 
 
               Charity’s workers never waned, though their patience frayed. Dr. DeBlieux said:  
Within 2 weeks after the storm, our entire residency contingency and 
many of the academic faculty were back in the building salvaging, in 
hopes of delivering care in that facility. The leadership at the state 
level told us to stand down. They did not think that was a salvageable 
enterprise. It was very difficult [to accept] (Flynn 2006, p. 311). 
                                                 
36
 See Epilogue for the 2012 status of LSU Health system budget cuts, furthering the loss of Charity Hospital. 
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Senator Coburn and others demand that Charity be reopened and independently evaluated 
               LSU officials, under fire for keeping Charity closed in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, 
confronted head-on their critics. Dr. Michael K. Butler, Chief Medical Officer of LSU’s Health 
Care Services Division (LSU-HCSD), in a letter to the ACEP’s Suter, caustically remarked: 
The first casualties of [Hurricane] Katrina were truth and sound 
reasoning. Much misinformation has been promulgated in the media, 
and from well-meaning staff and providers (Butler 2005). 
 
               Butler replied to Suter that Charity cannot be revived, despite the attempt to do so: 
People now think that Katrina was a hospital renovation improvement 
project which will “magically” convert Charity to be appropriate for 
[Emergency Department] work when it wasn’t appropriate prior to the 
storm. The “cited” experts and their reports have not materialized. We 
are concerned, more than you, about retaining our faculty, our 
education programs, and our patients. We understand you are 
concerned about the specific emergency department program and 
your concerns are noted. Promulgation of rumors and innuendo is not 
appropriate or productive. We are concerned about 87 residency 
programs with 800-plus residents (Butler 2005). 
 
               LSU’s expulsion of its doctors and military personnel from Charity Hospital also 
reached the halls of Congress. U.S. Senator Tom Coburn, a practicing physician, received 
complaints from members of the Oklahoma National Guard that Charity could have reopened. 
During a hearing October 6, 2005 before a U.S. Senate subcommittee, Coburn suggested that 
LSU was taking advantage of the storm to get a new Charity replacement (Moller 2005d). 
               Senator Coburn (2006) wrote LSU-HCSD’s Chief Executive Officer Don Smithburg, 
expressing his awareness of New Orleans’ “decimated hospital infrastructure” and urged that 
Charity be reopened, to “provide a temporary solution to a crisis situation.” Coburn stated that he 
was impressed with “the heroic efforts of the medical staff to clean the rest of the hospital – 
without pay or credit.” He then reiterated that assessments made by the U.S. military certifying 
that Charity could be used for interim medical care not be summarily dismissed (Coburn 2006).  
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               Senator Coburn also called for an independent review of Charity’s medical viability: 
I understand that in order to allow military personnel in to clean up 
the place, the Army Corps positively assessed the hospital for its 
structural soundness. In addition, the 82nd Airborne, (the 
Occupational, Safety and Health Administration), and the (U.S.) 
Public Health Service have all visited the hospital and informally 
assessed its soundness. I understand that these reports were 
preliminary. However, their positive outcomes (underscore) that a full 
and professional evaluation be conducted. So far, the only 
“comprehensive” assessment of the Charity Hospital facility was 
conducted by Louisiana’s consulting engineer from Atlanta, Walter 
Adams. As a member of the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and 
Government Affairs Committee (HSGAC), I strongly recommend that 
the LSU system commission a completely independent evaluation of 
the facility (Coburn 2006). 
 
               LSU-HCSD’s Chief Executive Officer Don Smithburg responded to Senator Coburn, 
referencing the Adams Project Management assessment. Smithburg expressed appreciation for 
the doctors’ attempt to reopen Charity, while reiterating that LSU had no intention of reopening: 
Like you, we have heard views expressed that it would be a relatively 
easy matter to clean and reopen Charity Hospital. However, it would 
be derelict for us to act on anything other than the best evidence 
available … We appreciate the help and concern from others who are 
well-intended and motivated by a shared concern for patients and 
education. In fact, it is a testament to the dedication of our LSU 
physicians that many are willing to endure all manner of adverse 
conditions, whether obvious or hidden, in order to continue serving 
the New Orleans population. But, our fiduciary duty to our patients, 
medical staff, and the community requires us to make decisions based 
on written assessments by qualified engineering experts… (Smithburg 
2006). 
 
               Smithburg warned Coburn that unseen damage and dangerous mold and other hazards 
lurked behind Charity’s walls. 37 He ignored skepticism of Adams Management’s impartiality. 
Nor did he mention Adams’ recommendation two years before Katrina for “the replacement or 
relocation of the Charity campus …” with “a new replacement 600-bed health-care center (to) 
become the centerpiece of a bold, new Medical Center of Louisiana” (This Week at MCL 2003).   
                                                 
37
 Photos taken by LSU of Charity’s storm destruction and medical response are in Appendix B. 
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Despite LSU’s proclamation of closure, Charity’s workers make a last public stand for 
reopening; FEMA disputes LSU’s amount of Charity’s storm damage reimbursement 
 
               LSU-HCSD’s chief Donald Smithburg proclaimed to the LSU Board of Supervisors 
that Charity and University hospitals “were issued their ‘death warrant’ by Katrina” (AP 2005b).                  
This contention that it was Hurricane Katrina that had done in Charity Hospital – while LSU 
and the state long sought the hospital’s closure in advance of the storm – particularly rankled 
Charity’s Emergency Department doctors. Nearly three months after being barred from 
reopening their unit along with Charity’s first three floors, The New York Times reported: 
The state officials who manage Charity say Hurricane Katrina dealt 
this Huey Long-era landmark a deathblow and want it torn down. In 
its place, they say, they want to build a hospital with a “new mission,” 
one that treats both public and private patients and relies less on 
government money. But doctors who work there sharply disagree 
with that plan. They say Louisiana officials are using the storm as an 
excuse to achieve the state’s long-sought goal of demolishing Charity, 
and then moving away from a promise that has long been made to the 
city’s poor (Nossiter 2005). 
 
               Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) infrastructure specialist David 
Fukutomi previously suggested that federal rules under the Stafford Act allowed funds to be 
applied to replacement construction, noting that LSU and the State of Louisiana could take 
advantage of “a fantastic opportunity to implement a vision for the future” (Connolly 2005). 
Adam Nossiter’s New York Times’ reportage showcased for a national audience Charity’s ED 
doctors’ contention that the hospital was not damaged beyond repair and could had been 
reopened on an interim basis to address New Orleans’ post-Katrina vital health needs. Signaling 
a shift that set up a new phase of contention between those favoring and opposed to reopening 
Charity, The New York Times’ report now quoted FEMA’s Fukutomi expressing skepticism 
about LSU and the state’s “very impressive public relations campaign to publicize their desires” 
to keep Charity closed and reapply its replacement value toward a new facility (Nossiter 2005). 
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               Indeed, FEMA was fully aware of the clean-out of Charity Hospital by both its workers 
and military units under the command of Joint Task Force Katrina, as authorized under the 
National Response Plan: “FEMA funded all of these emergency protective measures in an 
expedited manner as it was assumed Charity Hospital could be re-opened to provide critically-
needed medical and emergency services care to the New Orleans area” (FEMA 2009, p.11). In 
contrast to the state’s $257.7 million damage assessment, FEMA said its late 2005 assessment 
found Charity sustained storm damages of $23.9 million (FEMA 2009, pp.12-15). 
               In what was described as “a 2-hour tongue lashing,” Charity Hospital ED members 
quoted in the December 2005 New York Times report were summoned to a January 2006 meeting 
by LSU-HCSD chief Donald Smithburg and HCSD Chief Medical Officer Dr. Michael Butler. 
The workers were warned against continuing their public dissent against Charity’s closure – or, 
suggested Butler, there would be grave consequences of “Biblical proportions” – meaning the 
potential loss of their medical emergency department operating contract and other actions. The 
most outspoken member, Dr. James Moises, weeks after the meeting, formally resigned his 
Charity clinical appointment in protest (Moises 2009b, pp. 134-137, 168). His continued public 
dissent, joined by medical residents, sparked continued public resistance to Charity’s closure. 38 
               While it is thought that some Charity workers continued to 
dissent behind the scenes, for 100 medical personnel, joined by former 
patients, New Orleans City Council President Oliver Thomas and the 
grandson of Charity’s architect, their last public expression was held 
March 25, 2006 outside Charity’s shuttered ED ambulance ramp. 39  
                                                 
38
 The author joined with Moises in this public resistance. A list of organizations calling for the reopening of Charity 
Hospital – as well as saving the Lower Mid-City New Orleans neighborhood from demolition for the proposed 
University Medical Center replacement are provided in Appendix C. 
39
 Reporting by Haber (2006) and Martel (2006); Commentary by Elie (2006) and LSU-HCSD (2006d)  
93 
 
               Though Charity Hospital’s doctors could no longer publicly dissent against LSU and 
the state’s abandonment of Charity Hospital and keep their jobs, their attempted disaster 
recovery efforts to restore healthcare by reopening Charity Hospital had significantly influenced 
FEMA’s challenge on reimbursement for actual storm damages versus pre-storm and post-storm 
facility neglect (FEMA 2009, pp. 11-12). Clashing with LSU and the state’s unyielding response 
to keep Charity closed at all costs – only an unprecedented political intervention would convince 
FEMA to approve releasing the funds for Charity’s full replacement cost. 40 
               LSU often cited a March 2006 U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report to back 
its decision to keep Charity closed by not spending tens of millions of dollars on an outdated 
facility. 41  Yet that report also suggested, in the same cited paragraph, that LSU faced “a 
complicated decision” because of Charity and University hospital’s centrality as a healthcare 
safety net – and that not reopening “could have significant implications for health care service 
delivery in post-Katrina New Orleans and for statewide graduate medical education and Level 1 
trauma care” (U.S. GAO 2006b, p.10). Six months later in a follow-up GAO report: 
As we reported, the availability of health care services – which 
includes those provided within and outside of a hospital facility – is 
one of the factors that can affect whether and how quickly residents 
return to an area after a disaster (U.S. GAO 2006c, p. 2). 
 
               The September 2006 GAO report reflected more deeply the absence of Charity and 
University hospitals. While it said bed capacity across metro New Orleans had rebounded to “a 
sufficient number of staffed inpatient beds” – it did not qualify that most of the beds were at 
private facilities. And further, finding any empty psychiatric beds remained next to impossible; 
and retaining nursing staff was almost as challenging. Without Charity Hospital, emergency 
room occupancy was 96 percent for adult critical care beds (U.S. GAO 2006c, p. 13-14). 
                                                 
40
 See Gallegos (2009) and U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2009a-b) – and further described below. 
41
 E.g., Webster (2007): “SPECIAL TREATMENT: Reopening Charity Hospital’s first three floors possible” 
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               In its assessment of the LSU and FEMA dispute, the September 2006 GAO report 
detailed  initial FEMA repair estimates of storm damage to Charity Hospital were raised slightly 
to $27 million, while LSU’s storm repair estimates rose to $257 million. The significant gap in 
costs was gauged primarily between LSU and the state’s desire to be fully reimbursed for what 
they termed “whole building repair” versus just storm damage repair. LSU’s addition of a “cost 
escalator,” built into the estimates to account for the rise in cost of post-Katrina building 
materials and labor, led LSU and the state to claim that the needed repair costs exceeded the 51 
percent FEMA threshold for a full building replacement (U.S. GAO 2006c, pp. 19-21). 
               FEMA responded that “LSU (could) select a few projects at Charity Hospital and put 
them out for bid” to serve as a baseline for real costs. The GAO said LSU demurred on this 
request, deeming it potentially wasteful spending on an obsolete facility they had no plans to 
resurrect even “to perform the functions for which the hospitals were being used immediately 
prior to the disaster.” LSU suggested federal regulations allowed for the costs of code upgrades, 
combined with storm damage that the costs rose above the fifty percent FEMA replacement 
threshold (U.S. GAO 2006c, pp. 19-21). Curiously, LSU did repair University Hospital with full 
FEMA funding under the agency’s emergency services regulation that it originally offered to 
LSU and the state, if Charity was allowed to be reopened (Darcé 2006; FEMA 2011).  
               Representing LSU and Governors Blanco, then Jindal in negotiating FEMA’s Charity 
storm damage determination was Jerry Jones, head of the Office of Facility Planning and Control 
(FPC) under the state Division of Administration. As designated by a Blanco executive order 
(remaining in effect as of this writing), no repairs or rebuilding of damaged facilities are allowed 
without Division of Administration sanction (Blanco 2006). Jones unabashedly noted: “If I have 
anything to say about it, we’re not going to rebuild Charity” (Moller 2006a). 
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               Governor Blanco and Jerry Jones’ resolve not to reopen Charity was met with 
significant opposition. The New Orleans City Council unanimously demanded Charity’s 
reopening (R-06-143 2006). A 2006 Louisiana state legislative resolution also called for the 
reopening of Charity Hospital – specifically its first three floors – on an interim basis until its 
replacement could be constructed; and that the facility is independently evaluated “to determine 
the advisability of repairing or restructuring the entire facility…” (Louisiana HCR 89 2006).   
               Though Charity never reopened for medical care, Charity’s maintenance shop, laundry 
building and power plant returned to service the LSU Interim Hospital. 42 Meanwhile the 
independent group recognized by the state legislature, the Foundation for Historical Louisiana, 
contracted and funded a $600,000 study completed by RMJM Hillier in August 2008 – which 
found that Charity could be revitalized to become a 21st century LSU academic medical center. 43 
               As previously referenced, FEMA rejected Adams Management’s storm assessment of 
Charity on behalf of LSU and the state. FEMA’s stated concern was Adams’ format, since it was 
presented as a summary document from which FEMA said it could not verify the findings as 
qualified for storm reimbursement. FEMA, in conjunction with state officials and LSU, launched 
a “scope alignment” process to better evaluate Charity Hospital’s storm damages. Over an 18-
month period beginning in late 2006, the state’s selected contractor, Blitch/Knevel and 
Associates and FEMA “scoped” out the damage. (FEMA 2009, pp. 13-14) Responding to calls 
for the state and LSU to reopen Charity, Jones replied: 
We’re trying to show and convince FEMA this damage was done by 
the storm. And if we go in there and start occupying the facility 
FEMA may say, ‘You’re OK,’ and that there’s no need for all these 
repairs (Webster 2007). 
 
                                                 
42
 Confirmed thru participant observation. Charity’s Laundry Building (405 LaSalle), Maintenance Shop (433 
LaSalle) and Entergy facility (Gravier and South Claiborne) all were reopened by LSU Interim Hospital’s opening.  
43
 See http://www.fhl.org/fhl/news/presvalerts/charityhospitalsyn.shtm; and list in Appendix C. 
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               Initially FEMA and the state FPC agreed to a process of review which served both 
parties interests. FEMA upheld its original claims of Charity’s damage without contestation; the 
state in particular justified Charity’s continued closure, as well as effectively delayed by nearly 
two years the release of independent state legislative-authorized evaluative findings that might 
call for Charity’s reopening. Intriguingly, the state’s contractor, Blitch/Knevel and Associates 
(BKA) also conducted two evaluations of Charity’s psychiatric Crisis Intervention Unit (CIU) – 
finding that it could either be reopened under limited repairs bringing Charity’s first three floors 
and 128-beds into operation for $38 million; or reopen after a total upgrade to current life codes 
for about $50 million (BKA 2007). Blitch/Knevel and Associates’ finding that Charity’s 
“deficiencies are correctable” ran contrary to the state’s contention that Charity could not be 
returned to use as a hospital of any sort. 
               It became evident by the spring of 2008 that the joint FEMA/FPC “scope alignment” 
process of Charity Hospital to determine eligible storm damages was going off its procedural 
track. After stopping joint evaluations that April, in July 2008 the state filed a claim with FEMA 
revising upwards the cost of replacing Charity to almost $492 million. FEMA in turn raised its 
Charity repair estimates from $23 million to $150 million. In response, the state planned to 
appeal (FEMA 2009; FPC 2009; Moller 2008d). 
               While FEMA expanded its award, it would not relent on its core contentions: 1) that 
Charity’s damages had not met the 51 percent criteria for full replacement; 2) that the state 
hadn’t adequately secured Charity Hospital against post-storm elements or new damage – nor did 
it attempt to make even minimal fixes such as roof and window repairs to limit further damage; 
and 3) that the state was trying to claim as storm damage years of deferred maintenance and 
facility neglect (FEMA 2009, pp. 9-10; Moller 2008a; Moller 2008b).  
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LSU overcomes FEMA through the political intervention of Cao, Landrieu and Obama 
                Louisiana state officials acknowledged the urgency of settling the FEMA issue, as well 
as the climate of profound distrust between them and FEMA officials. Dr. Fred Cerise, LSU’s 
vice president for health affairs and medical education, referenced FEMA’s Charity damage 
award should at least match what the state legislature had already pledged: 
The biggest issue we’ve got to resolve is the FEMA issue. If we can 
come to the $1.2 billion [LSU University Medical Center] project 
with $800 million in equity, that makes it much easier to get the bond 
folks into the conversation (Moller 2008c).  
 
               Jerry Jones of the state FPC addressed the issue of trust between it and FEMA:  
It’s like they don’t trust us, that we’re trying to beat the system and 
we really aren’t. Pretty much throughout this disaster that’s how 
FEMA’s treated us (Moller 2008a). 
 
               To meet FEMA statutory guidelines, the state filed an appeal March 11, 2009 of 
FEMA’s $150 million award to settle all matters. The state contended that in denying the state’s 
assessment that damages exceeded 51 percent of replacement costs, or almost $492 million, 
FEMA, said the state, had responded with “various vague, unspecific and factually … 
unsupported reasons” (Moller 2009a; FEMA 2009, p. 30). 
               On May 8, 2009, FEMA’s acting regional administrator denied the state’s first appeal. 
The state then filed a second appeal – but with the proviso that “FEMA take no action on the 
appeal request” until the state could determine whether a substitution of binding arbitration could 
occur (FEMA 2009, pp. 30-31). State officials had previously sought this possibility from their 
U.S. Congressional delegation (Moller 2008c). The near-constant advocacy of senior Louisiana 
U.S. Senator Mary Landrieu, as well as from newly-elected New Orleans Congressman Anh 
‘Joseph’ Cao – was about to yield the political intervention that LSU and the FPC had long 
hoped for – to have FEMA pay for Charity Hospital’s replacement. 
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               LSU had already reached two significant milestones since Hurricane Katrina:  
• Reclamation of LSU Health Sciences Center-New Orleans campus was in full swing; 44  
• The United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) not only agreed to create side-
by-side medical centers with LSU in Lower Mid-City New Orleans – the deal received 
the VA’s full financial commitment by 2008. 45  
               To be sure, significant challenges remained for the LSU University Medical Center 
project – not the least of which were several lawsuits challenging Charity’s closure, violations of 
the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA), and a lawsuit against New Orleans Mayor C. Ray Nagin for permitting the 
expropriation of property in Lower Mid-City for the proposed VA Medical Center without public 
hearings. Grassroots activism that was originally sparked by Charity’s workers had almost died 
out in late 2006, but re-emerged in 2007, reigniting the “Save Charity Hospital!” movement. 46 
               The 2009 inauguration of President Barack Obama however was the watershed moment 
for LSU and the state in its quest to total out Charity Hospital for its full replacement value, in 
order to fulfill its new University Medical Center. Previously cool relations with FEMA and 
other federal agencies warmed considerably for the state. Widely assailed for its unyielding and 
incomprehensible bureaucracy, FEMA’s ineptitude under the leadership of Michael Brown, 
along with much of the rest of the federal response, resounded as part of the failure of the Bush 
Administration. Along with the Iraq War and 2008 economic crisis, FEMA’s mishandled 
response in advance and following Hurricane Katrina also paved the way for Barack Obama’s 
election victory (Lipton 2008; New York Times 2008; Stolberg 2008; Lipton 2011). 
                                                 
44
 See the LSU Health Science Center-New Orleans’ recovery progress websites: http://www.lsuhsc.edu/biweekly/, 
http://www.lsuhsc.edu/DailyUpdates/ and Chancellor Larry Hollier’s Notes: http://www.lsuhsc.edu/chan_notes/  
45
 See LaPlante (2006); LSU Louisiana Recovery Authority (LRA) Presentation (2006); Lynch (2007). 
46
 A list of reopen Charity groups are in Appendix C; Also confirmed by direct participant observation. 
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               As a signal of FEMA regime change, Janet Woodka, former legislative director for 
Senator Landrieu, was appointed as Gulf Coast recovery czar (United States Department of 
Homeland Security / U.S. DHS 2009a). Tony Russell was also named to head up FEMA’s 
Louisiana Transitional Recovery Office, replacing “embattled” director Jim Stark, Said Russell: 
We are going to collaborate as full partners. We are never going to be 
an adversary. Any hint from my staff or myself of being an adversary 
will not be tolerated. That is in the past (Johnson 2009). 
 
               But before the ice thawed completely, in remarks before a U.S. House Committee 
considering FEMA’s operations, now retired Lt. General Russel Honoré, Commander of Joint 
Task Force Katrina, reiterated his contention that the state took advantage of Hurricane Katrina 
to close Charity Hospital. He charged state officials “used FEMA as a get-out-of-jail-free-card” – 
and that “the state of Louisiana needs to pay for its own damn medical center” (Tilove 2009a). 
Honoré later shifted his position to being in favor of FEMA funds to replace Charity – though he 
never waivered on his contention that Charity could’ve reopened (Tilove 2009c). 47 
               First term New Orleans Congressman Anh ‘Joseph’ Cao, following Honoré in his 
testimony before the U.S. House Committee, blamed FEMA for fiddling “about the value of 
doorknobs and toilets” as other New Orleans-area hospitals took up in Charity’s absence care of 
the uninsured – and flirted with bankruptcy in the process. Later Cao met with Honoré and said 
that Charity had facility accreditation issues before Hurricane Katrina. Reopen Charity Hospital 
advocates however produced evidence that the hospital had earned JCAHO (Joint Commission 
for the Accreditation of Health Organizations) certification before its permanent closure by LSU 
and the State of Louisiana one month after the storm (Tilove 2009a). 48  
                                                 
47
 See Honoré (2008) Journal of Public Health Management and Practice, p. S-6; Honoré, Moises, Harden, Walker, 
Washington and Ott (2009); Honoré (2010) (C.V. citing works which said Charity could have reopened). 
48
 See: Honoré, Moises, Harden, Walker, Washington and Ott (2009); Cao (2009); FPC (2009, p. 7) – attesting that 
Charity was a JCAHO (Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Health Organization) certified facility. 
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               Congressman Cao arranged for a special Congressional site visit and hearing held June 
1, 2009 in the first floor lobby of Charity Hospital. It was cast as an effort “to break loose the 
backlog of FEMA recovery projects still pending after the 2005 hurricanes” (Bolar 2009). The 
location of the special U.S. House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure hearing 
unmistakably accented the main issue – that “under the federal Stafford Act, FEMA is obliged to 
pay the full cost of replacing Charity if, as LSU contends, it was more than half damaged in the 
storm.” The hearing also was one of the first public opportunities to showcase Senator Mary 
Landrieu’s new arbitration system, passed into law as part of original Obama American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act legislation, designed to speed up the resolution of FEMA public 
works claims – “of which Charity is by far the largest” (Tilove 2009b; Hammer 2009). 
               The special Katrina-Rita arbitration panel was set up to expedite settlement of FEMA 
claims as an alternative to the federal court system. Unlike regular federal proceedings, appellant 
bodies are barred from the process of discovery, have pre-determined time limits for filings and 
answers, and any decisions rendered are binding without further appeal. A panel of three 
administrative law judges of the United States Civilian Board of Contract Appeals (U.S. CBCA) 
would hear cases. After a series of procedural motions and filings from both the state and FEMA 
throughout the fall of 2009, the FEMA arbitration proceedings were held January 11-15, 2010. 49 
               In a key procedural ruling issued before the start of the proceedings, the U.S. CBCA 
panel ruled unanimously December 9, 2009 that the state could introduce evidence not 
previously presented, as well as call outside witnesses. More crucially, the panel also overturned 
the previous FEMA standard for undoing public assistance amounts determinations – which was 
only possible if FEMA’s actions were “arbitrary and capricious” (Moller 2009d; U.S. CBCA 
2009). Through this ruling LSU and the state overcame a previously insurmountable FEMA rule. 
                                                 
49
 See 44 CFR Part 206 (2009); U.S. DHS (2009b); Moller (2009a-d); Shuler (2009); U.S. CBCA (2010, 2011). 
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               Much as the three judge panel affirmed the new arbitration process to trump previous 
FEMA agency procedures and appeals of FEMA public assistance determinations, it did not rule 
on an attempted citizen intervention (Intervention 2009) seeking to also submit outside evidence 
and “consideration of facts, arguments … when time, the nature of the proceeding and the public 
interest permit.” The intervention was lodged on behalf of “parties with a fundamental interest in 
the outcome of the FEMA appeal” including former Charity Hospital patients who were 
plaintiffs in a suit against LSU, along with two community health advocates. 50  LSU System 
legal counsel Ray Lamonica, who as lead attorney for the state would later successfully argue for 
the inclusion of outside evidence on behalf of LSU and the state in its pursuit of its FEMA 
arbitration claim, said the arbitration panel “should not consider any information or evidence 
other than the documentation FEMA and the state provided” (Barrow 2009; Intervention 2009). 
               The FEMA arbitration hearings produced few variations from prior months of filings 
and stated contentions. FEMA stated that the state was seeking full replacement value on a 
facility they called deficient before the storm. FEMA also challenged the actual level of asset 
protection following the storm to prevent deterioration of Charity. Lamonica contended that the 
state engaged in good asset protection. He said that FEMA’s 18-month scoping process had 
major shortcomings, foremost its ‘room-by-room’ evaluation failed to take into account 
mechanical systems that served entire hospital areas – hence the state’s “zone” method of 
estimating damages was more factual.  Lamonica reasserted that the state deserved to receive full 
replacement value because storm damage exceeded 51 percent of Charity’s replacement value. 
He also scored rhetorical points by noting that “it takes an act of Congress to get something 
done” – in this case the arbitration process could resolve this matter instead of the bureaucracy of 
FEMA (U.S. CBCA 2010b). 
                                                 
50
 The author was one of the two community health advocate intervenors represented. 
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               Per the actual nature of the arbitration process, a curious departure occurred from usual 
federal court and even regular Civil Board of Contract Appeals proceedings. After noting that 
this special FEMA arbitration was the result of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 
Judge Stephen Daniels said that the 3-judge panel had reviewed carefully the respective 
statements from FEMA and the state of Louisiana’s Office of Facility Planning and Control – 
and that these proceedings would not require sworn testimony: 
We are here this week to supplement the documentary record and to 
gain a better understanding of it by taking testimony from people, and 
in likeness as to the appropriate amount to be paid to Facility 
Planning and Control. We’ll hear from witnesses called by both 
Facility Planning and Control and FEMA. Because this is an 
arbitration hearing, not a judicial proceeding, the witnesses will not be 
asked to testify under oath. We do expect the witnesses to tell us the 
truth in response to questions asked of them, however. We need all 
the truthful information we can get in order to resolve the case (U.S. 
CBCA 2010a, pp. 4-5). 
 
               Charity Hospital’s Director of Facility Planning Robert Arnold was asked under 
questioning by FEMA attorney Chad Clifford whether Arnold had turned away General Electric 
generators for providing permanent electric power back-up to Charity Hospital – as attested in a 
sworn affidavit by U.S. Army electrician Staff Sergeant John Johnson. Arnold said he had not – 
though he also intimated in his testimony that the generators might not had even been delivered: 
 Q: Now you’re saying to your knowledge, Mr. Arnold, you’re now 
claiming that this sworn statement from a respected veteran and 
current member – Armed Forces member is not – you – don’t have 
personal knowledge as to whether or not generators were brought and 
rejected? 
A: Not to my knowledge, no. 
Q: Is it possible that they were and you simply don’t know? 
A: Unlikely. 
Q: Unlikely. Were you the main person for LSU working – 
A: I was on the ground from that Thursday until today.  
(U.S. CBCA Transcript 2010a, pp. 91-92; Moller 2010b). 
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               Arnold also said he wasn’t “personally aware” that LSU had ordered an end to 
Charity’s disaster recovery operation, the removal of U.S. military units and Charity’s workers 
(U.S. CBCA 2010a, p. 93). Under this special FEMA arbitration proceeding, Sergeant Johnson 
was never called to elaborate in person on his contrasting sworn testimony. 
               The proceedings did offer some variation from contentions that both FEMA and the 
state contended were true. Arnold testified for example that Charity’s basement had been drained 
of floodwaters by the time that the U.S. military left the facility in late September; and that 
power had been restored to most parts of the building, not just from temporary connections, but 
from upgraded electrical switchgears located on the hospital’s upper floors – contradicting the 
state’s formal request for arbitration drafted by the Office of Facility Planning and Control: 
The major mechanical, electrical, and plumbing (MEP) systems in 
Charity Hospital were located in the basement which was totally 
inundated by contaminated and corrosive floodwaters for more than 
40 days. Unlike more modern constructed facilities, this facility was 
constructed in 1939 when it was a common practice to put critical 
MEP in the least utilized spaces. The critical MEP of this hospital 
sustained its entire operations; it was the heartbeat that allowed the 
hospital to function. The contaminated floodwaters incapacitated all 
utility infrastructure of the entire building, not for a few days or 
weeks, but for months… (Italics indicate their emphasis) (FPC 2009, 
pp. 8-9; U.S. CBCA 2010a, pp. 28, 52-53, 57-63). 
 
               Issuing their ruling just twelve days after the conclusion of their hearings, the U.S. 
Civilian Board of Contract Appeals ruled unanimously in favor of granting $474,750,898 to the 
state for the full replacement value of Charity Hospital. It said that FEMA’s representatives 
“were less experienced and less credible” than the state’s experts. Since FEMA essentially 
acknowledged it had been verifying the state’s findings of damages through eighteen months of 
the joint FEMA/BKA scoping process, the 3-judge panel found that the state knew better of 
Charity’s storm damage situation, since it produced detailed analyses (U.S. CBCA 2010c, p. 4). 
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               Though Louisiana officials plainly acknowledged they had long sought a Charity 
Hospital replacement before Hurricane Katrina, their testimony and presented evidence to the 
panel claimed that they made conscientious efforts to retain the hospital’s accreditation. Even if 
the measures taken were “at a sub-optimal level before the storms occurred” – the judges said 
they could not be repaired cost-effectively from the storm damage they had incurred. A major 
determining factor, which raised the level of storm damage considerably above the 51-percent 
qualifying threshold, said the panel, was the probability that Charity’s potable water “piping on 
the upper floors had been contaminated…” The judges doubted FEMA contentions that with a 
system flush and cleanse safe drinking water could be assured. BKA’s contention was that: 
When the basement flooded, toxic wastes inundated the piping system 
for potable water, up through an indeterminate number of floors. The 
system had been modified over time, and because as-built drawings 
were lost in the flood, the number and location of dead ends was 
unknown. The BKA engineers determined that the entire system had 
been compromised and had to be replaced … On the whole, the 
record supports the (state Office of Facility Planning and Control) 
position as to disaster-related damage (U.S. CBCA 2010c, pp. 3-4). 
               Though the FEMA arbitration panel dismissed FEMA’s contentions on the scope of 
storm damages and the levels of asset protection by the state FPC following Hurricane Katrina, it 
did agree with FEMA’s cost “estimate (as) the best approximation available of the cost of 
replacing Charity Hospital with a new facility” – affirming reopen-Charity advocates’ 
contentions of the cost of revitalizing the building within its Art Deco shell. 51 The panel said: 
The panel understands that differences of opinion exist in New 
Orleans as to whether the public is better served by rebuilding Charity 
Hospital in its present location or by constructing a new hospital 
elsewhere in the city. This issue is not relevant to our determination in 
this case, and we did not consider it in the course of our deliberations. 
How to proceed with the rebuilding or new construction is a matter 
for decision by other authorities (U.S. CBCA 2010c, p. 5). 
                Any hopes in trying to reopen Charity Hospital now appeared to have evaporated. 
                                                 
51
 See RMJM Hillier (2008); Roberts and Webster (2010); Sack (2010); and Shuler (2010a). 
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I think we have a clean sheet to start again. And with that clean sheet 
we have some very big opportunities. 
 
Joseph Canizaro, Member, Bring New Orleans Back Commission 
(BNOB), quoted by Gary Rivlin, The New York Times (Rivlin 2005)   
 
 
 
Hurricane Katrina essentially right-sized the overbuilt hospital 
system… 
 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers “Report on Louisiana Healthcare Delivery 
and Financing System” (PwC 2006, p. 6) 
 
 
 
[Charity Hospital’s closure] created a significant barrier to return 
for displaced residents in need of medical care. 
 
Chris Kromm and Sue Sturgis, Institute for Southern Studies (ISS 
2008, p. 26)   
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Charity was closed when New Orleans was virtually emptied of its populace; Its patients 
were the heart of the Katrina Diaspora; Fears of exclusion from recovery decisions 
 
               Nossiter’s 2005 New York Times report on Charity also broached another controversy – 
whether, by keeping Charity Hospital and other institutions serving the city’s poor closed, that 
the entire cultural and economic complexion of New Orleans could be permanently transformed: 
As one of the two oldest hospitals in North America – it was founded 
in 1736, the same year as Bellevue Hospital in New York – Charity 
has from the beginning been a symbol of a social commitment to the 
poor, and its wards are empty at a moment when thousands of poor 
New Orleans residents are struggling to return home and fear that 
government has abandoned them. In many ways, the debate over its 
future parallels that of New Orleans itself, as it chooses whether to 
become a more middle-class city or return to earlier traditions 
(Nossiter 2005). 
 
               The closure of Charity Hospital slowed recovery of the region and blocked the return of 
many of New Orleans’ poor, elderly and most vulnerable residents who relied on Charity for care 
(Connolly 2005; Eaton 2007). Months after the storm, many displaced residents were scattered 
around the nation; having lost their homes, schools, community and their main source of 
healthcare, while navigating the whirling tempest of the Katrina Diaspora.   
               Roberts and Durant (2010, pp. 226, 243) noted that since the Civil Rights movement, 
Charity system patients have been predominantly African American. Citing LSU figures, in the 
2004-2005 year, Charity/MCLNO* black patients constituted over 70 percent of the total. 52 
Table 2: Charity/MCLNO* Inpatient Admissions/Outpatient Encounters by race, 2004-05 
Inpatient Admissions (Percent) Outpatient Encounters (Percent) 
Black       16,549 (70.2%)      Black     331,320 (75.9%) 
White         5,548 (23.6%)      White       84,521 (19.3%) 
Other          1,465 (6.2%)      Other       20,834 (4.8%) 
Source: Roberts and Durant. 2010. A History of the Charity Hospitals of Louisiana. p. 243. Table by K. Brad Ott 
*Totals include both Charity and University hospitals of the Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans (MCLNO) 
                                                 
52
 LSUHSC Planning, Program Development and Governmental Affairs, Baton Rouge, LA. FY 2004-2005. 
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Table 3: Charity system* Inpatient Admissions / Outpatient Encounters by race, 2004-05 
Inpatient Admissions (Percent) Outpatient Encounters (Percent) 
Black       33,161 (58.2%)      Black     888.515 (55.6%) 
White       20,758 (36.4%)      White     660,646 (41.3%) 
Other          3,088 (5.4%)      Other       50,051 (3.1%) 
Source: Roberts and Durant. 2010. A History of the Charity Hospitals of Louisiana. p. 243. Table by K. Brad Ott 
*Totals include nine LSU hospitals including New Orleans (but excluding LSU-HSC Shreveport) 
               VanLandingham (2007, p. 1614) said “New Orleans was essentially emptied by 
Hurricane Katrina at the end of August 2005.” Guin, et al (2009) adjusted VanLandingham’s 
austerely-stated population amounts and departure by another few weeks – 12,000 people rode 
out the storm at the Louisiana Superdome; 25 area hospitals held 2,500 patients and 11,000 staff 
and their families; another 130,000 didn’t leave until a week after the storm, with 65,000 of those 
being rescued.  Guin, et al said that with the close of the evacuation by mid-September 2005, “an 
estimated 10,000 people remained in Orleans Parish” (pp. 34, 45, 51). 53 
               A RAND Corp study said the city’s December 2005 population was about 91,000; and 
projected it at 155,000 by March 2006 (McCarthy, Peterson, Sastry & Pollard 2006, pp. xi-xiii). 
It often swelled on the weekends to 275,000 as displaced residents cleaned up (Connolly 2005). 
               Fears arose that decisions about the future of the city would be made absent the most 
impacted storm victims.  New Orleans public housing and public schools reports noted that the 
lack of stakeholder participation significantly impacted policy outcomes (Rose and Tuggle 2010, 
pp. 2-3; Perry and Schwam-Baird 2010, p.6). Proponents of privatization to supplant Charity 
Hospital’s public health mission also admitted the widespread absence of public participation – 
but were more circumspect about the impact (Louisiana Public Health Institute/LPHI 2005, p. 6). 
At the time of Charity’s September 2005 closure, the city was virtually emptied of its populace. 
                                                 
53
 The Louisiana State Medical Examiner said 1,464 people died between August 28 and October 1, 2005 (Guin, et 
al, p. 45). Another 2,300 “excess deaths” were recorded in a study comparing Times-Picayune obituary listings from 
the first six months of 2006 with 2004 (pre-storm): Stephens, Grew, Chin, Kadetz, Greenough and Burkle (2007). 
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The Bring New Orleans Back Commission attempts to capitalize on the Katrina Diaspora 
               Just days after the last of the mass evacuations from New Orleans were completed, 
about 60 corporate and political leaders met in Dallas with Mayor C. Ray Nagin to plot out the 
city’s future (Scott 2005). The 17-member Bring New Orleans Back (BNOB) Commission, 
formed out of the Dallas meeting, held its first public session one month after the storm (Donze 
and Varney 2005). Commission member Jimmy Reiss, Chair of the Regional Transit Authority, 
voiced what many African Americans and advocates for the poor were the worst fears: 
Those who want to see this city rebuilt want to see it done in a 
completely different way: demographically, geographically and 
politically. I’m not just speaking for myself here. The way we’ve been 
living is not going to happen again, or we’re out (Cooper 2005). 
               Largely void of its populace at the time of Charity’s late September closure, the city’s 
population status in the months following the storm remained a paramount issue. The BNOB 
Commission, joined by the Urban Land Institute (ULI), proposed a building permit moratorium 
and permanent land buyouts in areas flooded greater than four feet in depth (ULI 2005). A 
Brown University study found that “if nobody was able to return to (these) damaged 
neighborhoods – New Orleans is at risk of losing 80% of its black population” (Logan 2006, p. 
1; Dao 2006). BNOB commissioner and developer Joseph Canizaro observed: 
As a practical matter, these poor folks don’t have the resources to go 
back to our city just like they didn’t have the resources to get out of 
our city. So we won’t get all those folks back. That’s just a fact. It’s 
not what I want; it’s just a fact (AP 2005d). 
               The outcry over the BNOB Commission proposal granting just four months for 
residents to decide on their neighborhood viability before being “green-spaced” dominated the 
headlines (Donze and Russell 2006). Mayor Nagin joined the New Orleans City Council in 
ultimately rejecting implementation of BNOB Commission / ULI land use provisions. 54 
                                                 
54
 Nossiter (2006); Rivlin (2006) and Powell (2007).  
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               In contrast, BNOB Commission co-chairs Mel Lagarde, head of the Hospital 
Corporation of America’s Delta Division, and Barbara Major, director of the St. Thomas Health 
Clinic (Scott 2005), along with BNOB “Health and Social Services Committee” chair and 
attorney Kim Boyle (Henderson 2009) recorded virtually no public outcry over Charity 
Hospital’s closure. Much the same way the BNOB Commission attempted to couch its land use 
planning in the language of safety and equity, its Health and Social Services Committee 
proclaimed “the need for courageous conversations to change the delivery of health and social 
services” (BNOB Health 2006a, p. 4). As would be the case with most post-storm “health 
reform” initiatives, the BNOB Commission ignored the attempt of Charity’s workers and the 
U.S. military to restore hospital services, and formulated the transformation of the healthcare 
landscape from one which held Charity Hospital as its historic epicenter. The BNOB Health and 
Social Services Committee effectively recommended Charity’s continued closure in order to 
realign its public healthcare mission and financial resources toward corporate medicine; while 
also endorsing LSU’s academic medical center model (BNOB Health 2006a; Webster 2006). 
               Nelson, Ehrenfeucht and Laska (2007, p. 27) posed that the BNOB Commission 
deliberations, though nominally open to the public, “were not designed to include 
nonprofessional residents.” The BNOB meetings “out of perceived necessity, occurred before 
most people returned, residents had to seek them out, and engaging residents as participants was 
not a priority. Subsequently many residents opposed the BNOB Commission’s proposals.”  
               In comparison with the land use deliberations, few patients, non-health professionals or 
others without a pecuniary interest participated in the BNOB Commission’s Health and Social 
Services deliberations.  BNOB participants overall were predominately white males. 55 
                                                 
55
 BNOB Health (2006b): Attendance substantiated via review of a BNOB “Members and Meeting Participants” list. 
Also see Lake to the River Foundation for Legal Aid & Disaster Relief (2005); Nolan (2006a); RAND (2010). 
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               It has been said many times that “Hurricane Katrina … laid bare deep, social, economic 
and cultural divisions that have long plagued New Orleans” (McKiven 2007, p. 742). McKiven’s 
critique of the political advantage taken (or lost) during New Orleans’ 1853 yellow fever 
epidemic presaged the parade of “reform” initiatives abounding in New Orleans in the months 
and years following Hurricane Katrina’s August 2005 landfall. For example, backers of the 
BNOB / ULI plan to shrink the city’s inhabitable footprint attempted to forge lines of support 
based on avoiding “racial polarization” and supporting “the common good” toward creating a 
new city that would be more equitable and humane for the displaced to return – while clamoring 
for the active silencing or disregarding of active dissent to discourage community disunity in a 
time of crisis (Cowen 2006). These appeals also attempted to extol the fear of avoiding “real 
estate speculators and unchecked market forces” (Nolan 2006a).  Curiously, the leading 
supporters of the BNOB plans were real estate interests and developers (Davis 2006). 
               The idea of viewing a catastrophe as a chance for societal reordering and investment 
opportunities has been heightened in recent decades by what Naomi Klein (2007) calls “disaster 
capitalism.” She defines the term in its broad scope as the use of a disaster or major event for the 
deliberate re-engineering of economic, political and community spheres while affected 
populations are internally displaced; by its “military speed and precision” and in its “treatment of 
disasters as exciting market opportunities” (pp. 5-6). Klein quotes New Orleans’ developer and 
BNOB commissioner Joseph Canizaro’s response to a New York Times reporter on the city’s 
future in the wake of the storm: “I think we have a clean sheet to start again. And with that clean 
sheet we have some very big opportunities” (p. 4; Rivlin 2005). Klein lambasted “using moments 
of collective trauma to engage in radical social and economic engineering” when most disaster 
survivors seek the opposite: to rebuild, not remake their homes and communities (p.8). 
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Considering Charity’s closure as a human rights violation of the internally displaced 
 
               In virtually any other global setting, failure to open a working hospital would have 
sparked a United States government condemnation. Federal authorities apart from FEMA 
however never seriously contested the forced end of Charity’s disaster recovery operation.                           
               News of Charity Hospital’s forced closure, together with reports of the abandonment of 
Orleans Parish Prison inmates to drown in their cells, the mass firings of teachers and municipal 
workers, and demolition of public housing while its residents were internally displaced aroused 
notice of human rights activists and organizations from around the world. 56   
               The American Civil Liberties Union’s (ACLU) National Prison Project, investigating 
charges of some Orleans Parish Prison inmates being left to drown in their locked cells, also 
uncovered “the criminalization of mental illness” as a result of the closure of Charity Hospital’s 
psychiatric Crisis Intervention Unit’s (CIU). In the ACLU’s 2007 follow-up report:  
Perhaps the biggest blow to the region’s mental health system is the 
loss of Charity Hospital … With so few psychiatric services available 
to the public, mentally ill people are being funneled into the criminal 
justice system. Some families have grown so desperate that they have 
sought to have their mentally ill relatives arrested in the hopes of 
getting them psychiatric care… (ACLU 2007, p. 22). 57 
 
               Even with significant improvements to community-based treatment programs under the 
purview of the Metropolitan Human Services District, the combination of inpatient hospital unit 
closures (particularly the New Orleans Adolescent Hospital (NOAH) and outpatient program 
budget cuts has continued to hobble the mental health system (Levin 2010). Indeed the city has 
just half the inpatient beds, with double the need, since the storm (Hudson 2009). 
                                                 
56
 National Economic and Social Rights Initiative / NESRI (2008); Institute for Southern Studies / ISS (2008); The 
Brookings Institution (2008); Center for Constitutional Rights / CCR (2009); Amnesty International / AI (2010); 
Advisory Group on Forced Evictions / AGFE (2010); Advocates for Environmental Human Rights / AEHR (2011). 
Two additional reports with human rights and Charity Hospital analysis include Quigley (2008) and Luft (2009). 
57
 Abused and Abandoned: Orleans Parish Prisoners in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina, ACLU (2006). 
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               Underscoring the impact of the loss of Charity’s psychiatric CIU has had on the 
criminal justice system, Orleans Parish Sheriff Marlon Gusman, in a sworn affidavit in support 
of a lawsuit to reopen Charity, said the closure of the CIU added to his “incredible burden”: 
  As Sheriff of Orleans Parish, I have been confronted with the 
incredible burden of dealing with mental health issues in the 
criminal and prison systems. While the prison in New Orleans has a 
facility for mentally ill inmates and can treat inmates who are 
suffering from mental health issues, before the storm police officers 
could take people whom they suspected were exhibiting criminal 
behavior as a result of mental problems to Charity Hospital. Since 
the closure of Charity’s Crisis Intervention Unit, police officers have 
limited options as to where they can take people with mental health 
problems outside of jail (Gusman 2008). 
 
               The ACLU report indicated that in addition to Orleans Parish Prison’s 60-bed 
psychiatric unit, “300 prisoners in the general population receive psychiatric medication.” Many 
of these prisoners have been declared incompetent to stand trial by reason of insanity, or not 
mentally competent to stand trial. The lack of outside psychiatric beds often results in prisoners 
languishing for months “and in some cases years” at Orleans Parish Prison and other jails. Once 
able to enter Louisiana’s only forensic mental hospital, the Feliciana Forensic Facility, many 
prisoners then cannot leave because of the lack of community outpatient group and nursing home 
placements willing or able to accept them (ACLU 2007, p. 22). The ACLU report noted: 
Without community mental health services and a functioning 
emergency system for acute psychiatric care, mentally ill people will 
continue to be incarcerated for behavior that is a product of their 
illness, and will spend increasingly long periods of time in jail, rather 
than in a proper therapeutic setting (ACLU 2007, p. 23). 
 
               NESRI’s report on Charity Hospital’s closure cited Article 25 of the United Nations 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate 
for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and 
medical care and necessary social services…” (NESRI 2008, p. 2).  
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               Principle 18(2) of the UN’s Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement states:  
At the minimum, regardless of the circumstances, and without 
discrimination, competent authorities shall provide internally 
displaced persons with and ensure safe access to: a) Essential food 
and potable water; b) Basic shelter and housing; c) Appropriate 
clothing; and d) Essential medical services and sanitation. 58 
                       
               Charity Hospital’s closure “created a significant barrier to return for displaced residents 
in need of medical care.” With Charity’s psychiatric CIU closed, Orleans Parish Prison’s 60-bed 
unit was the largest inpatient facility “(contradicting) Guiding Principle 28, which calls on 
authorities to establish conditions allowing (internally displaced persons) to return home “in 
safety and with dignity” (ISS 2008, p. 26).  
               The AGFE report highlighted the inherent loss of healthcare space with LSU’s choice 
to restore the smaller University Hospital rather than the much larger Charity facility: 
University Hospital has just one-fourth of Charity Hospital’s capacity. 
This forces many uninsured, underinsured and poor residents of New 
Orleans to travel long distances to receive treatment at one of 
Louisiana’s other public hospitals. In fact, many residents simply 
forego needed medical care. More than one in three New Orleans 
residents postpone needed medical care and one in four report that 
they had no doctor, clinic, or pharmacy to turn to for needed care 
(AGFE 2010, p. 43). 
 
               Amnesty International’s report echoed the ACLU and ISS reports on the loss of mental 
health care, but also emphasized Charity’s closure as a disproportionate loss for the working 
poor and the uninsured: 
Charity served a largely poor, predominately minority population 
through inpatient care, a network of outpatient clinics and the busiest 
emergency department in the city. Nearly three-quarters of its patients 
were African American, and 85 percent had annual incomes of less 
than $20,000. Over half of the indigent care provided by (Charity and 
University hospitals) was for patients without insurance, representing 
two-thirds of the care to the uninsured in the city (AI 2010, pp. 17-18) 
 
                                                 
58
 NESRI (2008, p. 4); ISS (2008, p. 33) AI (2010, p. 27). 
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               The forced expropriation and demolition of the Lower Mid-City New Orleans 
neighborhood for the proposed LSU/VA Medical Center, resulting in the internal displacement 
of hundreds of residents and dozens of businesspeople and their enterprises, have been according 
to the AGFE mission no less human rights violations than the internal displacement and forced 
relocation of public housing residents. Citing the U.S. as a signatory of the International 
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the AGFE mission reiterated that 
under articles IX and XXIII of the 1948 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 
“every person has a right to own such private property as meets the essential needs of decent 
living and helps to maintain the dignity of the individual and of the home” (AGFE 2010, p.36).  
               Both the AGFE and CCR reports also referenced that planning for the LSU/VA project 
was accomplished without the effective consultation of those facing forced internal displacement 
as the result of the plans – in violation of human rights covenants (CCR 2009, pp. 20-21; AGFE 
2010, pp. 28, 34-45, 49).  59 
               Walter Kalin, Representative of the U.N. Secretary General on the Human Rights of 
Internally Displaced Persons, and Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement observed the 
U.S. governmental response before, during and in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina:  
The U.N. Human Rights Committee, a body of independent experts 
entrusted with the task of monitoring the implementation off the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, when examining 
the report submitted to it by the USA, expressed its concerns “about 
information that the poor, and in particular African Americans were 
disadvantaged under the reconstruction plans” and recommended to 
the U.S. “review its practices and policies to ensure the full 
implementation of its obligation to protect life and of the in matters 
related to disaster prevention and preparedness, emergency assistance 
and relief measures … that the rights of the poor, and in particular 
African Americans, are fully taken into consideration in the 
reconstruction plans with regard to access to housing, education and 
healthcare” (Kalin 2008). 
                                                 
59
 The author contributed testimony and documents for the NESRI, CCR, AGFE and AI reports. 
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               More than six years after Hurricane Katrina, there remains an unprocessed 
conversation about human rights that first arose when the BNOB Commission plan to leave 
fallow much of the city of New Orleans that flooded deeper than four feet failed to take hold.  
The conversation is rooted in the fact that most white residents were able to immediately return 
to the city and determine the course of their storm recovery while many African Americans 
remained internally displaced for months and even years. 60 It also remains within the still 
contested terrain of a “recovery” climate set up by the mass firing of mostly African American 
female certified public school educators from New Orleans’ public schools, facilitating mass the 
arrival of privately-managed “non-profit” charter schools to occupy new school buildings 
constructed with public disaster relief funds; closure and demolition of the city’s public housing 
developments, to be replaced by market-rate, privately-managed apartments; and the closure of 
Charity Hospital. This disaster capitalist paradigm has contributed to the continuing internal 
displacement of our poorest citizens and the profound abridgement of their human rights. 61  
               Indeed, predominate is the mindset of those who proclaim that storm “recovery” has 
ended. This is epitomized best by New Orleans Mayor Mitch Landrieu’s often spoken response:  
We are no longer rebuilding. We are now creating. Let’s stop thinking 
about rebuilding the city we were and start dreaming about the city 
we want to become (Davis 2010; Landrieu 2011).           
 
               The 118,000-fewer African American residents and 24,000 fewer white residents 
according to the 2010 U.S. Census seem to represent the failure of recovery. In fact many 
represent what Robertson dubbed “a shadow city” of people wanting, but unable to return. 62  
               Also caught up within the shadow city, this thesis author suggests, is Charity Hospital. 
                                                 
60
 See Louisiana Family Recovery Corps (2007); Hill (2008); RAND (2010, p. 3); Robertson (2010); Krupa (2011). 
61
 See Reed (2005); Ouroussoff (2006); Hill (2008); Penner and Ferdinand (2009); Davis (2010); Perry and 
Schwam-Baird (2010); Mildenberg (2011). 
62
 See Louisiana Family Recovery Corps (2007, pp. 4-5); Plyer (2010); RAND (2010, p. 3); Robertson (2010-11); 
Gill (2011).  
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LA. Health Care Redesign Collaborative also attempted to capitalize on Charity’s closure 
               Klein (2007) suggests disaster capitalism has transformed the provision of crisis relief 
and social reconstruction to reflect neoliberal values – that is to instill classic private free market 
economic attributes through the marshalling and reallocation of once public resources: 
Disaster capitalists have no interest in repairing what was. In Iraq, Sri 
Lanka and New Orleans, the process deceptively called 
“reconstruction” began with finishing the job of the original disaster 
by erasing what was left of the public sphere and rooted communities, 
then quickly moving to replace them with a kind of corporate New 
Jerusalem – all before the victims of war or natural disaster were able 
to regroup and stake their claims to what was theirs (p. 8). 63 
 
               Emboldened by acceptance of the BNOB Commission Health and Social Services 
Committee recommendations, advocates of “Louisiana healthcare redesign” laid the groundwork 
for a massive reworking of the state public hospital system along medical neoliberal lines. U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (U.S. DHHS) Secretary Michael Leavitt joined 
Louisiana Governor Blanco’s administration with consent of the state legislature in 2006 to 
launch the Louisiana Health Care Redesign Collaborative. Its chief aim was the redirection of 
federal Medicaid DSH financing, garnered predominately by Charity system hospitals and clinics 
to care for the poor, toward funding vouchers for the purchase of private health insurance. 64   
               Like the BNOB Commission, the “Collaborative” held its meetings in public, yet the 
public sparsely attended. The Collaborative’s decision-making body included healthcare and 
hospital administrators, private foundation interests and health lobbyists, Blanco administration 
health officials, state House and Senate Health and Welfare committee chairs, along with LSU 
graduate medical education and LSU Health Care Service Division (LSU-HCSD) officials. 65 
                                                 
63
 For international examples following disasters, see Bello (2006) and Srinivas (2010). 
64
 See Leavitt (2006); U.S. Department of Health and Human Services / DHHS (2006); Center on Policy and Budget 
Priorities / CBPP (2007); Solomon (2007); DeSalvo and Sorel (2009); Clark (2010b). 
65
 Review of Collaborative attendance lists, board members and affiliations; and minutes of meetings, 2006. 
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               LSU-HCSD officials professed support for “the broad objectives” of the Collaborative, 
including the proposed “medical home” outpatient model, and use of “health information 
technology” and “electronic medical records.” But they cautioned that Collaborative 
deliberations had not addressed “the unlikely prospect of being able to effectively achieve zero 
un-insurance,” and challenged the redirection of DSH funds away from the Charity system: 
Retention of DSH funds for safety net providers will still be needed in 
the event that reforms are only partially successful [as] patients who 
depend on the safety net are as important as those we can move into 
insurance programs (Comments from Collaborative members 2006). 
 
               Like the BNOB Commission, many Collaborative sessions revolved around mapping 
out a redesigned healthcare system that was without Charity Hospital. Much to the displeasure of 
the Bush administration and private healthcare interests, state legislative authorization of the 
Collaborative limited any healthcare redesign to the New Orleans area (HCR 127 2006).  
               Ultimately, state officials rejected the federal scheme of replacing Charity Hospital 
system coverage with insurance vouchers, saying it would cost $500 million more per year than 
having Charity care just in the New Orleans area – and cover only 80 percent of those eligible. If 
extended statewide, state health officials said the cost could double and leave nearly 500,000 
people that use the Charity system without coverage (Moller 2006e; Moller 2007c). 
               Many healthcare redesign supporters in response called for dissolution of LSU-run 
Charity, apart from their teaching hospitals in New Orleans and Shreveport. Citing Louisiana’s 
poor health standing in national rankings, researchers, private foundations and medical lobbyists 
issued papers detailing the woeful state of Louisiana healthcare pre- and post-storm. 66  
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 E.g., Louisiana Hospital Association / LHA (2003, 2006); Louisiana Public Health Institute / LPHI (2005); 
RAND Health Research (2005); BNOB Commission (2006); Louisiana State Medical Society / LSMS (2006); 
Council for a Better Louisiana / CABL (2006-2008, 2010); Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana / PAR 
(2006-2008); Pricewaterhouse Coopers / PwC (2006); Tulane University (2006-2008); Blueprint Louisiana (2007, 
2011); American Association of Retired Persons / AARP (2008); The Heritage Foundation (2008). 
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                Though many critics attributed the entirety of the state’s poor health outcomes to the 
“inefficient” Charity hospital system, very few of them acknowledged the data that showed 
private medicine was far more responsible than Charity for failing to improve these woeful 
indicators. For example, the nation’s highest Medicare costs with the worst health outcomes 
occurred not at Charity, but in private settings. 67 Oddly, Charity had been also criticized by the 
same forces for causing the “two-tier” system because of its disproportionate care for the 
uninsured, often the same patients excluded from private healthcare. Based on 2005 inpatient 
discharges, just 2.6 percent of Charity/MCLNO patients were covered by private insurance, 12.6 
percent on Medicare, 21.5 percent on Medicaid, and 63.3 percent uninsured (Verité 2010, pp. 8-
9). Costs would be much higher if uninsured patients’ only access was via private providers. 68 
               Paradoxically, the sternest admonitions against changing or devolving Charity’s 
inspired statewide safety net hospital network came from the same LSU apparatus whose closure 
of Charity Hospital sparked the Collaborative in the first place. LSU responded to research 
reports suggesting that it concentrate on its educational rather than safety net healthcare 
missions, divest some or all of its public hospitals to local control, and generally recast its public 
operations entirely under free market outlines. Much in the spirit of its 1997 acquisition of the 
Charity system from the Louisiana Health Care Authority (LHCA), LSU extolled the virtues of 
Charity’s public system being far superior to the vagaries of private insurance coverage 69   
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 Amongst the few non-state sources to acknowledge this was Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC) (2006, p. 6) PwC 
also said that there were “too many hospital beds in the private sector”; “Hurricane Katrina essentially right-sized 
the overbuilt hospital system…” PwC curiously offered no private sector reforms; yet called for significant cuts in 
the Charity Hospital system under assumptions that private providers would then care for all Charity’s patients – an 
unlikely outcome. For example see “Making Profits and Providing Care…” Horwitz (2005). 
68
 e.g., Moller (2006d): Louisiana spent almost $935 million in Fiscal Year 2006-07 for Charity hospital safety net 
care serving 850,000 residents lacking insurance; “Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Louisiana spends more than three 
times that amount to finance care for about 1 million policyholders,” said BCBS/LA CEO Gery Barry. 
69
 LSU-HCSD on PriceWaterhouse Coopers (2006a); Medical Homes (2006b); the Leavitt proposal on healthcare 
vouchers (2006c) & PAR (2007a); Blueprint Louisiana (2007b) reports’ on the Charity Hospital system. 
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               LSU’s contradictory exhortations about Charity notwithstanding, legions of healthcare 
lobbyists and foundation reformers in New Orleans in Hurricane Katrina’s aftermath said that a 
“medical home” was possible now that Charity was closed. An independent community clinic 
network did arise in a laudable attempt to meet healthcare needs once met by Charity’s 160 pre-
storm primary care clinics. They prided themselves on reframing the entry point away from 
hospital emergency rooms. Lovell (2011b) observed this discourse as “ripe terrain for 
modernizing and rationalizing healthcare provision,” but it cannot ever hope to replace Charity: 
This network has provided New Orleans a nationally-heard narrative 
of redemption, not only from disaster; but from corruption, collective 
ineptitude, widespread poverty and supposedly antiquated ideals of 
pre-Katrina healthcare embodied in Charity Hospital. But primary 
care clinics cannot meet the tertiary care needs of an already 
chronically ill, disabled and aging New Orleans population. 
 
               In fairness, what would become “504 Health Net” did not physically close Charity 
Hospital, LSU and the State of Louisiana did. 70 Yet few of the 504 providers have honestly 
addressed the reasons for Charity’s closure. Indeed, several supported the Louisiana Health Care 
Redesign Collaborative attempt to reallocate Charity’s operating funds toward the purchase of 
private insurance vouchers. And their collective failure to demand the full restoration of 
Charity’s safety net hospital and clinical services limits their own viability to fully serve 
Charity’s former patients, too many of whom remain without a medical home since the storm.  
               Interest in reopening Charity Hospital persists years after its closure primarily because 
the healthcare that it provided has never been fully replaced (Walsh and Moller 2006). 71 Yet 
LSU continues to divest itself from areas of healthcare “not core to (its graduate medical 
education) mission” and which no other entity public or private can adequately or expeditiously 
fill (Cerise 2005, p. 13; Spiegel 2007). Without Charity, many have become medically homeless. 
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 See http://504healthnet.org: a non-profit organization of 15 community health service provider safety net… 
71
 See T-P (2009): “Poll backs Charity rehab” – “…voters prefer by a 2-to-1 margin gutting Charity and rebuilding.” 
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Continuity or Rupture? Comparing LSU’s pre-storm plans to close  
Charity Hospital with its disaster capitalized closure following Hurricane Katrina 72 
 
                Lovell (2011b) juxtaposes the hallmark of Charity’s iconic safety net network with the 
new challenge arising from the federal government’s creation of the Medicaid program, which 
concentrated the poor and uninsured exclusively to Charity system hospitals: 
The uniqueness of Louisiana Charity Hospital system is rooted in the 
principle that everyone has a right to medical care – certainly 
anathema to American neoliberalism and hardy individualism, but 
founded in the 1930s populist doctrine of the Long dynasty that 
governed Louisiana for decades. However, the arrival in the 1960s of 
Medicaid, the major program to assist low-income individuals with 
obtaining health services, intensified a two-tiered system of healthcare 
(Lovell 2011b). 
               Though LSU gained administrative control of Charity in 1997, it has not freed it from 
dueling with state administrations against reallocation of much of its self-generated DSH budget. 
Thus LSU has sought to “(avoid) replicating the ‘old Charity model’ of reliance on State 
funding” (ADAMS 2007, p. 5.1). Lovell suggests LSU’s planning process was already underway 
in the months before Hurricane Katrina toward the replacement of Charity Hospital:  
Burdened with hospital accreditation problems and a deteriorating 
facility, LSU had long envisioned building a new hospital, in part to 
attract a private patient base and unburden itself of nonpaying patients 
… Lack of adequate financing for new facilities stood in the way of 
that plan. Katrina provided the opportunity to narrow that gap by 
accessing federal funds to replace the old facility (Lovell 2011b). 
               Vice President of Communications and External Affairs Charles Zewe clarified that 
LSU’s new academic medical center model “turns it more from a charity matrix to a university 
teaching hospital matrix.” One part of this matrix shift is to replace the pre-storm Charity’s 160 
on-site outpatient clinics with a network of neighborhood clinics (Moller 2006b). LSU and its 
new University Medical Center (UMC) announced it will qualify for the Jindal administration’s 
privatized Medicaid HMO clinic network (Maginnis 2011a; Verité 2011, pp. 18-19). 
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 Regarding the “conceptual tools” of continuity and rupture in social change analysis, see Borocz (1997). 
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               Louisiana’s Department of Health and Hospitals’ (DHH) Coordinated Care Networks 
(CCN), once known as “Community Care,” historically have been arranged to favor individual 
physician and group practices dispensing fee-for-service care. Their new CCN program, dubbed 
“Bayou Health,” shifts this payment and delivery model to private managed care organizations. 
Medicaid participants must sign-up or be assigned a private Medicaid HMO plan. LSU officials 
acknowledged their public discomfort with the CCN privatized contract process (Verité 2011, 
pp. 18-19; Shuler 2011c).  LSU public hospitals and clinics will now have to compete for 
Medicaid patients amongst a group of private insurers, narrowing even further its indigent patient 
pool. The DHH CCN process also serves to interrupt LSU’s process to cultivate its own 
physician network to make referrals exclusively to the new LSU UMC, as LSU already has with 
its highly-regarded “Shreveport model” out of LSUHSC Shreveport. In effect, the DHH CCN 
HMO scheme undermines LSU’s attempt to transcend its “Charity model” by reinforcing 
dependency on DHH / Louisiana Medicaid funding, rather than move towards a more diverse 
payer mix (such as LSU Shreveport) where private insurance and Medicare plays a greater role.73 
               The new CCN scheme fulfills a long-time ideological goal of Governor Jindal, who 
favors neoliberal / neoconservative privatized purchase of services rather than supporting public 
healthcare delivery and administration (Shuler 1996b). These private CCN contracts are now 
“the most lucrative in state government” (Shuler 2011b). The program was passed into law over 
state legislative objections through an inserted “technical amendment” on an unrelated bill 
during the final hours of the 2011 Regular Legislative Session. The inserted CCN language, 
while serving as “fine print” that most legislators simply overlooked, had the profound impact of 
instituting privatization over the objections of legislators by removing requirements of prior 
legislative approval and codifying CCN rule making exclusively within DHH (Maginnis 2011b).  
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 See Deslatte (2007) and Eggler (2007). 
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               After more than five years of planning, winning the FEMA Arbitration and legislative 
budget scrutiny (and withstanding several lawsuits challenging both Charity’s closure and the 
expropriation of land in Lower Mid-City New Orleans for the combined LSU/VA Medical 
Center), LSU and the state won final approval from the Louisiana state Joint Legislative 
Committee on the Budget on September 16, 2011 to begin construction of its Charity Hospital 
replacement known as the University Medical Center (UMC) (Barrow 2011f; Deslatte 2011). 74  
               Despite pledges by local, state and federal officials to consider meaningful public input 
of alternatives to the abandonment of Charity and the demolition of a federally-designated 
historic Lower Mid-City neighborhood, LSU’s academic medical center plans, along with new 
Veterans Administration Medical Center plans, have for the most part remained intact since their 
inception. Indeed, decisions on how the process would unfold were finalized before much of the 
affected public even knew they were made (Moran 2008).75 The state legislature originally 
demanded Charity’s reopening for interim use in the year after Katrina. Yet it has largely 
afforded Charity’s replacement to proceed even as legislators scrutinized the financial details. 76 
New Orleans officials in particular, also initially demanding Charity’s reopening, enabled 
fruition of LSU/VA plans by authorizing the expropriation and destruction of Lower Mid-City. 77  
               Though LSU appears to have received its crucial “green light,” many uncertainties 
remain. Ironically, those unknowns, coupled with LSU agreeing to scale back and self-finance 
parts of their UMC, afforded its ultimate approval since it reinforced perceptions that LSU must 
move beyond “the old Charity model” to have a viable project (Barrow 2011c). But this outcome 
underscores that the result will be far fewer hospital services than offered by “Mother Charity.” 
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 See Leblanc et al v. Thomas et al (2008); Thurman et al v. Nagin (2009); NTHP v. VA and FEMA (2009).  
The author contributed legal research in Leblanc v. Thomas; and was a plaintiff in Thurman v. Nagin. 
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 SCR 99 (2006); VA-City MOU (2007); http://www.valsumedcenters.com/index_files/T2meetinginfo.htm.  
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 HCR 89 (2006); SCR 99 (2006); SCR 76 (2007); Moller (2007a-b, e-f); Barrow (2011e). 
77
 See R-06-143 (2006); M-07-237 (2007); MCS 22944 (2007); Head (email stream) (2008); Eggler (2011). 
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               In the months after the storm, LSU spokesperson Marvin McGraw said one thing that 
was certain: “When we build a new hospital in New Orleans to replace Charity, we would plan to 
at least return with the services that we had there before” (Moller 2005e). Its 2011 business plan 
approved by the legislative budget committee however states that LSU’s new UMC will be less 
than what Charity provided.  In general, increased numbers of beds available for the new UMC 
as projected are compared to 275 available before current fiscal year budget cuts in LSU Interim 
Hospital, as opposed to those that were in operation at Charity in 2005 (Verité 2011, pp. 3, 11).  
               To underscore the previous example, “expansion of inpatient psychiatry services” plans 
60 beds, an increase of 22 from Interim LSU Hospital levels. Yet officials acknowledge the beds 
“rapidly will be filled” with patients (Verité 2011, p. 17). Charity had a 128-bed psychiatric 
Crisis Intervention Unit (BKA 2007) – apart from 84 emergency department beds (Moises 2009).  
               The proposed UMC also projects an increase in “urgent care clinic” visits (Verité 2011, 
p. 18). Yet LSU Interim Hospital’s urgent care center, originally open 24 hours a day, has 
reduced service hours as of July 1, 2011, belying the stated assumptions of the proposed UMC. 78 
               Gauging the continuity of pre-storm plans, LSU in this instance has experienced a 
profound rupture. Medicine clinics and services which once defined Charity Hospital and trained 
generations of medical professionals have been discontinued. Nor will these services necessarily 
be a part of the new UMC. LSU-HCSD closed “its inpatient pediatrics program in the face of a 
diminished population of children” which severely impacted pediatric training across the region 
(Berggren and Curiel 2006, p. 1551). On August 1, 2010, LSU Interim Hospital also ceased labor 
and delivery services, closing its neonatal intensive care and nursing care units (McGraw 2010). 
If this decision stands, a major New Orleans legacy will end – the creation of “Charity babies.” 79   
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 MCLNO (2011a-b): Clinic hours’ change substantiated via: http://www.mclno.org/mclno/menu/, p. 3. 
79
 Lovell (2011a): “Debating Life After Disaster: Charity Hospital Babies and Bioscientific Futures…” 
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               LSU announced its opening of the UMC will be 2015 – ten years after Hurricane 
Katrina (Barrow 2011a). There will likely be a change in its management, to the UMC 
Management Corporation; “a non-profit corporation (which) will retain a CEO.” The 
“destination programs in identified specialties” have not been identified. The UMC will also 
have an immediate impact upon the six LSU-HCSD hospitals outside of New Orleans, as 
“activities that were displaced by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita will be transferred (back) to the 
new (UMC)” (Verité 2011, p. 3). The result could be more service cuts and hospital closures. 80 
               The UMC Business Plan notes that if the federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (PPACA) insurance purchase mandate requirements are overturned, “UMC’s safety net 
services may be greater than assumed” (Verité 2011, pp. 27-28). Nevertheless, the fiscal impact 
upon DSH funding, the main source of safety net hospital operating receipts, is projected to be 
curtailed sharply from current levels after 2014 if the PPACA is fully implemented (Kulkarni, 
2011). LSU-run Charity Hospital system facilities already face the loss of DSH funds from DHH 
reallocation and from the “DSH Audit Rule” that came effective at the close of 2010 – the latter 
limited the amount of allowable healthcare services that can be federally reimbursed (CMS 2009; 
Moller 2010a; National Association of Public Hospitals / NAPH 2011; Shuler 2011a).  
               Business conditions for public and non-profit safety net hospitals, many with aging 
facilities and out-of-date diagnostic equipment, are driving many to merge with for-profit 
providers, redesign their healthcare delivery for the consumer marketplace, or face bankruptcy 
and closure (Landsberg 2004; Harrison and Sexton 2004; Darcé and Pope 2006; Stone 2006). 
Yet these healthcare marketplace adjustments may also conflict with their charitable missions, 
leading to their demise as charity safety net providers (Landsberg 2004; Stone 2006). 
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 Baton Rouge’s Earl K. Long is slated to close and merge with Our Lady of the Lake in 2013: (Shuler 2010b). See 
Maginnis (2010); Hasten (2008) (Huey P. Long/Pineville); and Roberts (2010) (Lallie Kemp/Independence). 
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               Once threatened with the potential loss of a half-billion dollars in DSH funds, DHH 
officials and Senator Mary Landrieu scrambled successfully to defend Louisiana’s adjusted 
“Federal Medical Assistance Percentage” (FMAP) to reflect the influx of storm relief funds as 
well as the displacement of thousands of Medicaid recipients to places outside of Louisiana 
(Shields 2011). Nationally known (derisively) as “the Louisiana Purchase” – Landrieu’s 2010 
rider was reportedly added in exchange for her support of the PPACA. This political carve out 
supposedly safeguards LSU Charity hospitals and Louisiana Medicaid until 2014 (Alpert 2011). 
But this experience yet again urges LSU to move beyond its DSH-reliant “old Charity model.” 
               LSU Health Sciences Center Chancellor Dr. Larry Hollier said that he is “absolutely 
committed to keeping us away from the charity model” (Moller 2006e). He noted that while 
Charity for decades “drew young physicians for training and helped keep them in Louisiana to 
practice” LSU’s ability to continue to train seventy percent of physicians that remain in the state 
must have a “magnet” academic medical center “that is financially sustainable” (Griggs 2010). 81 
In this regard, LSU post-Katrina planning is solidly in a continuous line with pre-storm plans to 
diversify its patient base with a greater concentration of insured, healthier patients. 
               Hollier said that shifting from “a Charity model” to “an academic medical center 
model” bypasses the limitations of relying on DSH funding. By attracting more Medicaid 
patients through the PPACA expansion, Hollier said “more matching federal funds (can) come in 
because there’s not a cap on Medicaid eligibility and matching,” unlike DSH funds that are 
capped. Hollier said this will also expand education opportunities since the subject patient base 
will become more varied with its expanded payer mix (Hollier Deposition 2009, pp. 71, 94). 
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 For lists of research breakthroughs made while New Orleans’ Charity Hospital was in operation, see Yakubik, 
Brown, Greer and Lee (2011, pp. 4, 11-13) and LSUHSC (2011): http://lsuhscimportantwork.com/importantfacts.  
More UMC superlatives: Moller (2007d): The UMC would mean “a new emphasis on teaching and research”; 
Barrow (2011b): The new UMC will be “an elite facility that would draw patients from across the Gulf Coast.” 
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               While reaffirming LSU’s public academic medical center status, Hollier elaborated that 
LSU is “changing the entire way the uninsured receive care.” He contrasted the current ten-
hospital state-owned Charity safety net system with LSU’s “public/private partnership” model: 
The state legislature … approved a public/private partnership between 
(LSU/Earl K. Long and Our Lady of the Lake medical centers). The 
result is a fully funded infrastructure, because 98% of the patients will 
be insured. This will dramatically reduce our dependence on state 
health care dollars, and produce a major change in care for the 
uninsured … A similar project replicating that public/private 
enterprise model is underway in New Orleans, where we are building 
a new academic health center which will serve both uninsured and 
insured patients … The private institutions with whom we are 
partnering have service goals that match well with ours. … By 
reducing the hospital funding needs, we can ensure that state dollars 
are available to be redirected to advance education, infrastructure, and 
the development of new treatments (Hollier 2010, p. 17). 
 
               Legnini and Waldman (1999) investigated tensions within academic medical centers 
(AMCs) forced to contend with the private healthcare market environment while upholding their 
once unquestioned mutual provision of medical training and safety net healthcare: 
AMCs play another important function in the medical system – as 
safety net providers. Since the establishment of the first hospitals in 
this country that served the poor exclusively and also trained 
physicians, academic medical centers have provided large amounts of 
free care and have been an important source of access to highly 
specialized services without regard to ability to pay. AMCs have the 
largest pool of physician labor available to care for the poor – namely 
physicians in training (both often located in inner cities…) (p. 1). 
 
               Even LSU’s private healthcare critics suggest that the key for revitalizing LSU’s 
teaching hospital enterprise is to escape the “stigma” of a “Charity Hospital” (Deslatte 2007). 82 
Yet Dr. George Thibault, a professor at Harvard Medical School, said “local history, local 
culture and local relationships” impact desired changes. Thibault said LSU’s challenge will be: 
“Can you create that de novo if you do not have that 100- or 200- year tradition?” (Eggler 2007).  
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 For viewpoints on charity and its association with the stigma of poverty and need: see Fothergill (2003): “The 
Stigma of Charity: Gender, Class and Disaster Assistance” and Frey (2005): “Big Charity in New Orleans.”  
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               In proposing before Hurricane Katrina the consolidation of Charity with University 
Hospitals through the construction of an entirely new medical campus, Adams Management 
consultants heavily predicated their assumptions on discarding the Charity heritage. Yet their 
report reflected both divided sentiments amongst LSU-HCSD and LSUHSC professionals (e.g., 
divided for / against having the new academic medical center in the midst of LSUHSC between 
Charity and University hospitals due to their proximity to Charity, with those in favor desiring 
continuing Charity heritage; those opposed suggesting “the charity stigma may be too strongly a 
part of this neighborhood”) but most decidedly in favor for the Charity Hospital mission and 
clinical research traditions, especially with Tulane clinicians, to remain in place as an ethic. 83  
               Though LSU has largely remain consistent with its plans with regards to the project 
intent as proposed by their consultants, its post-Katrina size has taken a decidedly suburban 
scope and look (moderate-story buildings of five to six floors versus 16 to 17 floors on a smaller 
land footprint before the storm. This is in stark contrast with pre-Katrina plans when the 
preferred option amongst both LSU-HCSD and LSUHSC was the South option. Likewise the 
needs for community consultation in the pre-storm planning was seen as crucial; whereas post-
Katrina, the effective decisions have already been made before public input was even sought.  
               Grimly, the 2005 Adams pre-storm report noted about the possibility of the closure of 
the Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans (MCLNO) combined Charity and University 
hospitals campus if steps were not taken to supplant the hospitals with a new combined facility:  
Other than replacement, the only option would be to ultimately close 
MCLNO and redistribute medical education and patients throughout 
the private hospitals in the region. This would have a negative impact 
on the medical education component due to the absence of sufficient 
clinical mass at any one site, present access challenges for patients, 
and shift the uncompensated care burden to private hospitals and 
physicians (ADAMS 2005, p. 3) 
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 See ADAMS (2005, pp. 95-97). Post-storm LSU UMC comparisons made via http://www.newhospital.org.  
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                Administratively since Hurricane Katrina LSU has made its decision to do away with 
even the institutional memory of Charity. Indeed, LSU has been in a process of ‘rebranding.’ In 
addition to exorcizing all references to “Charity hospitals” LSU has also moved away from 
“LSU Hospitals,” first in favor of “LSU Health System;” and the latest name: “LSU Health.” 84 
Mapped out as part of a “complete logo hierarchy” in order to ensure “consistency” in LSU 
Health brand “(presentation, usage, messages)… strengthening the overall impression of quality 
and professionalism for LSU Health as a whole.” It answers the question: “Why a new identity?” 
Regardless of what we know (about our health system), it’s what 
others know about us that defines our brand. Because a brand is not 
what we say it is. It’s what those who perceive us say it is. That’s why 
it is essential for us to seek relevance and to connect with the public… 
As we update our brand to better reflect who we are and how we are 
perceived in today’s world, it is imperative that we develop a strong 
visual identity to underscore our commitment to the future. Our new 
logo and its various versions, is designed to make a simpler, yet more 
powerful, statement about who we are – one that is both easy to grasp 
and relevant … The new logo serves as the springboard for all of our 
brand identity efforts, the cornerstone around which we will build a 
more relevant and more focused message about who we are at LSU 
Health (LSU Health Graphic Standards 2010, p. 2). 
 
               Changing cultural perceptions however are likely to be a tall order. According to 
national surveys, healthcare consumers prefer “hospital,” associating hospitals with better and 
more comprehensive healthcare than “medical centers,” contradicting rebranding efforts by 
hundreds of hospitals across the nation (Mueller 2011; Jacobson 2011; FierceHealthcare 2011).  
               While LSU has clearly been attempting “a change in culture,” its institutional response 
has taken dramatic shifts since Hurricane Katrina; and in response to Governor Jindal’s DHH 
wholesale privatization of Louisiana Medicaid. Particularly with regards to LSU / Charity’s 
predominately African American patient base “a change in culture” has taken on a decided tone, 
one that may yet result in a rupture that could be greater than the closure of Charity itself. 
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 See http://www.lsuhospitals.org/Media-Relations/Newsletter.htm newsletters and releases (2008, 2010-2011). 
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               As previously noted in this case study, Charity Hospital during both Jim Crow 
segregation and following the Civil Rights movement has often been the only comprehensive 
acute facilities in Louisiana to admit African Americans as patients, albeit with varying degrees 
of actual dignity and personal treatment. And given Charity’s history, substantial numbers of 
poor whites as well as blacks have been Charity system patients. 85 Both Salvaggio (1992) and 
especially Roberts and Durant (2010) extensively document the rise of African American health 
professionals and hospital administrators since the advent of Medicare and Medicaid. Yet 
indications of a shift based on race would arise soon after Charity’s late September 2005 
permanent closure. For comparison, the pre-storm Adams Management report noted: 
Further, MCLNO will expand the volume of insured patients through 
focused programmatic development efforts and a marketing strategy 
centered on building market share of Medicare and Medicaid 
populations within the African American community in the core 
market [of Uptown and Mid-City New Orleans] and New Orleans 
East (ADAMS 2005, p. 2) 
 
               Likewise as noted by McDonald (2002) and reaffirmed in the 2005 Adams report and 
other venues, LSU Shreveport became the professed model before Hurricane Katrina of culture 
change away from New Orleans “two-tier system” of predominately African American poor and 
uninsured going to Charity Hospital and predominately white with health insurance receiving 
care from non-state private and parish hospital district facilities. Beyond the profound rupture 
caused by Charity Hospital’s post-Katrina closing, LSU leadership lodged their contention for 
abandoning Charity Hospital and charity care in racial-code class terms: 
I have a deep feeling that a lot of this is just a way of putting the least 
enfranchised people in a dilapidated, damaged, obsolete structure that 
will allow the upper-class citizens of New Orleans not to be bothered 
by the likes of them. Not in my backyard. Going into Charity Hospital 
is inappropriate, even temporarily, by any reasonable standards. (LSU 
Chief Medical Officer Dr. Michael Butler quoted by Webster 2007).  
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 See Table 2 on p. 106 and Table 3 on p. 107 for Charity Hospital system and New Orleans data by race. 
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               LSU System President John Lombardi wrote to The Shreveport Times proposing “the 
time has come (to modify the newspaper’s) official style regarding hospitals run by LSU.” He 
said their “Charity’ system references are “anachronistic and simply inaccurate”: 
Those who advocate an alternative to the old “charity hospital” model 
have become fond of the buzz word “health care redesign” even 
though they don’t know exactly what the term means or how much 
more redesign will cost. LSU has been quietly “redesigning” health 
care for many years and improving outcomes while living within its 
legislatively approved budget. LSU believes that phrases like “charity 
hospital” and “charity hospital system” is a part of the state’s proud 
heritage and a testament to the compassion conveyed by the Great 
Seal of the State of Louisiana, but they no longer describe the modern 
approach to medical care being pursued by LSU. In fact, no hospital 
among the 10 LSU public hospitals is legally known as a “charity 
hospital.” University Hospital in New Orleans that used to be a part of 
the Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans is now legally 
known as the Interim LSU Public Hospital (Lombardi 2007). 86  
 
               Lombardi also asserted LSU thinks “the term ‘charity hospital’ has become racially 
charged and is tinged with a pejorative undertone that not only negatively skews public debate 
over health care reform, but also feeds perceptions that unfairly challenge the quality of medical 
care delivered by our medical staffs…” (Lombardi, 2007).  
                Yet LSU officials apparently had no problem subjecting returning patients of any race 
to tents and other makeshift accommodations. The closure of Charity Hospital, charged historian 
Dr. Lance Hill, was “the single greatest obstacle to return of the black community…” Hill, 
executive director of the Southern Institute for Education and Research, called LSU and the 
state’s decision to close Charity the cause of “barbarous suffering and pain for people” especially 
in light of the loss of many black middle class jobs with insurance since the storm. Hill also 
suggested Charity’s post-Katrina closure merited more media exposure, suggesting that 
“(closing) the only hospital for the uninsured” elsewhere would not be tolerated (Hill 2008). 
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                Lovell (2011b) concurs with Hill and others that “for poor and African American 
residents who had struggled to return and rebuild broken lives, Charity Hospital’s closure 
reinforced their sense that the city was being redesigned for white, middle class residents and 
tourists.” Unlike many scholars, Lovell details the attempt by Charity’s workers and the U.S. 
military to reopen the hospital in the weeks following Hurricane Katrina – as well as highlighting 
the “broad social movement to reopen Charity Hospital, intensified by LSU’s announcement” of 
the planned razing of the predominately African American working class neighborhood of Lower 
Mid-City for the future complexes replacing Charity and the original VA Medical Center. 87 
               Though this author found no evidence of a pre-planned conspiracy to capitalize on the 
Hurricane Katrina disaster, the catastrophe nevertheless provided a clear opportunity to speed up 
LSU’s pre-storm plans to replace Charity Hospital with a “market-ready” facility. LSU and the 
state could have acted to reopen the hospital in the weeks after the storm. Indeed not to do so 
seemed to belie a “First do no harm” medical principle for its health system and its patients. 88 
And the closure of Charity Hospital set into motion consequences that invariably have had a 
disproportionately negative impact on New Orleans’ African American populace and Diaspora.  
               Skepticism that the new LSU University Medical Center will be different from what 
“white New Orleanians and Louisianans that view Charity as ‘a black hospital’” runs deep, even 
as LSU UMC supporters extol it as the next “destination hospital” for everyone, including those 
with insurance (Barrow 2011d). More disturbingly, by closing Charity Hospital and dispersing 
its core indigent patient base before building its new academic medical center, LSU risked the 
loss of meeting both its safety net healthcare and graduate medical educational missions. 
                                                 
87
 The razing of Lower Mid-City is nearly complete. See Vogel (2011): http://insidethefootprint.blogspot.com/.  
88
 Primum Non Nocere: “Latin for ‘first do no harm.’ A guiding principle for physicians that, whatever the 
intervention or procedure, the patient’s well-being is the primary consideration.” http://medical-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/First+Do+No+Harm.; See also Krause (1997) and Lakhani (2011). 
132 
 
Findings: New Orleans’ Charity Hospital was closed as the result of disaster capitalism to 
supplant its original mission in favor of LSU’s neoliberal academic medical enterprise 
  
               Through the rigorous review of multiple sources of literature and data, this case study 
finds that New Orleans’ Reverend Avery C. Alexander Charity Hospital was closed as the result 
of disaster capitalism in order to supplant Charity’s original safety net mission in favor of 
Louisiana State University’s neoliberal University Medical Center academic medical enterprise.  
               The genesis of LSU’s closure of Charity Hospital began years before LSU assumed 
administrative oversight of Charity and its inspired network of public safety net hospitals. Sorely 
neglected following the 1965 advent of the federal Medicare and Medicaid programs, Charity’s 
previous administrator, the Louisiana Health Care Authority (LHCA), also attempted to abandon 
the Big Charity Hospital campus and the Charity name fifteen years prior to Hurricane Katrina.  
               Under the LHCA’s administration Louisiana’s Charity Hospital system became the 
recipient of special Medicaid disproportionate share hospital (DSH) federal match payments 
designed to support safety net hospitals that treated a disproportionate share of the uninsured. 
Had the funds been distributed as they were intended, the Charity public hospital system could 
have completely modernized and fully integrated with other medical providers statewide to 
address Louisiana’s challenging health indicators long marked by poverty and racial inequality.  
               Rather than transforming the state hospital system, DSH “Medicaid golden goose egg” 
funds became an opportunity for outright avarice and corruption. Charity system hospitals were 
forced to ‘donate’ DSH-eligible funds to the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals 
(DHH). The resulting federal fund matches created up to three times the cost of Charity Hospital 
care to benefit not Charity, but private healthcare enterprises, many of them owned and operated 
by politically-favored allies of the Edwards gubernatorial administration. Charity system 
hospitals subsequently lost out on a total of approximately two billion dollars.  
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               Even after U.S. Congressional curbs were instituted and Charity Hospital system 
administration was transferred to LSU, hundreds of millions of DSH dollars meant for Charity 
hospitals continued to enrich private providers during Governor Foster’s administration. Indeed, 
upon LSU’s assumption of Charity hospitals in 1997, Foster had left LSU without operating 
funds, as $86 million of Charity DSH-generated funds instead went to balance the state budget.  
               Despite Louisiana state legislative attempts to afford LSU a greater ability to command 
its administration of the Charity Hospital system, almost uninterrupted budgetary shortfalls, 
coupled with continuing deferred facility maintenance issues, led LSU to seek the replacement of 
Charity’s flagship hospital in New Orleans in advance of Hurricane Katrina.  Initially LSU tread 
a wholly different path than its LHCA administrative predecessor. LSU had attempted to build 
public, state legislative, then gubernatorial support under the Blanco administration to transform 
the state hospital system on the chassis of the highly-regarded and beloved Charity into a greater 
integration with LSU’s graduate medical education enterprise. Yet its commitment to upholding 
Charity’s safety net mission under Louisiana’s tradition of “Open Access” without regard to 
one’s income had already eroded thanks to LSU institutional means-testing of Charity’s 
medically indigent patients a full two years before Hurricane Katrina struck.  
               The evidence on which this thesis bases its finding of the use of the disaster capitalism 
paradigm in Charity Hospital’s closure begins with LSU’s failure to uphold its responsibilities 
for hospitals statewide under Louisiana’s emergency operations plan in advance and following 
Hurricane Katrina. LSU did erect and staff what was then the nation’s largest field hospital on its 
flagship LSU academic campus in Baton Rouge. 89 Nevertheless both of its hospitals in New 
Orleans as well as all other area hospitals literally fended for themselves to deal with the loss of 
power and sanitation as well as evacuation from a flood-ravaged New Orleans. 
                                                 
89
 See LSU-HCSD (2006e, pp. 5-6) 
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               Following the evacuation of Charity’s patients, staff and their families five days after 
the storm, LSU essentially abandoned its two New Orleans hospital campuses. Charity doctors 
and U.S. military personnel indeed found the hospital’s entrance doors wide open. Following an 
assessment authorized under federal disaster plan guidelines, Charity’s workers, medical 
residents and U.S. military personnel proceeded to ready the facility for reopening.  
               Virtually uninterrupted for weeks in their attempt to revive this critical disaster medical 
infrastructure, the U.S. military was blocked by LSU officials in seeking installation of back-up 
electrical generators to support Charity Hospital’s permanent reopening. LSU officials also 
forced the deactivation of temporary generators which had successfully powered-up key areas of 
the hospital, including its emergency department; and informed U.S. military personnel that 
Charity would not be reopening, so their disaster recovery efforts would have to end. 
               LSU then threatened its workers who were otherwise authorized to restore Charity 
Hospital operations for future medical use with criminal trespass had they remained on the 
premises. This ended the attempt to reopen Charity Hospital and ended its use as a centerpiece in 
the U.S. Army’s Taskforce Katrina’s disaster recovery operation of New Orleans.  
               The State of Louisiana, through its Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH) and 
Office of Emergency Preparedness, blocked FEMA grant expenditures to fully repair Charity 
Hospital. The state returned $340 million in emergency public assistance – the same amount 
LSU-HCSD’s Chief Administrative Officer said it would cost to repair Charity. LSU’s choice to 
use its emergency FEMA funds on the much smaller University Hospital led to the loss of 
healthcare that Charity once provided because of University Hospital’s shortage of clinical 
space. LSU and the State of Louisiana also opted for the use of tents and other makeshift 
facilities, even as the still JCAHO-accredited Charity Hospital was left shuttered. 
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               The resulting loss of Medicare, Medicaid and private insurance reimbursement because 
of LSU’s use of makeshift facilities contributed to the mass firing of over 2,600 medical workers 
and the displacement of hundreds of medical residents, inflaming a public health crisis because 
of their absence. The closure of Charity Hospital and its 160-pre Katrina LSU clinics resulted in 
the loss of medical care, such that many New Orleans residents would remain displaced away 
from the city for a prolonged period of time; and for those who managed to return home, a 
critical shortage of adult acute hospital beds lasted many months.  
               The closure of Charity Hospital meant the loss of the only Level One trauma center on 
the Gulf Coast for more than seven months. This specialized unit also did not return back to the 
city from suburban Jefferson Parish until more than a year after the storm. Charity’s closure, 
particularly of its 128-bed psychiatric Crisis Intervention Unit (CIU), was said to be “the number 
one cause for the mental health crisis” afflicting New Orleans having amongst the nation’s 
highest rates of untreated Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and preventable suicide. 
               Because of Charity Hospital’s closure, healthcare access for all patients in the 
metropolitan area as well as Baton Rouge and statewide was negatively impacted, leading to 
delayed care and medical complications as a direct result of delayed healthcare. Charity’s closure 
also led to millions of dollars in unanticipated expenditures by the remaining reopened facilities; 
with them collectively still unable to replace the medical care that Charity once provided. 
               LSU’s closure of Charity Hospital was also found by international and national human 
rights organizations and bodies as having violated the human rights of internally displaced 
persons. These same human rights organizations found that the demolition of the Lower Mid-
City New Orleans neighborhood, slated for LSU’s new University Medical Center, would cause 
further internal displacement, hardship and human rights violations. 
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               Additional benchmarks of LSU’s disaster capitalized closure of Charity Hospital 
involved the timing of its execution (when the city was virtually emptied of its populace), and 
the lack of meaningful participation in charting New Orleans’ healthcare recovery.  
                Other parties, including the Bring New Orleans Back Commission (BNOB), the 
Louisiana Health Care Redesign Collaborative, the Bush administration, as well as several 
former and current local, state and federal officials also contributed to ensuring Charity’s 
permanent closure. This supplanted Charity’s historic safety net mission with the attempted 
medical neoliberal transformation of its physical, financial, institutional and cultural assets to 
favor private health insurance and corporate medicine. Healthcare became a commodity, rather 
than an inalienable human right, abridging what should have been free following a disaster. 
               The closure of Charity Hospital came at a time when New Orleans was effectively 
emptied and much of its populace was internally displaced, unable to return to the city. Charity’s 
closure disproportionately impacted African Americans through the displacement of its 
predominately African American patient base, house staff and nursing corps, as well as 
significant numbers of hospital physicians, administrators and contract medical vendors.  
               Many healthcare professionals, foundation representatives and medical lobbyists failed 
to acknowledge the attempted reopening of Charity Hospital by its workers and the U.S. military. 
Resulting disaster recovery decisions were made in desired expectation of Charity’s continued 
closure, with the attempted re-allocation of Charity Hospital’s main operating Medicaid DSH 
funds; first towards the purchase of private insurance vouchers, then toward the development of 
a private non-profit clinic network. Planners of these healthcare redesign efforts following 
Charity’s closure also knew in advance that most stakeholders, especially patients, were unable 
to participate in decision-making due to their internal displacement.  
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Epilogue: 
Conflict between LSU and the Jindal administration over LSU-HCSD state budget 
appropriations recalls how broken our healthcare system is without Charity Hospital 
 
               Finding its own Fiscal Year 2011-2012 budget in a mid-year shortfall of $251 million 
due to reduced tax revenues, Governor Jindal’s administration took $50 million in federal DSH 
match dollars generated from the LSU Charity Hospital system and gave the funds to the 
Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH) (Shuler 2012). As a result, LSU-HCSD ordered $34 
million in budget cuts, with $15 million of them imposed on New Orleans’ LSU Interim Hospital 
(Barrow 2012a). LSU-HCSD closed its dedicated stroke unit, the chemical detox unit, and 
nineteen psychiatric beds, including one-fourth of its beds at the former DePaul Hospital and ten 
of twenty beds in LSU Interim’s Mental Health Emergency Room Extension (MHERE). The 
budget cuts have resulted in total reductions of 225 positions, including the actual layoff of 110 
workers at LSU Interim (LSU-HCSD 2012b). Hundreds more health professional layoffs and 
significant service cuts have occurred at six other LSU-HCSD hospitals in Baton Rouge, 
Bogalusa, Houma, Independence, Lake Charles and Lafayette (LSU-HCSD 2012a). 90 
               This reallocation of LSU-HCSD system DSH funding again recalls earlier diversions 
where Charity Hospital system funds earned their enhanced federal match, then were shifted to 
benefit private Medicaid providers. Facing a firestorm of criticism for executing these budget 
reductions, DHH secretary Bruce Greenstein as well as Governor Jindal blamed LSU for wanting 
to overspend its appropriated state budget (Barrow 2012b; Wilson 2012). Greenstein in particular 
charged that LSU’s cuts to vital programs were “meant to mobilize communities and supporters” 
for LSU. Yet billings from non-state hospitals and private Medicaid providers were on pace to 
overspend DHH’s FY 2011-12 budget by nearly $500 million (Barrow 2012d). 
                                                 
90
 Three hospitals under LSUHSC Shreveport also face budget reductions and the loss DSH match funding; but did 
not face major cuts in vital programs or employee layoffs (LSU System Board of Supervisors 2012). 
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               The Jindal Administration has moved swiftly to privatize Louisiana Medicaid delivery 
through its Bayou Health scheme. Medicaid recipients are being forced to choose or be directly 
assigned to five private HMO providers in order to access primary and acute medicine. Enacted 
in the final hours of the 2010 Louisiana State Legislative Session, Bayou Health is scheduled to 
reallocate an additional $2.2 billion of the state’s $6.7 billion in annual Medicaid expenditures to 
private insurance providers. Critics have charged the program will not save the state money, will 
disrupt doctor-patient relationships, and was passed into law through a series of last minute 
obscure state budget amendments that bypassed the full scrutiny of state legislative budget and 
health and welfare committees (Barrow 2011g; Maginnis 2012). Indeed, state Medicaid 
overwhelmingly has become a private enterprise, as private providers are commanding close to 
$5 billion or almost three-quarters of Louisiana’s Medicaid program (DHH 2011, p. A1).  
               Under current cost projections, the only way DHH will be able to balance its corporate 
Medicaid largess within the current fiscal year is through its continued receipt of enhanced 
federal DSH funds generated out of currently budgeted LSU public hospitals (DHH 2012). Yet 
LSU’s response has been curiously muted for an entity which critics and supporters alike have 
long ascribed it “a fourth branch of government” status. 91 Indeed, in response to the Jindal 
administration lambasts of LSU’s poor budget performance, LSU President John Lombardi 
issued a memo requesting LSU system administrators not to complain about the austere 
dimensions of the state budget. As a result, virtually no one publicly commented to the Jindal 
administration’s recent release of its Fiscal Year 2012-13 state budget (Barrow 2012c). Likewise, 
aside from non-judgmental responses to DHH’s obvious re-appropriation of LSU-HCSD’s 2011-
12 budget, LSU officials remain tight lipped (Farris 2012, Barrow 2012d). 
                                                 
91
 See http://louisiana.gov/Government/Executive_Branch/#boardsandcommissions. The LSU Board of Supervisors 
is the largest of Louisiana’s more than 500 appointed boards and commissions. 
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               While DHH Secretary Greenstein smarts from public criticism in response to LSU-
HCSD’s draconian budget cuts, both Greenstein and LSU officials seem all too eager to 
outsource to private providers vital healthcare functions, and indeed graduate medical education 
programs that were once the primary domain of the state-run Charity Hospital system. Though 
Governor Jindal charged that LSU hadn’t made significant budget reductions from the beginning 
of the current fiscal year, LSU’s Executive Budget cuts of key hospital and medical school 
programs leave critics and supporters alike to wonder whether LSU might be more aligned with 
Jindal’s private enterprise-paradise. LSU-HCSD within the 2011-12 Fiscal Year is proceeding to 
complete the elimination of obstetrics, pediatrics, hyperbarics and hospital dentistry programs. 
Documents detail that FY 2011-12 expenditure reductions will reduce LSU-HCSD’s budget by 
$63 million (LSU System 2011, p. 1146). LSU also appears to be on track to meet its 2013 
deadline to shutdown its Baton Rouge Charity Hospital, the Earl K. Long Medical Center.  
               LSU public hospital system workers, patients and the communities in which they are 
located increasingly are becoming bewildered over how state officials could mete out such 
damaging budgetary reductions – and how LSU officials have been largely silent in the face of 
them. Indeed, so many key hospital services are being discontinued that their raison d’être is now 
in question. Most endangered is Louisiana’s once acclaimed Charity Hospital network. 92   
               More than one hundred health and public safety professionals along with current and 
former LSU and Charity Hospital patients demanded the reversal of planned cuts during a special 
meeting of the New Orleans City Council. Councilmember Susan Guidry posed what she called 
“the $64 question … the elephant in the room kind of thing” which had to send a chill onto LSU:   
“How is it that the state is going to be able to run this mega hospital if 
they can’t even run our little Interim Hospital now?” (New Orleans 
City Council 2012). 
                                                 
92
 See Rainier (2012); Decker (2012); American Press (2012a & b); Houma Today.com (2012a & b). 
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               Questions as to whether LSU still has the ability to uphold its 1997 commitment to 
provide safety net hospital and clinical healthcare to the poor and uninsured of Louisiana, much 
less be able to fulfill their graduate medical education transformation with its new University 
Medical Center project cannot be overstated. For possibly the first time in the state’s almost 200 
year history, state general funds are proposed not to be appropriated to support the historic 
Charity Hospital system. Instead, true to the model of governance Governor Jindal has long 
espoused, proposed funding for the LSU Health public hospital system is slated to come from 
non-state government sources. Indeed, the “means of financing” of the proposed Fiscal Year 
2012-13 Louisiana Executive Budget relies heavily on the sale of state assets, including the sale 
of the former New Orleans Adolescent Hospital (NOAH)! And the balance of what would 
normally be constituted with state general fund appropriations for the LSU/Charity system 
proposes to utilize unspent budget balances of close to fifty local and state agencies and support 
funds – including unspent Hurricane Katrina disaster recovery funds under the Gulf Opportunity 
Zone Act of 2005 that were meant for currently unmet needs in New Orleans. 93 
                To add insult to injury, the collected funds purportedly meant to cover the loss of state 
general fund allocations for LSU/Charity public hospital operations are being directed not to 
LSU-HCSD directly, but to a Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH)-controlled 
“Medical Assistance Trust Fund.” This aspect alone suggests that LSU-HCSD again will face a 
raid on their Fiscal Year 2012-13 budget as they experienced during the middle of the Fiscal 
Year 2011-12! Indeed, LSU Vice Chancellor for Health Affairs Dr. Fred Cerise said that LSU is 
anticipating that DHH will take about $50 million in LSU DSH-eligible funds to gain enhanced 
millions of federal matching dollars to benefit DHH’s private medical vendor program. 94 
                                                 
93
 See Louisiana House Fiscal Division (2012); LSU Health (2012); HB 822 Digest (2012). 
94
 See Cerise 2012a and Cerise 2012b; LSU Health (2012). 
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                Drawing from both known medical literature and personal experience, Orleans Parish 
Criminal Court Judge Arthur Hunter, who presides over New Orleans special mental health court 
said “everyone suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder, whether their house flooded or not” 
(Hudson 2009). As confirmed by the public testimony of New Orleans top public safety and 
medical professionals, the current state of New Orleans healthcare is precarious in the wake of 
recent state budget cuts to the LSU Interim Hospital. Several leaders said that a mental health 
system that was just emerging from the closure of Charity Hospital following Hurricane Katrina 
now is threatened with undoing the progress since the storm (New Orleans City Council 2012).  
                On top of severe Fiscal Year 2011-12 budget cuts to LSU/Charity public hospitals, 
their impact, along with the projected loss of state general fund support for the coming fiscal 
year are also anticipated to wallop LSU Health Sciences Center New Orleans graduate medical 
education and allied health programs. Chancellor Dr. Larry Hollier, in a presentation to the 
Louisiana House Appropriations Committee March 27, 2012, said the continued drop in state 
general fund appropriations since 2007 no longer can be mitigated with either federal stimulus 
funding (due to end with the FY 2011-12 budget year) and rising tuition costs on students – and 
not suffer the loss of the same students and LSUHSC health clinical access for patients, both 
levels of which have doubled since Hurricane Katrina. Indeed, unlike its Charity Hospital system 
counterpart, LSUHSC New Orleans said Hollier is facing from about $25 million to almost $37 
million in budget cuts for Fiscal Year 2012-13, based on anticipated reductions in state college 
and university formula funding from the State Board of Regents, and the expected reduction in 
health services at LSU Interim and other LSU/Charity system hospitals, curtailing needed 
graduate medical education residency training opportunities for LSUHSC New Orleans students 
(LSUHSC 2012; Louisiana House Appropriations Committee 2012). 
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                 Whatever the level of severity of LSU/Charity public hospital and LSUHSC New 
Orleans cuts have on local and state healthcare, the manner and timing of their occurrence has 
created an unprecedented reversal in “Louisiana’s way” of state healthcare and social insurance. 
Indeed, unless the Louisiana State Legislature fully asserts its constitutional and budget 
authority, Governor Bobby Jindal will likely make good on his most ideologically neoliberal / 
neoconservative pledge made when he first became Louisiana’s health secretary sixteen years 
ago, to slay sacred cows and transform Louisiana’s”focus from being a [public] health care 
provider to a wise purchaser of [privatized healthcare]” (Shuler 1996b).                     
                 Salvaggio’s (1992) characterization that New Orleans’ Charity Hospital during the 
early and mid-1980s was in its “death rattles,” unfortunately has become far worse today. Mother 
Charity then was at least open. And the former University Hospital, now known as LSU Interim, 
is but at a quarter of its pre-storm capacity, and is likely to face further drastic service cuts.  
                 Charity’s now-shuttered downtown New Orleans hospital, the emblematic anchor of 
iconic populist Huey P. Long’s Share Our Wealth commitment to the poor and dispossessed has 
literally become a shadow of its former self, even at its austere status of the time of Hurricane 
Katrina, to gravely portend to New Orleans a profound lack of an intact healthcare safety net.  
                 Charity and its inspired network of Louisiana public hospitals – a holdover remnant of 
Keynesian New Deal-era policies – have endured through decades of institutional neglect and 
cannibalization of their assets for private medical interests. They now face perhaps their own 
death rattles – by authorities taking advantage of the epic catastrophe sparked by Hurricane 
Katrina through the paradigm of disaster capitalism – to permanently supplant Charity 
Hospital’s historic mission in favor of medical neoliberalism. 
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Left to right: German engineers pump floodwaters from Charity Hospital’s basement; Charity Hospital’s 
Emergency Department, September 21, 2005; Charity Hospital’s Emergency Department, June 1, 2009. 
 
 
 
Appendix A:  
Photographs of attempted reopening of Charity by its workers and the U.S. military 
 
Note: Appendix A provides an internet address to photos taken in 2005 by Charity Hospital 
doctors, workers and members of the U.S. military both in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina, during the three weeks following the storm while Charity was being cleaned out by its 
Emergency Department staff, medical residents, U.S military personnel and other volunteers; as 
well as some follow-up photos taken in 2006 to certify Charity’s condition. Several of these 
photos made up “Exhibit C” of the attempted legal intervention by citizens with an interest in the 
outcome of the FEMA Arbitration; others made up photo booklets distributed to journalists, and 
state legislators to back workers’ demands to reopen Charity Hospital (Moises 2009b, p. 243).  
Save Charity Hospital (dot) com (2011):   
http://www.savecharityhospital.com/content/breaking-news-hospital-appears-clean-after-storm.  
Link to the Foundation for Historical Louisiana / RMJM Hillier‘s “Medical Center of Louisiana 
at New Orleans / Charity Hospital – New Life for a Cultural Icon” film: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_P9RiqkvrIE.  
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Left to right: Stairwell to flooded Charity Hospital basement, early September 2005; floodwaters in 
Charity Hospital basement, undated photo; E-MED tents on floor of Morial Convention Center, fall 2005. 
 
 
 
Appendix B:  
Photographs taken by LSU of Charity Hospital damage; surviving Hurricane Katrina 
 
Note: Appendix B provides internet addresses to photos taken in 2005 on behalf of LSU Media 
Relations and Communications, including ones that made up reports prepared by Adams 
Management (LSU’s lead consultant evaluator of Charity before and after Katrina); and ones 
posted on LSU System websites outlining both the heroism of its medical personnel and what 
they termed the “unsalvageable” damage to Charity and University hospitals following the 
storm. Subsequently University Hospital was reopened in November 2006; while Charity 
Hospital’s main building remains closed (even as its laundry, workshop, powerhouse and chiller 
facility also reopened by November 2006.  
“LSU Health: Five Years After Katrina and Rita” 
http://www.lsuhospitals.org/hurricanes/mclno.shtml; 
http://www.lsuhospitals.org/hurricanes/ourStory.shtml (slideshow of photos);  
“The Loss of Charity” LSU video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8v81bNsMjDc.  
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Appendix C: The movement to Reopen Charity Hospital and Save Lower Mid-City  
 
Note: In part due to my extensive involvement in the launch of the movement to reopen Charity 
Hospital, this thesis was not drafted as a social movement analysis; and is only referenced within 
the context of the stated research propositions of this case study. However, this work would be 
incomplete without noting the organized groupings of this movement – as on several significant 
levels it challenged the closure of Charity Hospital and the demolition of the Lower Mid-City 
neighborhood for the proposed LSU/VA Medical Center. What follows is a chronological listing 
and brief description of the primary organizational actors in efforts to Reopen Charity Hospital 
and Save Lower Mid-City: 
Doctors for Charity. March 2006-Present. Founded out of the efforts of Charity Hospital doctors, 
workers and medical residents who had attempted to reopen Charity Hospital within three weeks of 
Hurricane Katrina, September 2005. http://www.doctorsforcharity.com/about.html.  
The Committee to Reopen Charity Hospital. Circa Spring 2007-Present. Founded as an offshoot of the 
Health Committee of the People’s Hurricane Relief Fund and Oversight Committee (circa Fall 2005) – 
and with remnant activists from the pre-Katrina Advocates for Louisiana Public Healthcare (ALPH). 
Alternately known as the New Orleans Committee to Reopen Charity. http://www.charityhospital.net.  
Advocates for Environmental Human Rights (AEHR). Charity Hospital involvement began in 2006 
(e.g., brought attention of its closure directly to international human rights organizations and to the United 
Nations); Provided legal counsel and lawsuit support (e.g., led the attempted intervention of citizens with 
an interest in the outcome of the FEMA Arbitration, April 2009) as well as community activism. 
http://www.ehumanrights.org/ourwork.html.   
Foundation for Historical Louisiana (FHL). Spring 2006-Present. Charity Hospital involvement began 
following passage of HCR 89 during the 2006 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature (naming FHL 
to coordinate the architectural evaluation of Charity Hospital for possible renovation into a 21st century 
medical center) Responsible for alerting the national historic preservation community, leading Charity 
and the Lower Mid-City neighborhood to be nominated on the list of the Eleven most endangered places. 
http://www.fhl.org/fhl/news/presvalerts/charityhospitalsyn.shtm. 
ACORN / A Community Voice.  Spring 2006-Present. A pre-Katrina ally of Advocates for Louisiana 
Public Healthcare, ACORN and its successor A Community Voice’s Charity Hospital involvement 
continues. http://acommunityvoice.com/index.php?p=1_4_About.  
Health Law Advocates (HLA). Reopen Charity Hospital movement involvement began in 2007. 
Provided legal counsel and lawsuit support (e.g., organized and enlisted law firms to file the first lawsuit 
contesting Charity Hospital’s closure, January 2008). http://www.healthlawadvocates.org/; 
http://www.hlalouisiana.org/.  
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Louisiana Justice Institute (LJI). Reopen Charity Hospital movement involvement began in 2007. 
Provided legal counsel and lawsuit support (e.g., hosted filing of the first lawsuit contesting Charity 
Hospital’s closure, January 2008) as well as community activism. 
http://www.louisianajusticeinstitute.org/programs/health+care.  
C3/Hands Off Iberville. This group of public housing former / current residents and supporters in 2007 
helped revive active organizing to reopen Charity Hospital with sponsored forums of 2006 Reopen 
Charity organizers, leading to the formal designation of the Committee to Reopen Charity Hospital 
(following the dissolution of the People’s Hurricane Relief Fund and Oversight Committee); and remains 
active in partnership (most recently with the Occupy NOLA). http://c3handsoffiberville.blogspot.com/ 
United Teachers of New Orleans. Charity Hospital involvement began in 2007. Was the first union to 
formally endorse and continue in solidarity Reopen Charity Hospital efforts. http://la.aft.org/utno/.  
National Trust for Historic Preservation (NTHP).  Circa 2008-Present. The main national organization 
that has supported through recognition, resources (including staff and funding support) and litigation 
(e.g., NTHP vs. VA and FEMA) the Reopen Charity Hospital / Save Lower Mid-City movement. 
http://www.preservationnation.org/travel-and-sites/sites/southern-region/charity-hospital/;  
http://www.preservationnation.org/resources/legal-resources/additional-resources/ldf-updates/2009-5-
LDF-Update.pdf.  
Lower Mid-City Residents and Business Owners Affected by the LSU/VA.  Circa Spring 2008-2010. 
http://www.squanderedheritage.com/2008/06/25/open-letter-to-mayor-nagin-and-city-council/. 
Save Charity Hospital (dot) Com.  Circa 2008-Present. Website and campaign launched to escalate 
reopen Charity Hospital organizing and saving Lower Mid-City from demolition. Created by Eli 
Ackerman and Jonah Evans with support from the Foundation for Historical Louisiana and Mid-City 
residents and businesspeople. http://www.savecharityhospital.com.  
Smart Growth for Louisiana. Charity Hospital involvement began circa 2008 with their push for 
community participation in the development / expansion of the New Orleans Medical District. 
http://www.smartgrowthla.org/; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cAuw8Ny0eQk.  
Inside the Footprint Blog. September 2009 to September 2011. Founded by Brad Vogel, Fellow of the 
National Trust for Historic Preservation (NTHP). Nearly-complete chronicle of the struggle to save / 
demolition of the Lower Mid-City New Orleans neighborhood in advance of the LSU/VA Medical 
Center. http://www.insidethefootprint.blogspot.com/.  
New Orleans Bio District Watch. Launched in 2011 as an outgrowth of organizing to save Lower Mid-
City; the Mid-City, Gert Town, Zion City and Xavier neighborhoods now face impacts including possible 
demolition due to the designated Greater New Orleans Biosciences Economic Development District (now 
known as Bio District New Orleans.  http://nolabiodistrictwatch.wordpress.com.  
And many others. Efforts by Charity’s workers to reopen Charity Hospital led the recovery of New 
Orleans from Hurricane Katrina. Displaced members of the Katrina Diaspora began organizing for the 
Right to Return to the city. Reopening Charity Hospital was one of the main landmark goals of recovery 
for those supporting the Right of Return of all pre-Katrina residents. This listing is an incomplete list of 
efforts in 2009 to broaden the movement:  http://savecharityhospital.com/content/41-organizations-call-
governor-and-city-leaders-open-process-decision-making-major-hospitals.   
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 Photo of K. Brad Ott in front of Charity: Frank Ayami / New Orleans City Business 
Vita 
Kenneth Brad Ott (K. Brad Ott), an Erie, Pennsylvania native, graduated from New Orleans’ Warren 
Easton High School in 1979. A long-time New Orleans progressive community social justice activist, Ott 
suffered a DVT/Stroke in October 2003 from sitting too long on a trip. Paralysis that occurred was 
substantially reversed (as well as discovery of a congenital heart defect!) thanks to the quick action of the 
Rev. Avery C. Alexander Charity Hospital Emergency Department. Ott served as Legislative Chair of 
Advocates for Louisiana Public Healthcare (ALPH) (2004-2005). He was the appointed Consumer 
Representative for the Region 1 Health Care Consortium (representing the Louisiana parishes of 
Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines and St. Bernard), as well as co-chairing its “Care for the Uninsured” 
subcommittee (2004-2008). Ott was also the co-founder of the Committee to Reopen Charity Hospital; 
and served as its co-chair (2007-2010). Returning to the University of New Orleans (UNO) under a partial 
Louisiana Rehabilitation Services grant, Ott completed his Bachelor of Arts in Sociology in 2007. Ott was 
a Student Research Assistant (2006-2010) for the UNO Center for Hazards Assessment, Response and 
Technology (CHART), an applied research center supporting Louisiana communities’ resilience and 
recovery from disasters under the Participatory Action Research (PAR) paradigm. Ott remained at 
CHART as a scholar-in-residence throughout 2011 and 2012 to complete this Master of Arts thesis. 
Contact Ott at kott@uno.edu; bradott@bellsouth.net or P.O. Box 71221, New Orleans, LA 70172. 
 
 
